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This dissertation comparatively analyzes Habsburg and Ottoman decision-making and 
statecraft during the time of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa (1676-1683). I synthesize 
Habsburg diplomatic reports and Ottoman chronicles to show that during the peace 
negotiations between the Habsburg envoys and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court before the 
second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, the two state’s diplomatic postures were shaped 
by their different court structures. At the end, in response to the religiously-oriented 
explanations of early modern Habsburg-Ottoman confrontations, I argue that the 
monumental encounter in 1683 was a product of the difference between the two states’ 
governmental priorities and administrative mindsets formed within peculiar geopolitical 
conditions. This conclusion transforms our understanding of not only a specific moment 
in 1683, but also of early modern European-Islamic world confrontations by showing that 
a full comprehension of the two world’s relations can be achieved primarily through 
comparative case studies of tangible phenomena, such as governmental structures, 








On the night of May 11, 1683 the Habsburg courier Adam Schönberger arrived in 
Istanbul. He had brought to the Austrian delegation in the Ottoman capital the good news 
of the alliance signed between Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705) and Polish King Jan 
Sobieski III (1674-1696). Johann Giovanni Benaglia, who had joined the Austrian 
delegation as the secretary of the Hofburg’s special envoy Alberto Caprara, noted in his 
journal that “one has to thank the fatherly providence and the diligence of Innocent XI for 
this alliance.” This was a “wonderful treaty from which great benefits sprang.” However, 
he added, “the Turks do not believe the same as they are very haughty; they would not be 
afraid even if the entire Christendom united against them. The truth is,” Benaglia 
remarked, “their arrogance is so high that it will be the cause of their collapse and 
decline.”1 Two months later, the Ottoman armies under the command of Grand Vizier 
Kara Mustafa Paşa (1676-1683) appeared in front of the walls of the Habsburg capital 
Vienna for the second Turkish siege of the city. The grand vizier had forced the Austrian 
delegation to march with the Ottoman main army into the outskirts Vienna.  
                                                          
1 Johann Giovanni Benaglia, Außführliche Reiß-Beschreibung von Wien nach Constantinopel und wieder 
zurück in Teutschland, auch was sich Merckwürdiges dabey zugetragen: deß Hoch-Gebohrnen Grafen und 
Herrn, Herrn Albrecht Caprara etc. etc., welche er als Ihro Römisch-Keyserl. Maj. Extraordinari-
Gesandter und Gevollmächtigter den Stillstand mit der Ottomannis. Pforten zu verlängern, verrichtet 





What the Austrians witnessed as they approached the city was distressing: “As we 
approached, our sorrow multiplied in seeing so deplorable spectacles…We only felt the 
highest displeasure when we saw the [Kaiser]Ebersdorf, the imperial pleasure and 
amusement ground where hunting sessions were held in the falls. The Turks, to the 
memory of Süleyman who had established his pavilion there, knew well to use the 
building for their convenience.”2 The siege began on July 14, but Kara Mustafa Paşa 
failed to capture the city. On September 12, a European coalition army, commanded by 
Jan Sobieski III, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Ottoman forces at the Battle of 
Kahlenberg. Named after one of the hills overseeing Vienna from the northwest of the 
city where the coalition army’s attack on the Ottoman lines had begun, Kahlenberg 
marked the onset of the Ottoman territorial retreat from Europe after three centuries of 
expansion. 
Students of Austrian and Ottoman history know that Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa 
Paşa singlehandedly formulated and executed the Vienna campaign in 1683. 
Accordingly, studies on the grand vizier stressed his ambitious personality and character. 
Indeed, one could read Benaglia’s remarks about the haughtiness of the Ottomans mainly 
as Kara Mustafa Paşa’s arrogance, which had permeated the Ottoman court during his 
term and diffused into the capillaries of the Ottoman decision-making processes and 
statecraft. But, what had changed after the Köprülü grand viziers? Köprülü Mehmed Paşa 
(1656-1661) and his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676) had governed the empire for two 
decades preceding Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of office. Both of the Köprülü grand  
                                                          






viziers gained the admiration of contemporary Ottoman and foreign observers as wise 
and sagacious statesmen. Kara Mustafa Paşa was a protégé of the father Köprülü and also 
the deputy grand vizier during the term of his step-brother, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, with 
whom he had good relations. However, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s governmental style greatly 
differed from his predecessors. This dissertation is the story of Grand Vizier Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s rise to power as a protégé of the Köprülüs and the diplomatic talks held 
between the Habsburg envoys and Kara Mustafa Paşa government during the years 
preceding the Ottoman declaration of war on Austria in 1682.  
I argue that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s administrative style and his ambitious policies 
were a natural derivative of the governmental practices the father and son Köprülüs 
established during the two decades they ruled the empire. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa died, 
Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited an executive power and authority that no grand viziers in the 
history of the empire inherited from his predecessors. The Vienna campaign in 1683 was 
the product of that executive authority which equipped Kara Mustafa Paşa with 
unforeseen decision-making power.  
I employ decision-making to refer to specific moments and processes when the 
the Viennese court, Köprülü grand viziers, and Kara Mustafa Paşa determined policies, 
strategies, and objectives of their governments. Such moment and processes were deeply 
influenced by a certain governmental mindset, or statecraft, which was a function of the 
idiosyncratic historical traditions and geopolitical conditions surrounding each state. 
Within the framework of the present study, the discrepancy between Vienna and 
Istanbul’s statecraft was observed remarkably in diplomatic manners of the two courts in 





received orders to protect the status quo with the Porte as a result of the Monarchy’s 
precarious geopolitical condition. On the contrary, Kara Mustafa Paşa adopted a 
negligent diplomatic attitude toward Austria and Poland’s peace request and welcomed 
Transylvanian envoys despite remonstrations by the Habsburg ambassadors. What 
enabled such a reckless diplomatic manner was primarily the lack of immediate threats to 
the integrity and security of the Ottoman Empire.   
The early modern Ottoman decision-making and statecraft relied on an individual, 
often a grand vizier. Across Europe, no court knew this better than the Hofburg, the 
primary victim of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s pretensions. An Austrian document from the late 
seventeenth century that outlined the duties of the Ottoman courtiers described the power 
of the grand vizier as unmatched in European courts: “Vezir-i azam, or the grand vizier, is 
the prime minister of the Turkish Empire. His power extends so far that his peer at 
another court is unknown. It is true that he has to pay attention to every point 
cooperatively with the Sultan, who at the same time conceded an unlimited power [to the 
grand vizier] through responsibility of his seal and consigned absolutely all imperial 
affairs without exception to his discretion. He is the only state and war minister, the 
superintendent of finances, and in general supervises everything which he then presents 
to the sultan as he sees fit. For the most part, the sultan agrees with him.”3 In fact, the 
relationship between Mehmed IV and Köprülü grand viziers and Kara Mustafa Paşa 
greatly resembled to the relationships between many early modern European monarchs 
and their ministers and favorites. Mercurino Gattinara in Charles V’s court, Cardinal 





Olivares in Phillip IV’s court, or Prince Lobkowicz in Leopold I’s court, all fulfilled 
duties similar to that of the Köprülüs and Kara Mustafa Paşa. 
 
Kara Mustafa Paşa and Vienna campaign 
Much research has been published in English, German, and Turkish about Grand Vizier 
Kara Mustafa Paşa and his motives and goals in undertaking the siege of Vienna in the 
summer of 1683. Except for a few studies, Anglophone and Germanophone scholarship 
on the Ottoman grand vizier has relied almost exclusively on European sources and 
offered only monodimensional analysis from the European and Austrian perspective. 
Moreover, much of that literature was written on or before the tercentennial anniversary 
of the campaign in 1983, when orientalist premises determined the writing of the 
Ottoman history. Accordingly, most historians writing about1683 and Kara Mustafa Paşa 
from the western perspective interpreted the campaign as an attempt to reverse the 
constant decline of the post-Suleimanic Ottoman Empire, which they considered an alien, 
sinister, and irrational polity that succumbed to religious fanaticism. The well-known 
experts of the siege including John Stoye, Thomas Barker, Walter Leitsch, and Zygmunt 
Abrahamovicz frequently alluded in their works to a purported, inherent cultural 
incompatibility between the ‘Christian’ Habsburgs and ‘Muslim’ Ottomans. They did not 
hesitate to embellish their narratives occasionally with verses from the Qur’an about 
martyrdom or war against non-believers to emphasize the religious-motivations of the 
Ottoman court. In addition, their descriptions of the grand vizier were only slightly  
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 “Türckhisch Reichs Ministrorum und Derenselben Dienst Beschreibung” n.d., AVA, Familienarchive, 





modified from Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall’s pejorative portrayal of the grand vizier in 
the fashion of nineteenth-century orientalism, which harbored a little respect for the 
peculiarities of the Ottoman world. Notwithstanding the rigorous research these 
historians have undertaken, today their interpretations are outdated. 
Turkish scholarship has problems too. Despite the historical reputation of the 
grand vizier and the siege of Vienna in Turkish public memory and popular culture, 
modern scholarship about the period is conspicuously meager. There is no monograph in 
Turkish that analyzes the career of Kara Mustafa Paşa within the broader framework of 
early modern Ottoman history or from the onset of the Köprülü regime in 1656. The only 
scholarly study devoted to the grand vizier was an international conference organized in 
2000 by the municipality of the grand vizier’s hometown, Merzifon. Most of the papers 
found a reason to glorify the grand vizier, while few of them highlighted interesting 
secondary details; not one offered a novel interpretation of the era. Moreover, whatever 
has been written so far in Turkish is based solely on Ottoman sources. Despite 
contemporary Austrian documents’ first degree relevance to the siege, no Turkish 
historian to date has made use of seventeenth-century Austrian archival documents.4 As a 
result, just as its western counterpart, Turkish scholarship about Kara Mustafa Paşa has 
been linguistically monodimensional.   
Aside from linguistic insufficiencies and interpretative flaws of orientalist 
historiography, scholarship on Kara Mustafa Paşa in any language has ignored the 
                                                          
4 This shortcoming of the Turkish historiography is but a small fraction of a much bigger deficiency 
regarding the use of the Habsburg imperial archives by Turkish historians in studies of the pre-1800 
Habsburg-Ottoman relations. No modern Turkish university offers even preliminary level training on 






peculiar geopolitical frameworks and administrative mindsets that shaped the inner 
mechanics of the courts in Vienna and Istanbul. Thomas Barker’s Double Eagle and 
Crescent came closer than any other work to accomplishing such a contextualization. 
However, Barker’s attempt to cover entire continental politics in the 1670s was overly 
ambitious and prevented him from crystallizing a comparative perspective on the 
decision-making mechanisms of the two courts. As a result, the decision-making patterns 
and statecraft in each court in the years preceding 1683 have been examined to date as 
two independent phenomena. In reality, the mutual stances of the two courts vis-à-vis 
each other regarding the matters they quarreled about before 1683 must have been 
reciprocally formative on the course of policy-making in each court. Whether there 
existed such interconnectedness between the Habsburg and Ottoman policy-making could 
be revealed only through a comparative examination of Austrian and Ottoman archival 
sources. In this way, a complete narrative that meshed chronologically could be 
established, without the inevitable interpretative gaps that exist when only one half of the 
existing record is examined. 
Such methodological shortcomings of the literature derived from the unique 
paradigmatic trajectories of the Habsburg and Ottoman historiography. Habsburg 
scholarship has long overcome declinist assumptions about the Monarchy. Today, the 
Monarchy’s history is written from a progressive perspective that stresses unity and 
success. The reign of Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705) plays a significant role in that 
progressive storyline. Most historians agree that Leopold I set the groundwork for the 
great Habsburg Empire of the eighteenth century. One of Leopold’s most cherished 





following the victory against Kara Mustafa Paşa’s armies in 1683. That is, the Habsburg 
victory in 1683 represents a critical juncture in the Monarchy’s history, which often is 
assumed to have taken place at the expense of a weakening Ottoman state. Therefore, 
articulating a balanced view of 1683 and the grand vizier from the Habsburg (and 
western) perspective necessitates working against the prevailing tenets of the field. 
Instead, a pejorative image of the grand vizier and the contemporary Ottomans has 
proven much handier and more easily integrated into the Habsburg master narrative.  
Scholars writing from the Ottoman perspective face inherently different, but 
practically similar challenges. Declinist assumptions about the Ottoman state shaped the 
literature much longer than in the Habsburg scholarship, but they have been finally 
discredited at the theoretical level. New interpretative problems replaced the old ones as 
scholars urged to fill the analytical vacuum created by the lack of an overarching 
paradigm. Recent research has definitely charted new territory, but new paradigms 
formulated about the Ottoman Empire noticeably lack consistency and coherency. On the 
one hand, the empire is presented as a pietistic-minded, somewhat of a fanatical entity. 
On the other hand, it is considered a practitioner of proto-democracy in line with 
contemporary western European states. These are inherently contradictory arguments, 
which are not signs of interpretative breadth; they are by-products of a lack of unanimity 
about major historical questions concerning motives and intentions, that is, the very 
nature of the early modern Ottoman state. Such a picture greatly differs from the 
Habsburg field where the scholarly corpus is constructed upon widely shared verdicts 






Among the new approaches to the early modern Ottoman state, the “renewal of 
faith” paradigm most influenced the writing of the second half of the seventeenth century. 
The proponents of the paradigm have hypothesized an Islamic pietistic revivalism in the 
early modern empire. They argued that the increasing number of conversions to Islam 
and catechisms demonstrated that the early modern Ottoman world experienced its own 
version of confessionalization as an extension of contemporary confessional movements 
in Europe. These contentions inspired one historian to argue that the siege of Vienna in 
1683 was a jihad, that is, a religiously motivated enterprise.  
The present research is the product of an endeavor to address these manifold, 
intertwined problems emanating from the linguistic barriers, outdated interpretations, and 
paradigmatic peculiarities of the Habsburg and Ottoman historiography that all too often 
handicapped research concerning Kara Mustafa Paşa. Rather than interpret the launching 
of the Vienna campaign exclusively through the prism of religious motives, I undertake a 
wide-ranging reconsideration of the Köprülü regime and Kara Mustafa Pasha’s grand 
vizierate. Based on a pioneering, comparative analysis of the seventeenth-century 
Ottoman chronicles and Habsburg diplomatic dispatches to and from Constantinople 
between 1676 and 1683, this work surmounts, for the first time, the language barrier. I 
construct a new political storyline that addresses analytical problems emanating from the 
lack of a master Ottoman narrative that covers the second half of the seventeenth century, 
while also surpassing the analytical limits of the mono-linguistic scholarship. The 
discussion sheds light on correlations between Kara Mustafa Pasha’s strategic vision, 
geopolitical circumstances in the Central Europe that encouraged him to redesign the 






Ottoman decision-making mechanism. Ultimately, the project responds to the questions 
of how Kara Mustafa Pasha dealt with potential ally and enemy nations’ envoys and, 
more importantly, how he handled Habsburg envoys’ recurring peace requests before he 
declared war on Austria in the summer of 1682. 
The study consists of three parts. Part One includes two chapters which 
respectively analyze and deconstruct some of the key notions of Ottoman and Habsburg 
historiography. Discussion in these chapters shows that the current scholarship on the two 
states has many erroneous premises, which predispose investigations of the Habsburg-
Ottoman relations between 1650 and 1700 to misleading, reductionist conclusions about 
the motivations and objectives of the two states. The first half of the first chapter focuses 
on assumptions about the abstract motivations of the seventeenth-century Ottoman state. 
In the second half of the chapter, through a primary-source based discussion of Mehmed 
IV’s reign, I illustrate that the Ottoman court, contrary to conventional wisdom, had 
successfully taken advantage of the Kadızadeli movement (not vice versa) to repress 
social restlessness across the capital. The discussion about Kadızadelis may fırst appear 
irrelevant to readers. On the contrary, it is necessary because this section shows that the 
Ottoman court effectively capitalized on the Kadızadeli preachers as a means of social 
control in the capital, rather than succumbing to their religious discourse. The second 
chapter then shifts to Habsburg historiography. The first half tackles the progressive 
assumptions about the seventeenth-century Habsburg Monarchy. Here, I show that the 
progressive attitude in the literature toward the Monarchy which stresses achievements 
over chronic weaknesses, especially during the reign of Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705), 






reconstruction which derives from historians’ nostalgically-oriented retrospection on this 
multi-ethnic empire after experiencing the disasters of nation-states. The remainder of the 
study builds upon the conclusions of Part One.  
Part Two, formed of a single chapter, rejects the dominant trends in the 
Ottomanist literature and reinstitutes politics and diplomacy as analytical tools for 
understanding of the Köprülü regime and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s inheritance of the grand 
vizierate from his two Köprülü predecessors. The emphasis on these oldest themes of the 
historical profession in a bid to contextualize a “great man,” Kara Mustafa Paşa, may 
appear obsolete to some readers. It is worth mentioning that Ottoman history remains a 
significantly understudied field. Even less understood are the dynamics of Ottoman 
political history—presumably the most exploited domain in many other fields including 
Habsburg history—because it has undergone a premature death a long time ago. This was 
an outcome of the diversion that occurred within the recent decades in historical studies 
from the political to the social and cultural, a turn that also influenced the writing of 
Ottoman history before Ottomanists began to revise the declinist narrative. As an 
unintentional by-product of the historiographical fashion that privileged the apolitical, 
Ottomanist scholarship is devoid of paradigms that can shed light onto the inner workings 
of the early modern imperial court, hence the earlier mentioned reductionism and 
contradictory outlook of new approaches. The Köprülü era (including Kara Mustafa 
Paşa’s career) were not immune to the detour from the political, although the period is yet 
to be thoroughly illuminated. One could overcome the lack of a definitive narrative only 
by constructing a new one. To that end, the third chapter starts with a discussion of the 






1656. Afterwards, this section illustrates in the light of contemporary Ottoman and 
European sources how Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (1656-1661) and his son Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa (1661-1676) (re)established a grand vizier-centered regime. To date, historians have 
ignored how the defining characteristics of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand vizierate was 
established by that regime. The latter half of this part illustrates that while the father and 
son Köprülüs meticulously accumulated executive power at the hands of the incumbent 
grand vizier, Kara Mustafa Paşa, as the family’s protégé, climbed to the higher echelons 
of bureaucracy. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa died in November of 1676, Sultan Mehmed IV 
did not hesitate to hand his seal to Kara Mustafa Paşa.  
Part Three consists of three chapters which demonstrate how the unrivaled 
executive power Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited in 1676 led to the catastrophe in Vienna 
seven years later. The discussion in this part is based on the reports of three Austrian 
diplomats whose stay in Istanbul overlapped Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand vizierate. Johann 
Christoph von Kindsperg (ambassador, 1672-78), Peter Franz von Hoffmann 
(internuncio, 1678-79), and Georg Christoph von Kunitz (ambassador, 1680-1683) 
incessantly pleaded to extend peace with the Kara Mustafa Paşa government. Chapter 
four analyzes Kindsperg’s monumental stay in Istanbul. By the time Kara Mustafa Paşa 
took over the sultan’s seal in 1676, Kindsperg was in his fourth year in the Ottoman 
capital. His positive remarks about the grand vizier during the early phases of his term 
greatly influenced the Hofburg’s optimism to renew peace with the Ottoman court in the 
following years. Kindsperg died from plague in 1678 which took the lives of several 
other Austrian diplomats in the same year and the next, severely handicapping Austria’s 






Hoffmann who replaced Kindsperg. Hoffmann’s instruction had included peace 
conditions to be presented to the grand vizier. Neither the internuncio lived long enough 
to see the denouement of his mission nor did Kara Mustafa Paşa was willing to gratify 
Austria’s peace requests. Hoffmann, too, lost his life due to the plague, causing the 
Hofburg to rely on the reports of couriers resident interpreters during much of 1679. The 
following year, Georg Christoph von Kunitz, the former council of the Austrian Oriental 
Company, was appointed as ambassador. His negotiations in Istanbul form the basis of 
chapter six. As the tension between the two courts rose daily and the level of anxiety in 
Vienna amplified about a probable Ottoman campaign into Central Europe, the Hofburg 
decided to reinforce Kunitz with a special-envoy, Alberto Caprara. The latter arrived in 
the Ottoman capital in the spring of 1682. However, Kara Mustafa Paşa, who stipulated 
new and impossible conditions at every next meeting with the Austrian agents, declared 
war on Austria in August of 1682. 
To date, many case studies have analyzed diplomatic negotiations between the 
Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Much of that literature has focused on 
diplomatic encounters in the context of military encounters or their cultural significance 
to show the intensity of exchanges and interconnectedness between two political entities 
that were assumed to be archenemies. However, scholars have ignored whether the 
course of negotiations were illustrative of the two empire’s unique administrative 
mindsets. The present study concludes that the Habsburg-Ottoman encounter in 1683 was 
essentially a result of a contest between two imperial systems which possessed 





































The Ottoman Empire in a comparative perspective: still “comparing apples and 
oranges”5 
 
Systematic comparison is not of interest for most historians,6 while the comparative 
literature on early modern European empires rarely surpasses mere juxtaposition of 
descriptive or quantitative information with few exceptions that are analytical.7 There are 
several reasons. There is a vast scholarship on every empire, but it is difficult for an 
historian to develop a reliable command of descriptive and methodological core in more  
than one historical field. Also a language barrier exists. Empires ruled over multiethnic  
and multilingual territories and have left a copious amount of textual artifacts in various 
                                                          
5 Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires,” Journal of Early Modern 
History 3, no. 2 (May 1999): 105. 
6 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives 
of Comparative History,” in Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and 
New Perspectives., eds. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 1–
30. Both historians favor comparative history as a useful heuristic tool, but the present author benefit from 
critiques they brought to comparative methodology. 
7 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (Yale University Press, 2002); Jane 
Burbank, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); Stephen Frederic Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and 
Mughals (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gábor Ágoston, “Military 
Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History 12, no. 2 (2011): 281–319. Few historians have produced comparative works that are 
analytical: Jack A. Goldstone, “East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart 
England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 30, no. 1 
(January 1, 1988): 103–42; Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires”; Alfred J. 
Rieber, The Struggl or the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of 






languages. Scholarly literature concerning empires is composed of many different 
languages, requiring comparative historians to work with various languages. Yet, few 
historians can work with multiple languages; therefore, most comparative literature relies 
on secondary sources. The greatest challenge for comparative historians of empires, 
however, comes from the multitude of conflicting narratives and paradigms in 
scholarship. 
Philosophers of history have asserted that narratives and paradigms in a historical 
field are direct functions of historian’s ideology, aesthetic and ethical aspirations, and 
unique spatial and temporal context in which historical text is produced. In other words, 
scientific and scholarly narratives and paradigms are produced by highly subjective 
processes.8 A careful comparative reader in Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian history will 
note that narratives and paradigms produced via such subjective processes are abundant 
in each field.9 This is a natural outcome of multi-spatial and multi-temporal formative 
defining moments in the twentieth century which cyclically influenced historians’ 
perspectives on empires. The intense interaction between the Ottoman, Habsburg, and 
Russian empires make these states more worthy of comparison with each other than with 
many others. Nonetheless, it is difficult for a comparative historian to harness factual and 
                                                          
8 Referred as the “linguistic turn”, these ideas were first theoreticized by Hayden White and Roland 
Barthes. For a succinct analysis of the linguistic turn, see Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth 
Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1997), 118–133. Hayden White was more systematic and explicit in his critiques. He categorically 
denied modern historiography, the ability to reconstruct history objectively according to the archival 
evidence. According to White, the process of writing history is “the literary one of interpretative narrative, 
rather than objective empiricism and/or social theorizing.” Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 11. 
9 For a comparative analysis of how progressive approaches gave shape to the studies on the eighteenth 
century Habsburg Monarchy and Russian Empire, see Yasir Yılmaz, “‘Avrupa’dan Içeri 
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interpretive data from such a large body of literature; it is even a greater challenge to 
synthesize diverse arguments from the three fields into a new analytical narrative. As a 
result, reductionist and arbitrary comparisons prevail in comparative studies concerning 
the three empires. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka classified such comparative 
works, which fail to suggest a holistic comparative synthesis, as “asymmetrical 
comparisons”, characterized by sketchy homogenization of historical cases, concepts, and 
paradigms.10  
Recently, a comparative trend has become popular among Ottomanists, who use 
comparative methodology to replace declinist assumptions about the Ottoman Empire 
with a “positive narrative”.11 In the new works concerning the early modern Ottoman 
Empire, many scholars have transferred concepts and paradigms such as ‘Second Empire’ 
or ‘confessionalization’ from European historiography and applied them liberally to 
Ottoman history. However, these recent comparative approaches to the Ottoman Empire 
are also asymmetrical, and, hence, argumentatively flawed. They are not paying attention 
to the considerably distinct historical circumstances in early modern Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the parallels these works draw between Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire are superficial and unconvincing. Ottoman historiography needs its own 
concepts derived from the vocabulary in Ottoman textual artifacts to overcome the 
shortcomings of the decline paradigm and more recent problems posed by the 
asymmetrical comparisons.  
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The first part of this chapter one is a critical analysis of Ottomanists’ most recent 
contributions to the seventeenth century Ottoman studies. The most noteworthy 
commonalities of the works examined are their comparative methodology and religion-
centered approach which have produced various historiographical shortcomings. The 
second part of the chapter first reemphasizes some of the important findings in earlier 
researches on the seventeenth century, because they are ignored in most recent works. 
Then, I propose a new interpretative framework for the role religious movements played 
(especially the Kadızadelis) in the processes of decision-making in the pre-1683 Ottoman 
Empire. 
 
New frameworks for the seventeenth century 
The roots of comparative approaches to Ottoman history may be traced back to Rifa’at 
‘Ali Abou-El-Haj’s seminal essay published in 1991.12 Abou-El-Haj had argued that 
Ottoman historians should look for parallelisms between early modern Europe and the 
contemporary Ottoman Empire. He was motivated by a basic observation: Ottoman 
historiography focused on “peculiarities, oddities, and particularism” of Ottoman history 
and civilization. The decline paradigm, an explanatory framework historians used for 
decades assuming that the post-1600 Ottoman Empire underwent permanent structural 
decay, was an outcome of such an attitude. Abou-El-Haj argued, instead, that historians 
should approach Ottoman history as “comparable and commensurable with other 
histories”.13 Two leading Ottomanists, Suraiya Faroqhi and Cornell Fleischer had written 
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an introduction to Abou-El-Haj’s essay and they generally agreed with the author’s 
proposal. Yet, they had also asserted that establishing trans-regional connections for 
purposes of comparison should not mean universal application of theories and concepts 
designed to define a particular historical phenomenon. Faroqhi and Fleischer asserted that 
historical analysis is reliable only when differences are emphasized. Also they noted that 
one lesson historians learned from the intensive study of Middle Eastern texts was that 
the values and institutions of Renaissance Europe and the Middle East of the same period 
were not necessarily the same.14 
In the last decade or so there has been an increase in revisionist approaches to the 
Ottoman Empire. Many of these studies credited Abou-El-Haj’s works as their inspiration 
and suggested new frameworks built upon his ideas. Such literature has abandoned the 
decline paradigm and charted new territory in Ottoman studies. Most of these recent 
revisionist works have ignored Faroqhi and Fleischer’s cautionary remarks and they took 
Abou-El-Haj’s suggestion at face value. This manner has led to setting of many 
‘asymmetrical’ connections between early modern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. As a 
result, Ottoman historiography—in particular the literature on the seventeenth century—
has become an arena of contesting, and sometimes contradicting arguments.  
Among the recent works, Baki Tezcan’s monograph is the most notable.15 In an 
aspiring grand narrative of the seventeenth century, Tezcan went beyond merely 
opposing declinist assumptions about early modern Ottoman Empire and constructed his 
own version of a positive narrative. A central theme in Tezcan’s line of argumentation 
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was the gradual monetization of Ottoman economy during the sixteenth century. Tezcan 
argued that from the 1560s, an increasing number of commoners (consisting of merchants 
and financiers whom contemporary chroniclers called ecnebis-outsiders-due to their 
social origins), Janissaries, and members of the Ulema (educated class of Muslim legal 
scholars) benefited from opportunities presented by a more market-oriented economy and 
increased their wealth.16 From the late sixteenth century, all of these groups progressively 
translated their wealth into political power in the court, capital, and provinces. According 
to Tezcan, this development pointed to the expansion of a political nation, “the body of 
people who could influence or play a legitimate role in the government.” 17 Such 
developments marked the formation of a new socio-political setting in the Ottoman 
realm, which Tezcan described as the ‘Second Empire’. Between 1603 and 1703, the 
Second Empire saw ten reigns by nine sultans; six reigns ended with forceful 
dethronement, which typically occurred after a capital-wide rebellion and coups d’état 
carried out by different political factions. 18  
                                                          
16 Ibid., 50. 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Quoting Uriel Heyd, Baki Tezcan argued that a decree dated June 1696, marked the fixation of the 
jurist’s law as the supreme legal structure across the Ottoman realm after a century of struggle with kanun. 
Ibid., 27. Literally meaning ‘law’, kanun referred in Ottoman parlance to pre-Islamic, Turkic-Mongolic 
governing traditions. In Ottoman sources, the term kanun is frequently used along with örf (commonly 
observed customs and manners). According to Halil İnacık, the Ottoman legal system was a combination of 
Islamic law on the one hand, and kanun and örf on the other. In practice, however, kanun and örf gained the 
upper hand against Islamic orthodoxy in the early Ottoman state. The two concepts were granting sultans 
the authority to resolve any issue according to longstanding traditions when the dictations of the Islamic 
law were not in favor of the state’s stability. Kanun and örf’s preponderance over Islamic law was a 
peculiarity of the Ottoman legal system. For a survey of Ottoman law, see Halil İnalcık, “Osmanli 
Hukukuna Giriş: Örfi-Sultani Hukuk ve Fatih’in Kanunları [Introduction to Ottoman Law: Customary-
Sultanic Law and the Conquerer’s Law],” Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 13, no. 2 
(1958): 103–26. A recent and concise discussion is available in Karen Barkey's “Political Legitimacy and 







One of the key characteristics of the Second Empire was the expansion of the 
Ulema’s (‘jurists’ as Tezcan refers to them) sphere of influence. The empowerment of 
Ulema and the ‘jurist’s law’ (Islamic rules and  
regulations) developed at the expense of kanun. For decades, these developments were 
interpreted by historians as emblematic of decentralization and decline in the Ottoman 
Empire.  Challenging the established understanding and drawing comparisons with 
English history, Tezcan posed the following question: 
How have we been led to believe that the English Civil War, which led to 
the execution of Charles I in 1649, and the “Glorious” Revolution of 1688, 
which dethroned Charles I’s son James II, were advances in the history of 
limited government, whereas the regicide of the Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim 
in 1648 and the deposition of Ibrahim’s son Mehmed IV in 1687, for 
instance, were simply signs of decline?19 
  
Tezcan’s question was legitimate just as his observations about the new socio-
political setting in the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire. Yet, the legitimacy of his 
terminology was arguable. Tezcan contended that the expanding political nation 
generally consisted of two groups and he devised the early modern Ottoman counterparts 
of English “constitutionalists” and “royalists”.20 He suggested that the expansion of 
political nation marked “proto-democratization” of the Ottoman Empire. He equated 
Ottoman kanun with the feudal law of European middles ages. Finally, he detected 
“modern” and “secular” tendencies in the so-called Second Empire. 21 Most of these 
concepts connote developments which belong to English history, and they have no 
equivalent in the Ottoman realm. Ottoman territories spread over three continents and 
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harbored many social and cultural idiosyncrasies, disowning attributes usually associated 
with European history. Were there modern and secular tendencies, for instance, in the 
seventeenth-century Egypt, Eastern Anatolia, and the Balkans? If not, the parallels 
Tezcan drew between English and Ottoman history is highly questionable, along with his 
broad generalizations and his terminology. 
First, a liberal application of English historical terminology per se to the Ottoman 
history denies the Ottoman Empire any historical peculiarity. Tezcan’s line of 
argumentation indirectly suggests that an Ottoman “positive narrative” can only be built 
upon English historiography. Second, Tezcan undermines the Ottomanists’ ability to 
explain Ottoman history with a vocabulary endemic to the Empire. A recent article by 
Christine Philliou and Alan Mikhail is enlightening in this regard.22 In their survey of the 
comparative literature on empires, Mikhail and Philliou have observed that the Chinese, 
Roman, and British empires are considered by historians as the quintessential imperial 
structures of their historical eras. According to Mikhail and Philliou, in a world-historical 
framework, comparative historians take the existence or absence of these three empires’ 
characteristics in other imperial structures as a measuring unit. In other words, the 
military, political, artistic, and technological conditions possessed by the Chinese, Roman 
and British empires define the contemporaries of these three empires. Mikhail and 
Philliou determined that “such a framework presents a problem for empires that were not 
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the Chinese, Roman, or British, since most of these other empires look like losers to 
varying extents.”23  
By establishing his positive interpretation of the Ottoman Empire on British 
historical terminology, Tezcan has privileged in a like manner the terminology of British 
imperial historiography as the supreme authority for historiographies of other early 
modern empires—in this case the Ottoman Empire. This was definitely not a goal of 
Tezcan. Yet, such a methodology vitiated the authority of his grand narrative which 
otherwise successfully revived political history as a heuristic tool for the Ottoman history 
and illuminated the role different factions (consisting of networks formed by janissaries, 
Ulema and other courtiers) played in Ottoman politics. 
 To overcome the terminological shortcomings of Ottoman historiography, Marcus 
Koller suggested that Ottomanists conduct microstudies focusing on moments rather than 
grand narratives interpreting eras.24 Koller’s suggestion was reasonable, because, 
although Baki Tezcan’s reliance on British historical vocabulary was primarily a stylistic 
preference, it was also necessitated by the insufficiencies of the Ottoman paradigmatic 
depository. Some of the recent contributions to the field which are spatially and 
temporally well-defined may be interpreted as steps taken toward building such a 
depository. These recent works have expanded our understanding of expansion of the 
political nation in the provinces, the effects of making war at individual moments and 
places across the Empire, and the role guilds played in courtly politics. Scholars have 
documented that in provincial towns, such as Ayntab and Aleppo, the population of the 
                                                          






askeri (military) class continuously grew in the seventeenth century; during the process, 
members of the askeri progressively became involved in local economies. The result was 
“civilianization” of the Janissaries.25 One study examined seventeenth century guilds in 
Istanbul and argued that guilds exercised a certain degree of “leverage” in the capital. 
The same study also revealed that “fluidity” defined the inner structure of guilds much 
better than “traditionalism”, which was for long assumed to be the characteristic of 
guilds.26 The increase in the number of such thematically focused studies will eventually 
help the Ottomanist build a vocabulary endemic to the Ottoman history. 
  
“Renewal of faith” literature: Definition and Critique 
Another new paradigm that applied comparative methodology is the “renewal of faith” 
literature. Proponents of such literature argue that Islamic pietistic revivalism dominated 
the social and political processes of the early modern Ottoman Empire. These scholars 
argue that early modern European confessionalization stretched to the Ottoman [and 
Safavid] domains, and, thus, the early modern Ottoman processes of state and social 
formation were involved in the Mediterranean age of confessionalization. Various 
scholars have presented different evidence to substantiate this assertion. According to 
Tijana Krstić, the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam and also the debates found in early 
modern Islamic texts on issues, such as spiritual authority in the Muslim community, 
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25 Hulya Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: Ayntab in the 17th Century (Leiden: Brill, 
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correct forms of rituals, or authenticity of the Qur’an (through a language resembling the 
Catholic-Protestant polemics), have illustrated that European confessionalization theory 
and social disciplining are applicable to Ottoman history. Krstić also claimed that the 
principle of cuius regio, eius religio was upheld in the Ottoman and Safavid empires.27 
Another scholar, Derin Terzioğlu, approved the efforts to rewrite the history of the 
Ottoman Empire with recourse to the concept of confessionalization.28 She agreed that 
the Ottomans were involved in a global experience of early modernity. Terzioğlu 
admitted that there were connections between what she dubbed ‘Ottoman Sunnitization’29 
and “broad-based processes such as state-building, territorialization, urbanization and 
monetization.”30 She contended that situating the so-called Ottoman Sunnitization within 
the European confessionalization provided an analytical framework for studies about 
Islamic pietism, which Ottomanists have traditionally analyzed as a timeless phenomenon 
detached from spatial and temporal historical contexts which likely produced—and 
reproduced—it. Terzioğlu also presented the proliferation of Muslim/Sunnî cathecisms in 
the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire as an indication of Ottoman participation in the 
age of confessionalization. Judith Pfeiffer, too, argued that the confessionalization 
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paradigm was applicable to the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire.31 Her evidence for 
the Ottoman version of early modern confessional polarization was a treatise on Judaism 
composed in 1651 by a Jewish convert to Islam, a text based on a similar treatise written 
a century earlier by the famous Ottoman scholar Taşköprülüzade (d. 1561). Most 
recently, Guy Burak has also agreed with Krstić, Terzioğlu, and Pfeiffer. Burak posited 
that early modern Ottoman rulers belonged to an age where an important duty of 
monarchs was to defend the orthodoxy of their respective religion.32  
Mark David Baer’s proposition that conversion is best understood within 
concentric contexts of war, conquest, and power-relations also echoed the hypotheses of 
the “renewal of faith” literature. Though rejecting in his review of Krstić’s Contested 
Conversions to Islam the broad application of the confessionalization theory to the 
Ottoman [and Safavid] contexts,33 Baer used the concept of “turn to piety”: he alluded to 
a purported Islamic reformism supported by the queen mother, grand vizier, and sultan. 
Kadızadeli pietism (discussed below), Baer argued, was the driving force behind the 
policies of the early modern Ottoman court.34 
The logic that guided the efforts to detect parallelisms between European 
confessionalization and the contemporary Ottoman Empire partially originates in the 
works Reinhard Schulze. He had earlier attempted to establish associations within a 
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larger framework between early modern Europe and the contemporary Islamic world. 
The purported goal of Schulze was to reconstruct Islamic history through a positive 
storyline as a dynamic and creative process to liberate Islam from its position “between 
Scylla and Charybdis”.35 The inspiration of Schulze, who coined the concept of 
“Islamische Aufklärung” and speculated about an Islamic version of modernism, was 
German intellectuals’ ideas on Enlightenment. Schulze contextualized his perspective 
within Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that Aufklärung was not merely an eighteenth 
century phenomenon but a perpetual human experience. He asked “why would Islam not 
experience its own rationalization?”36  Schulze argued that at least the historiography of 
the Ottoman Empire, if not that of entire Islamic world, could benefit from insights 
derived from such reinterpretations and revisions.37 Nonetheless, Schulze’s arguments 
and responses to his seemingly innovative approach did not find their way into the 
Ottomanist scholarship until the proponents of the “renewal of faith” literature draw 
parallelisms between confessionalization Europe and the Ottoman Empire.38 However, 
just as in Baki Tezcan’s grand narrative, the historical links established within the 
“renewal of faith” literature between confessionalization Europe and the contemporary 
Ottoman Empire are historically unproven and show shortcomings. Many major 
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developments that were characteristic of the European confessionalization did not occur 
in the Ottoman Empire.   
Within the European historical framework, the confessionalization thesis argued 
that the intensive processes of early modern confession building and social disciplining 
gradually paved the way for emergence of modern European states. First articulated by 
Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard, the confessionalization thesis produced vast 
literature in which scholars rigorously tested the historiographical applicability of the 
confessionalization thesis to the European history and debated numerous confession 
building processes, periodizations, and terminology.39  
In European historiography it is a well-documented fact that there were numerous 
Reformatory and Counter-Reformatory moments and processes across Europe associated 
with confessions and a myriad of particular names and institutions. In his review of 
Tijana Krstić’s Contested Conversions, Baer alluded to this aspect of European 
confessionalization which used propaganda, censorship, catechizing, preaching, 
pilgrimage, and inquisitions, while also triggering new processes in many areas of social 
and political life.40  
In many studies historians have analyzed these issues. In Bohemia, artists and 
architects served the Habsburg Emperor in creating a Catholic baroque landscape and 
constructing and renovating pilgrimage complexes and monasteries. Conversion to 
Catholicism meant for the Bohemian nobility new paths to climb in the social hierarchy, 
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while those in the lower strata frequently faced confession-based coercion and violence.41 
Jesuit priests took influential positions—often as confessors—in Catholic courts. Many 
personal letters, diaries, and other types of textual artifacts document the finer details of 
relationships between Habsburg, Bavarian, and French monarchs and their Jesuit court 
confessors.42 In Prussia during Frederick William I’s rule (1713-1740), pietist reformists 
were greatly influential. Inspired by the ideas of Lutheran scholars (Phillip Spener and 
August Herman Francke), Halle Pietism became an important catalyzer in the 
institutionalization of the Prussian state. Frederick William I appointed pietists to high 
ranking clerical positions in Pomerania and East Prussia, by making them army 
chaplains. Pietists also established universities and founded small schools outside of the 
countries where they lived.43 Ultimately, confessionalization is one of the most 
persuasively argued themes in early modern European historiography. 
Yet convincing evidence is deficient in the case of the Ottoman Empire and 
Islamic history. Neither the hyperactive Prussian mobilization reinforced by pietistic 
ideals was paralleled in the Ottoman Empire, nor did an authoritarian drive toward 
uniformity occur as in post-confessionalization Europe. On the contrary, seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century Ottoman history is marked with decentralization. Whereas central 
states were gaining ground in Europe, the Ottoman Empire was enduring the challenges 
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of centrifugal forces. Therefore, the argument that the Ottoman Empire partook in the 
Mediterranean age of confessionalization is merely speculation due to the lack of 
evidence showing connections between Islamic pietism and politics, social movements, 
and institutional changes as in the case of Europe. Nevertheless, the present author does 
not deny the Ottoman participation in the age of confessionalization to reinforce the 
historically stagnant and decadent image of Islam and the Ottoman Empire. That image 
does not derive from history itself but rather from the inadequacies of scholarship: the 
poor evaluation and assessment of sources. Due to the unsatisfactory amount of research, 
as Reinhard Schulze noted, the Islamic past still looks like a “bricolage” and has a 
relatively “unlesbares Bild”, whereas European history is “lesbar”. The former needs to 
be further analyzed; whereas the latter, sufficiently analyzed, allows syntheses and 
formulation of paradigms.44 For Ottomanist scholarship, the outcome of insufficient 
primary source analysis is a vicious cycle. Even when source-reading and critiquing are 
satisfactory, contextualizing problems awaits Ottomanists: early modern Ottoman history 
remains a contested research field lacking its own paradigmatic depository. An 
“alternative paradigm that enables the fitting of disparate data into one coherent narrative 
thread” has yet to be produced; hence the experimental connections Ottomanists establish 
between the early modern European historiography and contemporary Ottoman Empire.45 
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Instead, historians have reproduced orientalist assumptions on Islam and religion’s role 
concerning the Ottoman administrative mentality.  
 
Religion and rationality in the Ottoman Empire  
Islam in the Ottoman Empire may be analyzed by various political, social, and cultural 
levels. However, historians have lately shown interest in three phenomena when 
analyzing religion in the Ottoman Empire: (1) the sultans’ devotion to Islam; (2) religious 
motivations behind campaigns and the troops’ devotion to a religious cause; and (3) the 
role of Islam as an abstract source of inspiration and political instrument in what 
historians have dubbed “Ottoman official ideology”. The Kadızadeli movement of the 
seventeenth century has especially attracted interest within the framework of the latter. In 
the following part of this chapter, I first examine the important aspects of the literature on 
Islam in the Ottoman Empire. Then, he suggests a brief template for analysis of the 
interaction between the Ottoman state and seventeenth century Islam.   
A recent study focusing on a sultan’s dubious commitment to the cause of Islam is 
Marc David Baer’s Honored by the Glory of Islam. In a narrative of Mehmed IV’s reign 
(1648-1687) focusing on conversion and holy war, Baer suggested that Islam was the 
most powerful catalyzer in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the seventeenth 
century. Baer disagreed with the widespread application of confessionalization theory to 
the Ottoman Empire, but he also interpreted religion as the major inspiration of the 
Ottoman decision-making mechanism in the second half of the seventeenth century. Baer 
argued that a “turn to piety”, an assumed pietistic Islamic revivalism, informed many 






1649), the campaigns on Poland (1672-1676), Russia (1676-1681), and Austria (1683) as 
well as the purported “Islamization of infidel space” in Istanbul through mosque 
constructions. He also explained the forced conversion of Sabbatai Zevi, a Sephardic 
Rabbi who proclaimed himself the long-awaited Jewish Messiah, and his followers to 
Islam within the framework of Islamic revivalism. 46 One piece of evidence Baer 
presented was the eulogies and glorifications addressed to Mehmed IV by contemporary 
Ottoman chroniclers such as Hajji Ali Efendi who praised Mehmed IV as “deliverer of 
conquest and ghaza [holy war], the powerful sultan who causes fear and dread”, and 
Yusuf Nabi who extolled  the Sultan as “defender of Islam”. Relying on such statements, 
Baer situated the Sultan at the center of an alleged process of what he called “turn to 
piety”.47 Even the hunting expeditions of the “convert maker” Mehmed IV had an 
objective within this regard as the mobile court “served as a travelling conversion 
maker”.48  
Marc Baer also failed to convince his readers due to his speculative reasoning and 
reductionist inferences from contemporary chronicles. The appellations attributed to 
sultans in chronicles are rhetorical patterns used both in Ottoman bureaucracy and by all 
Ottoman men of letters. Any reader of Ottoman documents and chronicles will easily 
                                                          
46 Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 92. Baer’s evidence for “transformation of the sacred space” 
(accompanied with conversion of the self and the conversion of others) was forced deportation of Jews 
from their neighborhoods for mosque construction. The project mentioned was the building of Yeni Camii 
(New Mosque) in Eminönü, also known as Valide (Mother sultan) Camii. Construction was sponsored by 
Mehmed IV’s mother Hatice Turhan Sultan. If one applies the same logic to the settlement of Jews who 
had escaped from Spain to Istanbul two centuries earlier, one can theorize another conversion story, this 
time in favor of Jews or non-Muslims. Yet, that would be too simplistic, overly reductionist, and 
historically inaccurate. For a detailed critique of Baer’s ideas regarding conversion of space, see Kenan 
Yıldız, “1660 İstanbul Yangınının Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlili [Socio-Economic Analysis of the Istanbul Fire 
in 1660]” (PhD diss., Marmara Üniversitesi, 2012), 190–210. 
47 Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 164. 






detect accolades of Ottoman sultans as gazi49 warriors. Through their narratives of 
glorification, chronicle writers assumed a reconstructive role for the rule of the reigning 
sultan. By placing emphasis on such commonplace conceptualizations, Baer gave the 
faulty impression that these concepts are unique definitions and descriptions awaiting 
interpretation. Dominic LaCapra labeled such insufficient questioning of factual or 
referential quality of chronicles and taking the primary sources at their face value as “the 
absolute dominance of the documentary paradigm that stifles the historical 
imagination.”50 
Even when one assumes that the glorification of Mehmed IV was not rhetorical, 
to what extent he deserved the eulogies attributed to him is questionable. The lengthy 
records of the palace chronicler Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa about the Sultan’s 
condition in the fall of 1686, a year before his eventual dethronement, are telling in that 
regard. Mehmed IV, also known as the Hunter, was obsessed by hunting. Even at times 
of war, he is known to have marched with his chief lieutenants only as far as the closest 
hunting grounds and let his viziers command the army.51 By September 1686, the 
Sultan’s obsession had turned into utter disregard for state affairs. During the three years 
following the defeat at the Battle of Kahlenberg on September 12, 1683, the Ottomans 
lost many strategic frontier fortresses in Hungary and Buda was under siege. Polish 
armies had laid siege to Kamaniçe (Kamieniec Podolski) and threatened Boğdan (the 
Principality of Moldavia), while Venice made significant incursions into the 
                                                          
49 An honorary title used for any Muslim from any rank who participated in a war and survived. 
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University of California Press, 2003), 6. 
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Peloponnese. On September 20, 1686, during a hunting expedition the Sultan dispatched 
a courier to scholar Hüseyin Efendi and invited him to lead the Friday prayer at the 
mosque nearby the hunting grounds. According to Silahdar, Hüseyin Efendi gave the 
following response to the courier:  
 
Whoever wants to listen to a sermon comes to the mosque just as ordinary people 
do. A religious functionary is not obliged to obey such an order, whereas the 
Sultan himself is obliged to stop hunting, return to his throne, and engage in 
prayer and worship. The country is in ruins and the servants of God need someone 
to look after them. It is not permissible in Islam to obey a man who disregards 
advice. The true words [told to the Sultan] go in one ear and out the other.52 
 
When the words of Hüseyin Efendi were reported to him, the Sultan ordered 
another religious functionary, Himmetzade Abdullah Efendi, to be brought to the mosque 
to lead the prayer. Abdullah Efendi eventually led the prayer, but he allegedly gave an 
even more vituperative sermon than Hüseyin Efendi as Mehmed IV was listening to him 
in the congregation: 
 
The Ummah (Islamic community) and state has no possessor. Many lands and 
fortresses are lost to enemies; countless mosques have become the houses of 
idols. Alter your deeds and repent. Henceforth, what we need is you to stay in 
prostration and weep until grass springs up from the ground with your tears...For 
long you are in a sleep of heedlessness. Though Sultans are known to go hunting, 
it is not the time as everything has a season.”53  
 
According to Silahdar, the Sultan walked out of the mosque in the midst of the 
sermon and went again to hunting, ordering that no sermon should be preached at the 
mosques where he prayed.54  
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Frustrated at the Sultan’s imprudence and disregard for state affairs, the notables 
among the Ulema, Janissaries, and judges have visited Şeyhülislam (the Grand Müfti) Ali 
Efendi on September 21 to discuss the Sultan’s condition. Such a council among the 
notables could easily lead to the dethronement of a Sultan; Mehmed IV should have been 
aware of the danger. Feeling uneasy about the situation, he skipped hunting on Sunday 
and participated in public prayer on Monday at the New Mosque. However, on Thursday 
of that week, the news arrived and echoed around the that the Habsburg army had 
captured the capital of the Ottoman province of Budin, the most important Ottoman city 
in Central Europe and the Balkans since 1541. In the midst of capital-wide anxiety, 
Mehmed IV ordered counsel to be held at his mansion on the hunting grounds and invited 
the Şeyhülislam and the governor of the capital. However, Şeyhülislam Ali Efendi 
ignored the invitation because the leading members of the Ulema did not have consent for 
him to go to the Sultan’s hunting mansion. Mehmed IV responded to this act of 
disobedience by expelling Ali Efendi to Bursa and appointing Ankaravî Mehmed Efendi, 
the supreme judge of Rumelia, as the new Şeyhülislam. Silahdar continued that to 
dissuade the Sultan from his obsession, the new Şeyhülislam gave up his predecessor’s 
dissenting manner and tried to calm situation by using a conciliatory language when 
speaking to the Sultan: 
 
My Sultan, please withdraw from hunting for a few days and honor with 
your presence the New Palace (Topkapı) or one of the mansions; let the 
gossip quell, then return to your pleasures. Unless you stop hunting, 
people will continue chitchatting [about the current situation]. The public 
is especially downhearted because of the condition at the frontier; 






deter from hunting now] it will be even harder later to repel [the 
discontent] and [the people] will do whatever they want.”55 
 
Everyone should have thought that the Sultan finally woke up from his “sleep of 
heedlessness” when he responded to Ankaravî Mehmed Efendi that he will stop hunting 
and relocate to the shipyards to inspect preparations, which he did on September 30. 
However, as Silahdar noted in an astonishing passage, Mehmed IV, the “gazi warrior 
Sultan”, could only endure being away from hunting for four weeks. On October 28, 
when all high officials gathered for a holiday prayer at Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia), it was 
reported to the statesmen that the Sultan was suffering from restless sleep at nights 
because he was constantly dreaming of hunting. Finally, Mehmed IV was given 
permission to go hunting again.56      
It is not possible for the modern reader to know for sure whether the Sultan and 
the statesmen pronounced word by word the statements recorded by Silahdar. Yet, one 
can reasonably assume that the passages attributed to the Şeyhülislams are representative 
of the feelings of many people in the capital. These passages communicate that Mehmed 
IV ignored state affairs like one would never expect from an Ottoman Sultan. Mehmed 
IV, whom Marc David Baer placed at the heart of a purported Ottoman “turn to piety”, 
was indifferent toward unprecedented threats posed to his realms. Which portrayal is 
more accurate? Can one expect such dramatic change in the attitudes of a Sultan, who 
once supposedly inspired “conversion of space and individuals” and holy war against 
non-Muslims; and then later in his life obsessively immersed in his pleasures and utterly 
disregarded state affairs? Most probably, neither of these images is true. The exaltations 
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addressed at Sultans by chroniclers were typical panegyrics found in any Ottoman 
chronicle. The etiquette of the time required that, as the greatest authority, a Sultan 
deserved respect and glorification of his subjects and the men of letters. Therefore, 
presenting Sultans as spiritual leaders raises many questions.  
While it would be wrong to present the Sultans’ lives as blind devotion to an 
ideological cause, it is at least equally misleading and reductionist to approach early 
modern Ottoman campaigns as religiously motivated undertakings in general. Baer 
called, for instance, the Vienna campaign the “failed final jihad”.57 Such a description of 
the Vienna campaign contradicted previous research which had shown inaccuracy of 
presenting Ottoman wars and the depressing lives of Ottoman warriors as merely spiritual 
adventures. In his authoritative discussion on troop motivation and the role of ideology 
and religious inspiration in Ottoman warfare, Rhoads Murphey asserted that much of 
what has been written on “the role of the Ottoman warrior’s faith and religious 
commitment as a source of his dedication” is “heavily reliant on simplistic cultural 
stereotypes and caricatured fixed assessments of the Ottoman psyche, without the least 
reference to changing historical circumstances during the empire’s centuries-long 
existence.”58 Murphey asserted that this misconception was a result of the assumption 
that jihad was a widespread and infinite responsibility for all Muslims at all times. He 
argued that jihad fully fulfilled its assumed role in the Ottoman Empire when the Muslim 
community itself was at risk of invasion (which did not occur until after 1683).59 
Murphey also noted that, from the sixteenth century on, the Ottoman expansion could not 
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rely on jihad against a Christian foe as the Empire had to motivate both Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects around a “co-operative ethos” that stretched beyond purely Islamic 
ideals.60  
Another significant aspect of Murphey’s observations was his comparison of 
religious faith and religiosity. Murphey argued that the religious faith of the Ottoman 
warrior was a personal matter operating within “the internal realms of conscience and 
belief where it served as the indispensable source both of spiritual values and individual 
piety.”61 Therefore, one can only speculate on the degree of religious motivation of a 
soldier on the battlefield. Ottoman histories contain ample evidence showing that the 
faith of the Ottoman warrior was most probably not such a primal driving factor and, at 
times of war, Ottoman soldiers pursued material goals as did European mercenaries. To 
substantiate his argument, Murphey had referred to chronicler Mevkufatî’s observations 
dated 1692.  
According to Mevkufatî, that year the Ottoman soldiers were deserting the 
imperial camp at the Habsburg frontier on the grounds that the end of the campaign 
season was nigh, but Mevkufatî argued that the main reason behind widespread troop 
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Vienna in 1683.62 For what happened in 1683 and what some of those “delights” were  
one again turns to chronicler Silahdar.63  ` 
In a section where he examines the reasons of defeat at Vienna, Silahdar remarked 
that once the army began its march on Habsburg territory in July, 1683 and soldiers found 
abundant amounts of wine in the outskirts of Vienna, even non-drinkers among them 
started heavily drinking and “committed unimaginable atrocities”.64 Silahdar noted that 
the campaign season had coincided with the holy months in the Islamic calendar, that is, 
Receb, Şaban, and Ramazan; but it did not restrain the troops from committing “adultery 
[and] engaging in homosexual activities”.65 Silahdar added that the horses of the Tatars, 
whom modern Turkish literature traditionally hold responsible for defeat at Vienna 
because of their arguable treachery and failure to stop the advance of the European 
coalition army, were so loaded with booty they had collected from Lower Austria that 
they were totally unable to fight back against the enemy.66 The Ottoman army also 
included tradesmen whose material concerns were obvious, but Silahdar argued that the 
tradesmen were excessively obsessed with protecting their profit. Upon seeing the earliest 
indications of military defeat on the morning of September 12, 1683, the tradesmen were 
the first to desert the army. Their haste to escape and save their goods disheartened troops 
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in the field. Silahdar wished that no such men whose goal was personal gains never again 
join the army.67  
Silahdar’s commentary could be exaggerations formulated to justify the defeat at 
Vienna from an Islamic point of view, but another eyewitness of the siege of Vienna, 
Esîrî Hasan bin Hüseyin, reported corresponding details of material concerns from the 
very beginning.68 According to Esîrî, the fetvâ (the religious opinion) that permitted the 
declaration of war on Austria was grounded on troops’ willingness to launch a new 
campaign and, therefore, it was illegitimate as far as Sharia law was concerned.69 Esîrî 
also noted that as the main army arrived Győr (Yanıkkale) and began its march in the 
enemy territory, the Ottoman troops placed nameplates on the fields to declare possession 
of them, assuming that victory was inevitable.70 Newly captured territories were never 
divided among the Ottoman troops in such a manner and even if Vienna was captured, 
troops would have no control of the allocation of lands.  
A reasonable amount of suspicion about the accuracy of Silahdar and Esîrî’s 
accounts is not out of question, but their narratives of the Vienna campaign in 1683 are 
important. At the operational level, Ottoman wars and troops were not primarily guided 
by spiritual concerns. Spiritual motivations attributed to Ottoman Sultans and soldiers 
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alike were often manufactured by historians and do not necessarily represent historical 
reality. Religion most probably did not motivate Ottoman Sultans more often and 
intensely than it could motivate ordinary people. Perhaps a Sultan’s spiritual education in 
his youth as an heir might have been conducive to occasional high-spiritedness during his 
life, especially after his ascension to the throne. However, in all probability, those were 
short-lived moments which soon succumbed to frailties of human nature. Sultans were far 
from being superhumans who permanently and unconditionally served an abstract cause. 
As with their subjects, they lived lives within the range of normal human condition. 
Moreover, the privileges they enjoyed could often lead to excessive pleasure seeking and 
negligence of the state. As with sultans, troops were humans first who had material 
concerns for themselves and for their families. When all this is considered en bloc, 
explaining an entire era in Ottoman history through the prism of immaterial motivations 
ascribed to a Sultan or his troops is misleading.   
Finally, Murphey’s remark on the use of religiosity by the state raises the 
polemical issue of Islam as the ideology of the Ottoman state. Religiosity, according to 
Murphey, served the state’s needs for “justification of its efforts to extend its territorial 
base by means of expansionist foreign wars”, best observed in the struggle against the 
Safavids during the reigns of Selim I (1512-1520) and Süleyman II (1520-1566).71 Now 
one can turn to the issue of religiosity and examine it separately within the framework 








Islam in the Ottoman state and ideology  
Placing intangible and immaterial religious motivations at the heart of seventeenth 
century Ottoman decision-making mechanism denies, in essence, the power of the 
Ottoman Empire’s ability to act rationally and strategically. Historiographically, 
therefore, explaining the Ottoman seventeenth century primarily through the prism of 
religion will reproduce assumptions of the decline paradigm. However, neither this 
statement nor the above discussion of religious motivations of Sultans and troops denies 
Islam’s essential place in the formation of the Ottoman state. From the beginning of the 
Ottoman Empire, Islam was a central component of the state and the legitimacy of the 
Ottoman dynasty was partially obtained through Islam.72 A seventeenth century 
chronicler, Hüseyin Hezarfen, pointed to this quality of the Ottoman state when he stated, 
“the state was founded on the religious affairs; in fact, religion is fundamental, while the 
state was established as its subdivision.”73 However, despite its centrality, Islam fulfilled 
a different role in the Ottoman case when compared to other Islamic states. As Ahmet 
Yaşar Ocak emphasized, the “Ottoman Islam” was rather instrumental in forming and 
maintaining the Ottoman state rather than being uniformly intrinsic.74 
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak was one of the first Ottomanists to discuss Islam’s function in 
the Ottoman state from a theoretical perspective. Ocak argued that ‘faith’ was the essence 
of so-called “Ottoman official ideology.” Concentric circles of politics and Islam, or state 
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and religion, coalesced into one unit in the Ottoman Empire unlike in other Islamic states 
predating the Ottomans; it gave shape to the Ottoman official ideology.75 Ottoman 
ideologues have legitimized the rule of the Ottoman dynasty by identifying sultans’ 
sovereignty with God’s authority on earth.76 The epithets of Ottoman sultans included 
phrases of Zıllullah fi’l-âlem (shadow of God in universe) and el-müeyyed min indillâh 
(empowered by God). Unlike in ancient Rome, however, sanctity was not attached to the 
person of sultans, but to the power and authority sultans attained and represented after 
accession to the throne.77 Ocak argued that compared to previous Islamic states, members 
of the Ottoman Ulema did not have independent authority. The principal obligation of the 
Ulema was to legally justify the acts of the Ottoman government, illustrating that Islam 
was subdued by state and employed as a political instrument. In Karen Barkey’s words, 
“religion was subordinated to the administrative needs of the state.”78 The most 
remarkable instance of Islam’s utilization by the empire as a political tool was against the 
Safavids. From the early years of the sixteenth century on, the Ottoman central 
government stressed the Sunni interpretation of Islam in the face of increasing 
Safavid/Shia propaganda in Eastern Anatolia. Ocak noted that, in this era, the struggle 
against the Safavids led Ottoman officials to relentlessly seek “unbelievers, apostates, 
and râfızîs” who were practicing Shia doctrines.79  
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The relations between the Ottoman court and Islamic orders also may be 
interpreted within the same context. In Ottoman society, the Ulema was representing 
Islamic ideals in the court, while religious orders were fulfilling the same at the public 
level. The Ottoman court always maintained good relations with religious orders; every 
Ottoman Sultan was believed to be a member of an order since the early decades of the 
Empire.80 If membership of each sultan to a religious order indicated presence of a 
genuine spirituality in the Empire’s governing mentality, the court’s leniency toward 
religious orders in general illustrated the pragmatism of that mentality. Ottomanist 
Cornell Flesicher alluded to this rationalistic quality of the Ottoman administration when 
he asserted that the Ottoman Empire’s rise to its peak of political and cultural greatness 
was a product of “Ottoman heterogeneity”, “nurtured and institutionalized by the ruling 
house”, and the state’s ability to judge nature and quality of various groups by careful 
selection.81  
The pragmatism of the Ottoman state is often encapsulated in the concept of 
istimâlet, a policy of accommodation that practically affected the lives of Muslims and 
non-Muslims in the Empire. In a frequently quoted passage, Halil İnalcık described how 
this accommodationist leniency policy operated: 
 
. . . In the early period of their expansion, the Ottomans pursued, primarily 
in order to facilitate conquest, or to make the indigenous population 
favorably disposed, a policy called istimâlet. It was intended to win over 
the population, peasants and townspeople, as well as military and clerics, 
by generous promises and concessions, sometimes going beyond the well-
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known, tolerant stipulations of Islamic Law concerning non-Muslims who 
had submitted without resistance [aman]. Within this policy of istimâlet, 
the Ottomans, especially during the first transition period, maintained 
intact the laws and customs, the status and privileges, that had existed in 
the preconquest times, and what is more unusual, they incorporated the 
existing military and clerical groups into their own administrative system 
without discrimination, so that in many cases former pronoia holders and 
seigneurs in the Balkans were left on their fiefs as Ottoman timar-
holders.82 
 
A worthwhile application of the istimâlet policy was exhibited in the Ottoman 
court’s ability to preserve a certain degree of closeness with the dissident religious 
movement of Kadızadeli preachers in the seventeenth century. For a long time, historians 
have assumed that, in the second half of the seventeenth century the Ottoman court came 
under heavy influence of the Kadızadeli movement. The use of religion as an explanatory 
tool in the recent literature partially relies on this contention. Rather, I argue that Sultans 
and Grand Viziers alike skillfully exploited the Kadızadeli preachers’ influence on the 
masses in the Ottoman capital rather than being influenced by them, pointing to the 
rationalistic quality of the Ottoman state. 
 
Kadızadelis 
Kadızadelis (lit. Kadızade-lites) were a group of preachers named after Kadızade83 
Mehmed Efendi (d. 1635). Kadızadeli movement never became a school of thought or 
gained institutional character. The term “Kadizadelis” is used to refer to a certain 
interpretation of Islamic matters by a group of Muslim orthodox scholars during the 
reigns of Murad IV (1623-1640), Ibrahim (1640-1648), and Mehmed IV (1648-1687). 
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During the seventeenth century, the Kadızadelis exerted influence on Istanbul’s 
population in three subsequent waves, under charismatic leadership of three preachers: 
Kadızade Mehmed himself, Üstüvani Mehmed from Damascus (d. 1661), and Mehmed b. 
Bistam of Van (known as “Vani” Mehmed) (d. 1685).  
The ideas promoted by the Kadızadelis had been expressed by many other 
Muslim scholars before the seventeenth century, most recently in the Ottoman Empire by 
Birgivi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1573). Birgivi was born in Balıkesir; he later moved to 
Istanbul where he pursued a scholarly career before becoming a teacher in a small village 
in Western Anatolia. Birgivi had rejected even the slightest innovation in religious 
matters. He argued, for instance, that it was by no means permissible to teach Qur’an for 
money or to receive payment for any act of worship. Birgivi also harshly criticized 
establishment of monetary foundations or endowment of cash to these foundations. He 
disagreed with Ebussuud Efendi, the influential Şeyhülislam of Süleyman the Lawgiver 
(1520-1566) about this matter. Ebussuud had allegedly defended the existence of 
monetary foundations, arguing that they produced public benefit through charity.84 
Birgivi’s disapproval of such administrative and social practices did not make the impact 
he would have desired in his own lifetime. Yet, from the early decades of the seventeenth 
century on, his ideas grew to span among a wide group of orthodox preachers in the 
capital. By the mid-seventeenth century, these orthodox preachers established close 
relations with the courtiers. 
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Kadızade Mehmed Efendi was the first among these preachers to establish such 
close connections with the court. Kadızade Mehmed was a fellow townsman of Birgivi; 
also he was also educated in that town by the learned disciples of Birgivi. Following the 
ideals of Birgivi, Kadızade Mehmed also moved to Istanbul. Having decisively 
established his career as a religious instructor in the capital, he was promoted in 1631—
most likely under auspices of Sultan Murad IV—as preacher to Hagia Sophia (Aya 
Sofya), the imperial mosque. Kadızade Mehmed and his disciples argued that the Islamic 
community had strayed from the path of the Prophet.85 Inspired most recently by Birgivi, 
Kadızadeli preachers especially vindicated what they saw as innovation in religion 
(bidʻa). They uncompromisingly attacked Sufis, whose interpretation of Islam focused on 
emotions and inner-dimensions of spirituality. Kadızadelis’ hard-line dismissal of Sufi 
mysticism was essentially a passionate reemergence of an interpretative discord in 
Islamic history between “holy law-defined “orthodoxy” and the methods and claims of 
Islamic mysticism.”86 Kadızadelis condemned singing, chanting, musical 
accompaniment, dancing, whirling, and similar rhythmic movements, all practices often 
attributed to Sufis. Allegedly, the ban on coffeehouses, taverns, tobacco and wine during 
the reign of Murad IV was partially inspired by Kadızade Mehmed.87  
 Kadızadelis and the Ottoman court became even closer during Üstüvani Mehmed 
Efendi’s residence in the capital. Üstüvani’s first appointment in the capital was to Hagia 
Sophia, where the congregation included imperial courtiers and servants from among 
helvacıs (confectioners of sultan), baltacıs (halberdiers), bostancıs (gardeners), and 
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students and other members of Enderun (boarding school inside the palace). Through the 
mediation of these circles, Üstüvani gained a reputation in the court and cultivated such 
intimacy with the Sultan that ultimately he became Mehmed IV’s personal preacher in 
the Privy Chamber (Has Oda), leading him to be mentioned among people as “padişah 
şeyhi”, the sheikh of the sultan.88 In later years, he also preached at Sultan Ahmed and 
Fatih Mosques. Once links to the highest echelons of the court were established, Üstüvani 
and his followers began to seek official approval of their ideas by Şeyhülislam. At least 
one Sufi lodge was shut down in the capital due to the efforts of Kadızadelis, encouraging 
them to increase their pressure on the court—especially on the person of Şeyhülislam—
for a general ban of Sufi activities as well as all religious practices Kadızadelis looked 
upon as innovation. After much effort to persuade the court, Üstüvani and Kadızadelis 
managed to have the Sultan order a meeting among scholars to discuss the ideas of 
Birgivi Mehmed, whose adherence to Islamic orthodoxy had informed the Kadızadeli 
movement from the beginning. Although an imperial order eventually forbade criticism 
of Birgivi and condemned Sufi denominations, the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed 
Paşa (1656-1661) to the grand vizierate marked the end of Üstüvani’s halcyon days. 
Historians often reiterate that Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was not necessarily a supporter of 
the Sufis. Yet, Kadızadelis’ were displaying militant tendencies as they were involved in 
the capital-wide unrest in 1656. An extremely precarious political conjuncture in Istanbul 
forced the septuagenarian Grand Vizier to take firm precautions against the rebels in the 
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capital and the Kadızadelis. As armed Kadızadeli supporters marched toward Fatih 
mosque, Köprülü had Üstüvani and his leading abettors banished to Cyprus.89 
 The relationship between the Kadızadelis and the Ottoman court took a new turn 
with Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s death and the transfer of the sultan’s seal to Köprülü’s son, 
Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676). In September 1659, Ahmed Paşa was 
appointed the governor of Erzurum province. In Erzurum, he met Vani Mehmed who was 
a resident scholar and preacher in the town as well as a keen follower of Kadızadeli ideas. 
Ahmed Paşa, too, had spent the early years of his youth among men of letters—hence the 
appellation Fazıl (virtuous)— and he soon became an admirer of Vani Mehmed. Upon 
appointment as the grand vizier in November 1661, Fazıl Ahmed took Vani with him to 
Istanbul. Soon, like his Kadızadeli predecessors, Vani Mehmed gained the confidence of 
the sultan. As previous Kadızadeli preachers, Vani Mehmed targeted Sufis practices, their 
hospices, and brethren. The bans of wine and tobacco were renewed and enlarged. Vani 
even rejected long-standing Ottoman traditions such as communal prayers at times of 
plague and campaigns against Christian powers, eventually winning the latter issue 
against the Şeyhülislam of the time. Vani Mehmed’s close relations with Mehmed IV and 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa marked the height of the Kadızadelis which lasted until the notorious 
defeat before the walls of Vienna in 1683. Before the Vienna campaign, Grand Vizier 
Kara Mustafa Paşa had Vani Mehmed and a number of other preachers give sermons 
about necessity and rightfulness of a campaign against Austria. Vani Mehmed personally 
participated in the Vienna campaign as the military chaplain and roamed through 
                                                          
89 Madeline Zilfi, “The Kadizadelis,” 259–262. For a detailed survey of Kadızadeli influence on the 






Ottoman trenches during the siege to lift soldiers’ spirits.90 At the end of the disastrous 
defeat on September 12, 1683, Vani faced the same denouement as Üstüvani Mehmed 
with banishment from the capital. He died in Bursa in 1685.91  
 
Kadızadelis: A middle ground between crisis-ridden masses and court?  
The aggressive discourse of Kadızadeli preachers against Sufi practices was also leveled 
at the court. Kadızadelis harshly criticized the extravagance of courtiers and lavish 
assemblies among dignitaries. It should have been much easier for masses to identify 
themselves with the ideas of the dissident Kadızadelis than commitment to dynastic 
ideals. Then, how did Kadızadelis manage to receive protection directly from sultans and 
grand viziers? I propose that rather than being a sign of the state’s capitulation to 
irrational fanaticism, the positive relations between the Kadızadeli preachers and the 
court indicated that an administrative acumen informed Ottoman decision-making 
mechanism; the establishment of close relations between the two parties from the 1630s 
on was not an historical coincidence.  
The rise of the Kadızadelis took place within a specific context. Ottoman 
historiography repeatedly reiterates that the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
of the Empire was marked by social and political turmoil accompanied with institutional 
reform.92 The protracted wars at the turn of the seventeenth century depleted the treasury 
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and set the stage for social change and transformation. The inefficiency of the sipahi 
cavalry in the wars against Safavids (1578-1590; 1603-1618) and the Habsburgs (1593-
1606) forced the Ottoman state to form new corps and recruit levends (landless vagrant 
peasants of Anatolia) as mercenaries equipped with firearms. When not in service, these 
levends were mostly uncontrolled and soon began to terrorize the countryside. In 
response, the central government deployed newly-recruited (and non-devşirme origined) 
janissary corps in provinces for the protection of subjects against the levends. This 
process had two major consequences: First, in major towns and cities across Anatolia, the 
janissary population increased, which eventually led to urbanization or “civilization” of 
the janissaries who neglected their military duties and participated in the local socio-
economic life. That process has more recently attracted interest of the Ottomanists and it 
is yet to be fully comprehended. The second impact of this change was much more 
significant within the court. Selected janissary officers were serving inside the palace as 
sultan’s household troops and many of them held high offices.93 In 1622, the “janissary 
junta”94 in the capital organized a coup which ended with the execution of Osman II. 
Until 1656 the Janissaries remained as the most influential clique in courtly politics.95 
 At a time of such social, political, and economic instability perpetuated by the 
lack of authoritative statesmen, possibly the “populism”96 of Kadızadelis and the 
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influence they enjoyed on the population of Istanbul served as a middle ground between 
masses and the court. Perhaps Murad IV took advantage of Kadızadelis for that purpose. 
The first nine years of Murad IV’s reign97 was marked with the control of Murad’s 
mother Kösem Sultan (1590-1651). Nonetheless, sipahi despots had become the actual 
disposers of state affairs. The sipahis had privileges in tax collection across the empire, 
although they had started to abuse those privileges by the first half of the seventeenth 
century. Not only their population had swollen unnecessarily, but they took over duties 
that did not belong to them, such as collecting tax from sultanic estates. In an effort to 
suppress sipahi power, Murad issued a ferman (imperial decree) in the spring of 1632 and 
annulled the privileges of the sipahis in tax affairs. Upon hearing of the decree, the 
sipahis gathered in Hipodrome square by the Sultan Ahmed (Blue) Mosque. Murad IV 
reacted by gathering an ayak dîvanı, an emergency session of the imperial council with 
ability to talk to the sultan directly and attended by all high-ranking statesmen and 
dignitaries as well as any plaintiff. The Sultan’s goal was to receive support of all 
administrative and religious representatives. He openly criticized sipahi leaders who were 
present at the meeting, and, at the end, he took written allegiance of the members of the 
askerî (janissaries, statesmen and administrators), kapıkulları (sultan’s household troops), 
and the Ulema. Murad IV placed himself again at the head of the decision-making 
mechanism and restored the court’s authority.98 Kadızade Mehmed, too, was present in 
the ayak dîvanı. Given that he had been appointed the preacher of Hagia Sophia a year 
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earlier, clearly he was a popular figure in the capital. Murad IV, who wanted to secure 
support from all segments of Ottoman subjects, protected Kadızade Mehmed and took 
advantage of the latter’s charismatic influence.99 Apparently, the court dictated the 
relationship with the Kadızadelis rather than Kadızadelis’ power. 
There are many other reasons that justify questioning the actual scope of 
Kadızadeli influence on the processes of decision-making within the court. Although the 
seventeenth century Ottoman chroniclers argued that there existed a mutually beneficial 
relationship between Kadızadeli preachers on the one hand and the sultan, statesmen, and 
courtiers on the other, one does not know if the statesmen and sultans had internalized 
Kadızadeli ideas. The facts that the Kadızadeli preachers inspired the closure of 
coffeehouses or prohibition of tobacco do not directly suggest that the statesmen 
incorporated the Kadızadeli ideas into all aspects of administrative affairs. Given that the 
movement’s sphere of influence in the courtly processes of decision-making expanded 
only when charismatic preachers represented them is significant in that regard. The 
movement soon lost its ground. Although it is true that the Kadızadeli preachers 
instigated social turmoil, whatever uproar they abetted was largely restricted to the 
capital and there is no record of Kadızadeli originated social unrest or violence outside of 
Istanbul. One can more realistically suspect widespread Kadızadeli influence on the 
actual decision-making mechanism. Moreover, Kadızadeli preachers were neither 
appointed as Şeyhülislams (Grand Müfti) nor served as Kadıs (judge). These positions 
were usually occupied by the scholars who were trained in the capital and held 
professorial positions, whereas Kadızadelis usually competed for preachership in 
                                                          






mosques. Their provincial origins made Kadızadelis in essence ecnebîs 
(outsiders/strangers), while the Sufi hospices in Istanbul which raised many Şeyhülislams 
and Kadıs were founded decades ago and operated under protection of the Ottoman 
dynasty.  
 Comparative studies will continue to enrich historical perception, but historians 
should be careful about the pitfalls of “asymmetric comparisons”. To avoid arbitrary and 
reductionist comparisons while building up a “positive narrative” of the Ottoman 
seventeenth century, Ottomanists should turn back to Ottoman textual artifacts. This is 
not to replicate the narrative in those sources which has actually once played a part in the 
formation of the decline paradigm. It is needed to enter a dialogue about the Ottoman past 
in the Ottomans’ own language and with their own vocabulary. Any direct application of 
foreign conceptualizations to Ottoman history will create new paradigmatic debates in the 
literature. More than any other historian, Baki Tezcan has come closer to producing a 
new storyline that illuminates macrohistorically the relationship between various factions 
in the capital during the seventeenth century. Yet the use of British historical terminology 
added a teleological dimension to his account, which—intentionally or unintentionally—
suggests in the final stage that a “positive narrative” should be one that flows toward 
Western modernity.  
There are many historical and historiographical reasons to question such a 
proposal, but they should be discussed in a separate context. Any narrative modeled upon 
European/Western historical concepts will reproduce Eurocentrism, while that very 
outcome was almost the sole reason behind Ottomanists’ efforts in the last three decades 






terminology could be and which particular archival collection(s) should have priority 
over the others in building that terminology are beyond the scope of the discussion in this 
chapter. 
 The second half of the above essay is dedicated to the discussion of religion and 
rationality, mainly in response to Marc David Baer’s contention that the second siege of 
Vienna was the “failed final jihad”. The most interesting aspect of recent publications on 
religion in the Ottoman Empire is the historians’ misleading presentation of Islam as the 
absolute source of motivation and inspiration behind political and social developments 
during the seventeenth century. Such an approach generates many problems. First, it 
contradicts the findings and criticisms of earlier scholars, such as Rhoads Murphey and 
others, who have indicated that Islam was subordinated to the state’s interest. Therefore, 
it represents a regression from previous scholarly achievements. Second, it denies the 
Ottoman state apparatus and Ottoman subjects the ability to think and act rationally. A 
full comprehension of both politics and religion in the Ottoman seventeenth century can 
be achieved primarily through the analysis of tangible processes, such as the strategic 
objectives of the state or the personal ambitions and goals of historical actors under 
examination. When one analyzes the state apparatus and statesmen, one is dealing with 
an institutional entity and individuals who typically have certain objectives. Some of 
those objectives are immaterial, but an accurate understanding of immaterial motives is 
only possible through a contextualization within the historical setting that produced them. 
The use of subjective concepts such as “renewal of faith”, “Sunnatization”, or “turn to 
piety” as universal explanatory paradigms will cloud the historical truth. One needs many 










Historians have often emphasized the paradoxical nature of early modern Austrian 
Habsburgs’ purported place as a great European power.100 Throughout much of its 
history, there has been a discrepancy between the achievements of the Habsburg 
Monarchy101 and its limited resources. From the election of Rudolph I (1273-91) as the 
Roman King to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War 
I, the lands ruled by the House of Habsburg stood at the center of European power 
politics. As often reiterated, the Habsburgs owed this somewhat of a privileged position 
observed and protected in many occasions by networks of European powers to their 
unique condition as neither an overly powerful nor too weak of a political entity: 
 
From beginning to end [the Habsburg] Monarchy’s fate was shaped by the 
European practice of balance of power diplomacy, especially by the 
assistance of neighboring states that perceived it to be sufficiently strong 
to help resist more powerful enemies, yet weak enough not to pose a 
serious threat to their own security.102  
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Credited to this widespread perception in early modern Europe, the Habsburg 
Monarchy survived for centuries recurring threats posed by powerful enemies and 
political rivals, violent social upheavals, and severe financial difficulties. Meanwhile, the 
ruling Habsburg dynasty also achieved re-election as emperors in the Holy Roman 
Empire until 1806 except for a short period in the 1740s. The House of Habsburg was 
able to cling to the imperial regalia for so long because of another dimension of the above 
conviction that peace within the Holy Roman Empire, or Reichsfriede, so central to the 
balance of power in early modern Europe, could only be protected by the Habsburgs or 
any other royal house endowed with a similar special condition: hence the famous quote 
“if the Habsburg Monarchy did not exist it would have to be created.”103 The assumed 
special condition of the Habsburgs, however, did not always function to the benefit of the 
Monarchy. In fact, the history of the Habsburg Monarchy is also a history of political, 
social, and cultural crises. 
A very critical episode in this history of fluctuations was the second half of the 
seventeenth century. During much of the second half of the seventeenth century, Leopold 
I (1658-1705) ruled the Habsburg Monarchy and the Holy Roman Empire. From the 
earliest days of his election as the Emperor to the end of his life, Leopold I wrestled with 
many political challenges and fought some of the most consequential wars in Habsburg 
(and European) history. Mainly due to developments that occurred during his rule, 
Habsburg historiography traditionally approaches the years between the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) and the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) as a major era of transition from a 
                                                          






politically confined and insecure position to a new one marked by strong centralized 
government and cultural flourishing. Historians unanimously agree that it was during this 
period that the Habsburgs elevated to great power status through military victories against 
France and the Ottoman Empire especially between 1660s and 1710s. Also, the 
Monarchy achieved ambitious imposition of Catholicism in their lands and the 
construction boom of the baroque style in Vienna and elsewhere in the Monarchy after 
1683. Such observations are based on specific developments in the Monarchy’s history. 
Nonetheless, the contention that the Habsburg Monarchy significantly transformed during 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century in essence replicates a persistent and 
seldom challenged progressive assumption in European historiography that the given 
period was the political and cultural seedbed of what is to come next, the Enlightenment 
and the modern state.104 As I will show in the first part of the following section, many 
Habsburg historians have applied this assumption with little modification to the history of 
the Habsburg Monarchy.  
The most noteworthy military victory the Habsburgs gained during this period 
was arguably against the Ottoman Empire. A European coalition army under command of 
Polish King Jan III Sobieski (1674-1696) crushed the Ottoman Grand Vizier Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s forces on September 12, 1683 in front of the walls of Vienna. The 
disgraceful defeat of the Ottoman army at Vienna was only the beginning of the Holy 
League-Ottoman War (Der Große Türkenkrieg) of 1683-1699 that opened the gates of all 
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of Hungary and southeastern Europe to the Habsburgs. The war also marked the 
beginning of the Ottoman retreat from Europe which lasted more than two centuries. 
The significant victory in 1683 and territorial expansion achieved by 1699 have 
become important landmarks in the Monarchy’s history and historiography, but the 
Habsburgs had tried to avoid this protracted warfare at all costs. Ever since the signing of 
the Treaty of Vasvár in 1664, most decision-makers at the Hofburg had seen France as a 
more immediate concern than the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while directing all of their 
military attention in years preceding 1683 to the Empire’s western frontier due to the 
Dutch War (1672-1679), the Hofburg instructed Austrian ambassadors in the Ottoman 
capital to use all means possible and avert an Ottoman campaign into Central Europe. 
The anxiety of the Hofburg was not unfounded. In the Ottoman capital, a rather balanced 
political atmosphere created by two successive Köprülü grand viziers, Köprülü Mehmed 
Paşa (1656-1661) and his son Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676), had begun to 
change with Kara Mustafa Paşa’s (1676-1683) assumption of grand vizierate.  
When Kara Mustafa Paşa took over the seal of sultan in November of 1676, 
Johann Christoph von Kindsperg (1672-1678) was the resident Habsburg ambassador in 
the Ottoman capital. During his critical stay in the capital of the Sublime State which 
overlapped the first two years of the newly appointed grand vizier’s term of office, 
Kindsperg held peace talks to extend the existing peace between the two states, but to no 
avail. The ambassador, who left Constantinople in late 1678 due to his deteriorating 
health condition, died before he could again see the Austrian capital. The Hofburg 
dispatched five other ambassadors to Constantinople until 1683, including four 






their missions (two even before arriving in the Ottoman capital). Peace was not renewed. 
In the summer of 1683 the Ottoman army laid a siege to Vienna.  
Historians have researched the second Ottoman siege of Vienna both militarily 
and from the perspectives of international politics, but one has yet to illuminate day to 
day details of how hyperactive Habsburg diplomacy operated in the Ottoman capital to 
check Kara Mustafa Paşa’s expansionism. The fact that these diplomatic efforts preceded 
a key battle that lies at the heart of the progressive narrative I alluded to above generates 
further interest about the dynamics of Habsburg diplomacy in Constantinople and how 
the Austrian ambassadors and Ottoman statesmen held talks during Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
grand vizierate. In the second half of the following section, I will discuss in light of 
Ottoman and European primary sources the rise of the Köprülüs to grand vizierate and 
the transition of power from the second Köprülü to Kara Mustafa Paşa. So far, no modern 
scholar has contextualized Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of office within the larger 
framework of the Köprülü age as I render in this section. 
Kara Mustafa Paşa went into the annals of history as a powerful and ambitious, 
but also opinionated and somewhat impulsive figure. Nonetheless, had he assumed grand 
vizierate at any other time in Ottoman history, Kara Mustafa Paşa most probably would 
not have been the same ambitious character he was, because the defining features of his 
grand vizierate were actually established by his predecessors. His ambitious and 
opinionated personality most remarkably observed in his neglect for recurrent Habsburg 
peace requests, his treatment of western envoys, and his eventual undertaking of the 
Vienna campaign were all natural extensions of a government style regenerated by the 






The first Köprülü to assume grand vizierate was Mehmed Paşa who was called by 
contemporaries a sâhib’ül-seyf (lit. ‘master of sword’), a definition used in early modern 
Ottoman chronicles when describing the ideal statesman who is expected to provide 
effective leadership and restore authority. As I illustrate, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s iron 
fist set in when the time was ripe politically and intellectually, yet he was not 
unchallenged at his position. On the other hand, the leverage his son Ahmed Paşa 
possessed in the decision-making mechanism was mostly unchallenged. In light of 
contemporary sources, I show that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had elevated the executive power a 
grand vizier could retain to the highest level. Once the grand vizierate rose to such 
prominence in the decision-making mechanism, the personality of the grand vizier 
became the key determining factor in state affairs, because the restored authority of grand 
vizierate would be conducive to positive outcomes only at the hands of a prudent 
individual. As a result, personalities and characters made the difference especially 
between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his successor, Kara Mustafa Paşa. The former was not 
called virtuous without reason; the essentially unrivaled executive power he so cleverly 
used produced disastrous consequences at the hands of the latter. 
Such contextualization presents a new perspective for understanding the second 
half of the seventeenth-century Ottoman history. Earlier, no modern scholar 
contextualized Kara Mustafa Paşa’s career and analyzed his rise to grand vizierate within 
the larger framework of the Köprülü era. Kara Mustafa Paşa assumed the defining 
characteristics of his administration from his predecessors. In that sense, he was another 
sâhib’ül-seyf, a powerful and unrivaled man of the sword. The Vienna campaign he 






the two men of swords who preceded him. This brings us to the question of whether the 
recently growing religion-based approaches to the Köprülü era that I have critically 
discussed in the previous chapter offer a reliable explanation. The discussion in that 
chapter debunked historical and theoretical shortcomings of assumptions woven into such 
approaches. My analysis in this chapter shows that the government styles of the Köprülüs 
and Kara Mustafa Paşa in essence were the eventual reaction of the Ottoman court to the 
political and social conditions in the pre-1656 period. Therefore, although religious 
motives may have played a part in the developments during the second half of the 
seventeenth century, we can fully understand the pre-1683 Ottoman Empire only through 
a detailed examination of how the administrative patterns of Köprülü era were formed 
and how Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited the two Köprülüs’ governance style.  
Having reframed the Köprülü restoration and the close relationship that developed 
between Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Sultan during Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s term of office, I 
then turn at the end this chapter to the curious case of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand 
vizierate. Based largely on the so-far unexplored finer details of the Austrian diplomatic 
reports regarding Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Ottoman court, I analyze the Ottoman 
decision-making mechanism starting from the Grand Vizier’s assumption of office upon 
the death of Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa in November 1676. During the first two years of 
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand vizierate, Johann Christoph von Kindsperg held talks on 
behalf of the Hofburg and dispatched detailed reports to Austria, while also receiving 
instructions from Vienna on a regular basis. The most striking element in Kindsperg’s 
reports was the changing portrayal of Kara Mustafa Paşa from a friendly personality to an 






descriptions of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s treatment of foreign representatives, in particular the 
Polish envoy Jan Gninski. As well known by experts of this era, the most critical strategic 
miscalculation of the Ottoman court before 1683 was its loss of Poland as an ally—or 
even as a bystander—in case of an Habsburg-Ottoman conflict. Kindsperg’s reports 
provide insightful perspectives regarding Kara Mustafa Paşa’s treatment of Jan Gninski. 
 
The Habsburg Monarchy in the second half of the seventeenth century: a 
historiographical inquiry 
 
Mainstream Habsburg historiography assumes that the second half of the seventeenth 
century and Leopold I’s rule formed the period of incubation for the Heldenzeitalter of 
Austria, the so-called heroic age, more recently called the “Second Habsburg Empire.”105 
I have already mentioned that the political, military, and cultural developments of the 
time inspired such an idea. Indeed, the contention is so strong that a historian who wrote 
an extensive critique of the literature on Leopold I began her book by stating that the 
Emperor’s “personality and the political culture of his reign allowed, and in fact 
demanded, that he be glorified.”106 I argue, however, that this paradigm is a result of 
wishful thinking about the early modern Habsburg Monarchy. Based on an “outcome-
focused”107 writing of history as much as inspired by the Monarchy’s ability to survive  
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many crises in one way or another, the idea is also an extension of an omnipresent 
hypothesis in general European historiography that places the second half of the 
seventeenth century at the heart of purported European progress. In the following section, 
I will discuss this phenomenon and show that the origins of this dominant paradigm in 
modern Austrian historiography may be traced to the writings of Austrian historians since 
the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, both Austrian and Anglo-Saxon 
historiography on the Habsburg Monarchy elaborated interpretative patterns originally 
articulated by earlier scholars. Such an analysis is necessary within the framework of the 
present study, because the progressive tone in the Austrian historiography becomes much 
bolder for the post-1683 Habsburg history and, in turn, affects—directly and indirectly—
how one approaches contemporary Ottoman Empire in general and Kara Mustafa Paşa in 
particular. The discussion in this section is by no means an exhaustive one, yet it is based 
on a wide collection of well-known and influential studies representative of the dominant 
trends in the field of Habsburg studies. 
If one can determine a turning point for early modern Habsburg historiography in 
the twentieth century one could point to the seminal monograph of R.J.W. Evans, The 
Making of the Habsburg Monarchy.108 This book was a revisionist response to earlier 
declinist narratives such as that of Oszkár Jászi, A.J.P. Taylor, Carlyle A. Macartney, 
Victor-Lucien Tapié,109 and others who focused with gimlet eyes on the illnesses of the 
                                                          
108 R.J.W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979). 
109 Oszkár Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1929);A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-
Hungary (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942); C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 (London: 







Habsburg Monarchy and the political miscalculations of Emperor Franz Joseph (1848-
1916) in the nineteenth century. At a time when these declinist arguments prevailed in 
Habsburg historiography, Evans returned to the structural roots of the Habsburg state in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and reconstructed a positive narrative that 
portrayed the Habsburg Monarchy as an administratively efficient and politically 
successful enterprise. He articulated the idea that the central apparatus of the Habsburg 
Monarchy rested upon an effective, functioning triad of dynasty, aristocracy, and church, 
seeds of which had been planted before 1700. Accordingly, there existed an 
administrative cooperation between the court, great magnate families across the 
Monarchy, and a myriad of confessions serving the Catholic cause. Such cooperation was 
efficient even in peripheral regions and generally produced the outcomes desired by the 
dynasty vehemently supporting the Counter Reformation. In probably one of the most 
cited statements of the Habsburg historiography in the last four decades, Evans described 
this efficient system as “a complex, and subtly-balanced organism, not a ‘state’ but a 
mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements.”110 Since its 
publication, R.J.W. Evans’s optimistic perspective about the Monarchy set the stage for 
future conceptualizations about the Habsburg state.  
The origins of Evans’s optimistic narrative, on the other hand, may be traced to 
grand narratives published before the 1970s by leading Austrian historians. These 
historians believed that the House of Habsburg was a major power in European politics 
since the mid-sixteenth century, but also interpreted the Peace of Westphalia as a major 
turning point in the Habsburg Monarchy’s rise to great power status. Indeed, optimistic 
                                                          






appraisal of the history of German-speaking lands was not a new phenomenon. For 
instance, there are remarkable parallels between, for instance, the seventeenth century 
German political theorist Samuel von Pufendorf’s (1632-1694) description of the Holy 
Roman Empire’s administrative system and R.J.W. Evan’s aforementioned optimism 
about the Habsburg Monarchy. Pufendorf, the author of many influential treatises on the 
Holy Roman Empire, had perceived the Reich as a structurally effective polity despite 
acknowledging its problems, just as R. J. W. Evans presented the Habsburg Monarchy as 
an effective political body while also conceding shortcomings of the monarchical system. 
In many ways, the former seems to have set for the latter some form of an exegetical 
precedent in a larger German framework. 
In 1667, Samuel von Pufendorf published his Severini Monzambano Veronensis, 
an analysis of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire (Reichsverfassung) and 
structure of the imperial system.111 Pufendorf’s book was not the first study on these 
matters, yet it was the first to present a sharp criticism through a “brilliant and direct” 
language and had the effect of a “catalyzer” for future debates on the structure of the 
empire.112 Pufendorf’s treatise attempted to answer a simple question: “Was this 
construction [Holy Roman Empire] only a state; and if so, how could it be classified 
among the prevalent theories of state?”113 Apparently, the confederation-like structure of 
the Holy Roman Empire posed a difficult problem even for a contemporary observer. In 
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1648-1806: Föderalistische oder hierarchische Ordnung (1648-1684), vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1993), 
346–350; Peter H. Wilson, From Reich to Revolution: German History, 1558-1806 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 305–306; Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: From the Peace of 
Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648-1806, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 95–
102.   







the original edition of the book Pufendorf had notoriously called the Reich a monstro 
simile, or monstrosity. In a discussion that began immediately after the book’s 
appearance, contemporary thinkers and later generations have fervently discussed what 
Pufendorf might have meant by the term and how one could define and describe the 
actual structure of the Holy Roman Empire. In his later explanations, Pufendorf himself 
stated that he had not used the term to insult the Reich. His intention was to indicate the 
fact that the administrative structure of the Empire was neither a democracy, nor an 
aristocracy, nor a monarchy. It was an irregular body.114 Yet, upon severe criticism of 
contemporary writers, in subsequent editions of Monzambano Pufendorf first modified 
the phrase including the term and then eventually completely removed it from the book.  
Important for the purposes of the discussion in this chapter is that Pufendorf had 
not used the term monstro simile pejoratively, although the term indirectly suggested that 
the Holy Roman Empire was an idiosyncratic entity that was constantly wrestling 
problems emanating from its structural peculiarities. There were strict limitations on the 
royal power due to “capitulations, laws, customs, and by the princes’ increasingly 
vociferous assertion of their rights.”115 In other words, there were legitimate reasons to 
think that the Reich, as an administrative body, was not a functional political entity.  In 
reality, however, Pufendorf was one of the first to declare institutional efficiency of the 
Holy Roman Empire under Habsburg orchestration even though detecting deterioration in 
the post-1648 Empire from a kingdom with clear-cut royal privileges into “an irregular 
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system of fragmented sovereignty.”116 Recently, modern historians have noted that many 
contemporaries and generations of historians had misunderstood Pufendorf whose goal 
was only to stress irregularity of the Reich: Pufendorf had optimistically believed that the 
Reich was capable of further progress and development.117  
The similarity between Pufendorf’s allegorical yet positive approach to the Reich 
in the 1660s and R.J.W. Evans’s optimism about the organizational efficiency of the 
Habsburg Monarchy four hundred years later must be more than a coincidence. Just as 
with Samuel von Pufendorf, R. J. W. Evans acknowledged the idiosyncrasies of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the near-inevitability of political conflicts and social disputes as 
a result of the coexistence of irreconcilable elements and opposing forces which 
necessitated permanent attention of Vienna. In the final stage, however, in a way 
analogous to Pufendorf, Evans preferred to stress progress in the Habsburg Monarchy 
and presented a considerably positive perspective.  
Inspired by R.J.W. Evans’s approach, many Habsburg historians in the last three 
decades have stressed the assumed harmony among the “mildly centripetal” forces of the 
early modern Monarchy as a hard-won success. Historians did not totally ignore what 
Evans called “bewilderingly heterogeneous [political, social, cultural] elements,” but they 
underplayed the administrative challenges emanating from the strained togetherness of 
those elements. Perhaps the ethnic wars and conflicts that followed the fall of empires in 
the early twentieth century led to a nostalgic veneration of multiethnic empires. Nation-
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states have persistently failed throughout the twentieth century in eliminating problems 
emanating from the frenzy of nationalism. Nevertheless, optimistic approaches to the 
Habsburg Monarchy constitute a remarkable phenomenon that awaits interpretation. They 
seem to be more a product of a teleological faith in the progress of the Monarchy than 
only nostalgia. In these approaches, Emperor Leopold I’s rule represents a momentous 
era of transition by the end of which the Monarchy elevated from a regional state to great 
power status.  
Seeking parallels between Samuel Pufendorf and R.J.W. Evans may look 
arbitrary to some readers, but there are more direct and manifest parallels between the 
latter’s positive interpretations and Austrian historians of more recent times, such as 
Oswald Redlich. Redlich was the author of Weltmacht des Barock: Österreich in der Zeit 
Kaiser Leopolds I, followed by a second book analyzing the first four decades of the 
eighteenth-century, namely Das Werden einer Grossmacht: Österreich von 1700 bis 
1740.118 Redlich’s study presented teleological discrepancies from the beginning. First, as 
noted by R. J. W. Evans years later, there was a logical fallacy in the naming of Redlich’s 
books which was most probably “unconscious,” because the ‘world-power’ of a given 
century simply could not be the antecedent of the ‘great power’ of the next. 119 Moreover, 
from the beginning to the end, Redlich’s narrative in the first book negated the title of 
that book with recurring contradictions and arbitrary calibrations. Redlich stated early in 
his book that the bulk of the Habsburg lands were a loosely connected part of the Reich. 
Only after expansion into Hungary and Transylvania and repelling of the Turks at the end 
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of the seventeenth century “emerged a really new, special Austrian Great Power.” 
Acknowledging the important role of contingencies in the longevity of the Austrian state, 
he had written that “without setting such a goal beforehand … the power and grace of 
events and achievements” created the Austrian Great Power.120 However, Redlich 
differentiated the House of Habsburg from the actual Austrian Monarchy. He argued that 
long before the “Austrian Monarchy” became a Great Power after the conquest of 
Hungary, the “House of Austria” was already a political Great Power since the time of 
Charles V due to numerous crowns and lands the family possessed.121 Concerning the 
Austrian Monarchy, by the mid-seventeenth century, one could not yet speak of “an 
Austrian Gesamtstaat or even only implications of a Gesamtstaat idea.” The Monarchy’s 
rise to Great Power status began after the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, which also marked 
the “first developmental phase of Austrian centralized absolutism,” and Austria’s rise to 
“European Great Power” status.122 At the end, such remarks disproved the titles of both 
volumes. If Austria had become a European Great Power by 1699, one simply cannot 
mention of a baroque world-power in the pre-1699 era. Yet, notwithstanding its 
numerous contradictions, Redlich’s study presented an overly optimistic view of the 
Habsburg Monarchy as a powerful political entity.  
A similar optimism and a stronger progressivism prevailed in the grand narrative 
of Hugo Hantsch who wrote a two-volume history of Austria. Perhaps feeling obliged to 
locate Austria’s place in Europe at a time when memory of the Second World War was 
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vivid and post-war ideological divides were still strong, Hantsch boldly stressed Austria’s 
Europeanness: 
 
The Peace of Westphalia is a European affair, and Austria does not stand 
outside of Europe. It is a fateful incidence for the [Holy] Roman Empire 
and Austria that the Erblande does not stand outside of Europe [and] it is 
an elegant member of it. Furthermore, the princely family [of Habsburgs] 
that rules over Austria carries the crown of Christianity, the crown of the 
Reich, and bonds of blood and interest combine the two branches of 
Austria ruling in Erblande and Spain. This House of Austria is therefore a 
first rank European power factor, and it is impossible in historical 
contemplation to dissolve or neglect a connection that history itself has 
created.123  
 
Hantsch wrote, echoing Redlich, that in the post-Westphalian Europe, it was 
Leopold I of the House of Austria who carried as the emperor the “noblest tiara” of the 
west. He added that despite intolerable tensions and crises during much of Leopold’s 
rule, the foundations of the “Monarchia Austriaca” were laid, Erblande’s sovereign state 
status developed significantly, and it achieved security while effectively halting the 
aggressions of the French.124 In addition, Leopold I’s rule coincided with the birth of the 
age of reason and rationalism as spiritual foundations of Europe were gradually 
shattering. Hantsch had no doubt that Austria was also participating in this intellectual 
process which opened for the country the door to a new world and access to hitherto 
hidden sources of life, closing the gap between living streams of Western Europe and 
Austria. In Hantsch’s perspective, the ability of fanatically pious Leopold to fully benefit 
from the advice of scholars such as Johann Joachim Becher, Phillip von Hörnigk, and 
Wilhelm von Schröder especially on economic issues illustrated that the Emperor was not 
                                                          







narrow-minded. Not only the restoration of Catholicism was completed during his rule, 
but he also had initiated the post-1683 building boom in the Monarchy.125    
The similarities between Oswald Redlich and Hugo Hantsch’s perspectives are 
not coincidental. Both Redlich and Hantsch were born in the nineteenth-century 
Habsburg Monarchy. When they were writing their histories of the Monarchy they were 
actually writing national histories of their home country. They both had witnessed how 
the Habsburg Monarchy suffered at the hands of nationalists. Both were students of 
certain teachers and lived in a certain political atmosphere. One of Redlich’s teachers was 
an Austro-German historian, Julius von Ficker. A keen believer in the multi-ethnic 
Habsburg Monarchy as the only viable solution to the spreading nationalist delirium in 
Central Europe, Ficker held a positive approach to the Monarchy’s history. In his well-
known debate with Heinrich von Sybel,126 Ficker stressed more than anything “the 
coexistence and harmony of universal and national duties as the very essence of the 
medieval Reich.”127 A similar perspective was also prevalent in Redlich’s two-volume 
history of the Habsburg Monarchy. When compared to Redlich, Hugo Hantsch was a 
member of a future generation of historians. Yet he was also born in the late nineteenth-
century Monarchy and raised in Bohemia where national strife was intense.128 It must 
have been difficult at the time for an Austro-German intellectual from Bohemia to 
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cultivate a nuanced view of the Habsburg state and not defend it against ambitions of 
numerous nationalities. This necessitated a progressive perspective on the Monarchy’s 
history. Moreover, Hantsch was an ordained Catholic priest which most probably served 
as another factor strengthening his identification with the Monarchy. Eventually, just as 
with Redlich, Hantsch progressively praised the achievements of the Habsburg 
Monarchy. One may suggest, therefore, that the works of Redlich and Hantsch 
transmitted the propagandist and inherently nationalist tones of nineteenth century 
historiography to the twentieth century.   
Adam Wandruszka’s brief book on the Monarchy, published originally in German 
in 1956, built upon a similar grandiose discourse. Echoing Redlich, Wandruszka 
mentioned a purported “Habsburg world power” as early as the sixteenth century, but he 
also venerated Leopold I as the ruler of high baroque. He stressed the relief of Vienna in 
1683 as the great political and military turning point for the Monarchy.129 A comparable 
optimism and progressivism guided Erich Zöllner’s macro-history of Austria published in 
the 1960s.130 Zöllner unequivocally acknowledged the “desperate loosening of the 
Reich’s unity” in the post-1648 period and the diminishing Habsburg influence in 
Germany. However, those were not signs of weakening or decline; rather they signified 
the “shifting of the heavyweight of Austria’s political, military, and financial 
foundations” from Germany to its hereditary lands.131 One could even speak of the 
“victory of [Habsburg] absolutism and Catholicism” after 1648 as Protestant resistance 
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finally broke in the Monarchy. In addition, echoing Redlich and Hantsch, Zöllner argued 
that between 1648 and 1740 Austria attained Great Power status.132 For Zöllner, Austria’s 
emergence as a Great Power was not merely a geopolitical phenomenon; it was 
economic, intellectual, and cultural too. Zöllner’s painstaking analysis discussed in detail 
the mercantilist policies implemented in the second half of the century in handcrafts, 
mines, forestry and many other manufacturing and production sectors as well as 
population movements and settlement. Further passages on scholarly, scientific, and 
architectural accomplishments of the time produced a portrayal the Monarchy in the 
second half of the seventeenth century as a land of achievements.133 Zöllner’s history was 
also progressive and optimistic. Yet it refined earlier approaches and assumptions in a 
language accessible to general readership. The book could be interpreted as the most 
complete single-volume modern history of the Monarchy published in German before the 
1960s.  
The optimism that Austrian historians have inherited from earlier generations 
became the norm in the Habsburg studies by the 1960s, determining the general tone of 
the Habsburg scholarship in and outside of Austria in subsequent years. Today, one can 
read similar ideas in the writing of Austrian scholars of later generations.134 As implied in 
R. J. W. Evans’s memorable circumlocution cited earlier and as seen in narratives of 
Austrian historians, Habsburg historiography has generally acknowledged the 
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idiosyncratic nature of the Monarchy emanating from political, social, and economic 
conflicts of interest among different lands and groups of people. Although these conflicts 
were rarely healed throughout the history of the Monarchy, optimism and progressivism 
often overcame criticism, especially for the second half of the seventeenth century.  
A noteworthy example showing that progressivism in Habsburg historiography 
was becoming normal outside of Austria was French historian Victor Lucien Tapié’s 
grand narrative. In his chapter concerning the period in question (1648-1683), Tapié 
asked whether the period was a “dark age,” as referred in Czech historiography, or an era 
of “baroque glory.”135 Tapié was a scholar of baroque and an expert of Bohemian 
baroque. To him, the answer was obvious: the artistic manifestations of the time 
illustrated the glory of the baroque age. Tapié presented the Bohemian baroque mostly as 
a timeless phenomenon alleviating the burdens of tragedies, miseries, revolts, and 
inequalities. Such evils “may have been more acute in [Danubian] countries,” he wrote, 
“but, even so, they serve as the measure by which to judge the compensations provided in 
the Baroque ideal.” Tapié agreed that 1683 was a turning-point for the Monarchy, yet he 
put forth a different claim. The evolution of the Monarchy after that year was not visible 
in economic and political developments or great military victories; it was reflected in 
triumphal Danubian baroque art.136 Decades later, another French historian and a student 
of Tapié, Jean Bérenger, repeated his adviser’s arguments and highlighted baroque’s 
centrality in the achievements of the early modern Habsburg Monarchy. The victory at 
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Kahlenberg highlighted “the end of the Turkish peril” and the beginning of “economic 
prosperity and the rebuilding of the capital on new foundations.”137    
Anglo-Saxon historiography concerning the early modern Habsburgs has also 
followed suit and applied a progressive and optimistic approach. Robert Kann’s grand 
narrative interpreted the period between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the end of 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1748) as a period of “evolution and assertion” for 
the Monarchy.138 The disorganized structure of Kann’s narrative prevented the book from 
making an impact as R. J. W. Evans would enjoy a few years later. Assumptions woven 
into his narrative were not unlike that of earlier histories: it was under Leopold I—
especially after the Turkish and French wars in the last three decades of the seventeenth 
century—that the Habsburg lands integrated into a “moderately centralized empire.”139 
Kann noted that the Austrian power in the Holy Roman Empire was questionable after 
1648. However, he added, “one may [still] consider the history of the Habsburg lands 
after 1648 as incipient evolution of the great-power status,” due to the Habsburg 
dynasty’s policy of basing its every move “exclusively on the strength resulting from the 
rule in hereditary lands and those of the eastern crowns … the basic premise for the 
attainment of a great-power position.”140 Kann, too, stressed the role baroque art and 
architecture played in the emergence of the so-called Habsburg great power. This 
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Baroque style offered the Habsburg capital “the opportunity to display the splendor due 
to the center of a rising great power.”141  
At an international colloquium held at the University of Minnesota in 1991, 
scholars from different backgrounds primarily saw hard-won accomplishments of the 
early modern Monarchy, demonstrating that progressivism had become the norm in 
Habsburg historiography by the 1990s. In fact, in the introduction written for the book 
published after the colloquium, R. J. W. Evans toned down his earlier progressivism. He 
acknowledged that only several decades after 1699 “things turned sour” for the Monarchy 
because, by that time, the “soft absolutism” of the so-called great power was 
“dangerously overextended.”142 Evans referred to the Habsburgs’ commitment to their 
imperial mission as a “long bout of schizophrenia” and conceded that the “lack of any 
consistent alternative ideology of dynastic rule” created uncertainties for the 
Monarchy.143 The contrast between his earlier optimism and such ideas were significant, 
but none of these deterred him from declaring “the year of deliverance from the 
infidel”—1683—“the symbolic date for an underlying change of direction.”144 At the 
same colloquium, issues that could have been associated with weaknesses in many other 
historical contexts were regarded by historians as indications of Habsburg ingenuity. In 
response to his fitting question about the “obvious disjuncture between [the Monarchy’s] 
achievements in its heroic age and the equally obvious paucity of its monetary resources 
to accomplish what it did,” John Spielman coined the concept of “the Habsburg economy 
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of privilege.”145 Accordingly, the Monarchy “delegated to its servants the right to collect 
honoraria” instead of paying them to assure loyalty of its servants. Spielman interpreted 
this as a successful strategy despite a “progressive inflation over time” in honorific titles 
and their eventual becoming of “parking stickers allowing the bearer a place amidst the 
crowds in Hofburg antechambers.”146  
The most significant contribution to the literature in the last three decades has 
been Charles W. Ingrao’s history of the Monarchy covering the period between 1618 and 
1815. Ingrao’s book achieved more than simply constructing another progressive 
narrative. The interpretations were so convincingly articulated with a solid command of 
details that the book became one of the fundamental reference works concerning the early 
modern Habsburg Monarchy. Nonetheless, Ingrao’s major achievement was to apply the 
outcome-focused triangular theory of court/noble/church cooperation to the eighteenth 
century, a task unfinished by Evans himself. Ingrao recontextualized the developments in 
the early modern Habsburg state within a Western European historical framework, 
detaching the Monarchy from its quite peculiar central/eastern European context. While 
doing this, as with many other scholars, Ingrao did not ignore the multitude of problems 
that the early modern monarchy faced. In fact, his narrative included lengthy discussions 
of the Monarchy’s structural shortcomings. Regardless, the narrative played down these 
problems and their influence on Vienna’s policies and presented a progressive 
perspective that stressed unity, cohesion, and—most importantly—success. The 
Monarchy, according to Ingrao, was “neither weak, nor backward, nor in decline” even 
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by the end of the eighteenth century.147 Leopold I’s rule symbolized a crucial phase in 
Ingrao’s progressive narrative too. He argued that by 1699, “the monarchy was more 
secure against outside threats than at any time in its history.” According to Ingrao, soon 
after the signing of the Treaty of Carlowitz that year, territorial acquisitions in the 
southern Netherlands and Italy set the stage for the foundation of the “second Habsburg 
Empire.”  
A most noticeable theme in the progressive narratives framed mainly around 
Leopold I’s reign is the Emperor’s religious personality. As shown in the previous 
chapter, religiosity of Ottoman sultans and statesmen in Ottoman historical context is 
frequently interpreted as a hindrance to development and progress. As such, the idea is a 
small fraction of widespread preconceptions in the literature regarding non-Western 
religiosity, in particular in Islamic historical framework. In response to that assumption, I 
have previously denied the Ottoman state’s capitulation to irrational religious fanaticism 
in the seventeenth century, arguing that the Ottoman administrative acumen subdued 
religion and religious groups and subtly pulled them under state service as mediators 
between the court and subjects attracted to the ideas of such religious groups. In 
Habsburg historiography, whether religious fanaticism has ever guided or even partially 
influenced courtly decision-making mechanisms during Leopold I’s rule is not a major 
problematic. Unlike in the case of the Ottoman history, historians do not see any 
discrepancy between moments that necessitated rational strategies and political 
fluctuations originating in Leopold I’s steadfast submission to divine guidance. For most 
Habsburg historians Leopold I’s devout Catholicism compares to an innocuous and 
                                                          






almost benign naiveté.148 The subtle portrayal of the Emperor by R.J.W. Evans represents 
this prevailing view in the literature regarding Leopold I’s religiosity: 
…devoutness going with a disarming gaiety; friendliness and immediacy 
with conscientiousness and pride. Here is a man well-informed, intelligent, 
and curious, but no freethinker; honest and correct, but pusillanimous and 
irresolute; thoughtful, immensely hard-working … and heavily reliant on 
advice which he treats, however, with some independence of spirit and 
without sense of obligation.149 
  
One reads similar assessments in John Spielman’s Leopold of Austria, where the 
author interprets the Emperor’s pietism as a benevolent factor for the course of events:  
…[Leopold’s] deep faith in Providence encouraged his ingrained 
prudence, while the striking success of many of his undertakings 
confirmed it. He saw the events that forced him to act not as the working 
of blind chance, but rather as the unfolding of God’s design.150 
 
Emperor Leopold’s devotedness to his faith was not a novelty for the Habsburg 
court. A zealot Catholicism had pervaded into the Hofburg since the times of Ferdinand 
II (1619-1637) whom Robert Bireley called “the founder of the monarchy” principally 
due to Ferdinand’s achievements in the confessional domain.151 In intensely religious 
setting of the court young Leopold’s tutor Jesuit father Phillip Christof Müller possibly 
swayed the emperor on occasion despite his solely spiritual duties.152 Leopold was so 
pious, had such strong faith in God, and the Catholic sentiments of his family were so 
amplified in his personality that Oswald Redlich questioned whether Leopold actually 
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needed a spiritual tutor.153 It was also during Leopold’s reign that the Capuchin order 
rose to prominence in Austria. Before, during, and after the siege of Vienna in 1683, 
Capuchin father Marco d’Aviano played a significant role in uplifting morale of the 
Viennese.  
Unlike in the case of the Ottoman Empire, no Habsburg scholar has questioned 
whether Leopold I’s religiosity was problematic. As I have illustrated above the 
“outcome-focused” progressivism concentrated on achievements and undermined issues 
that can be interpreted in different ways. In fact, divine guidance did not help Leopold 
reform the administrative structure at the monarchical center. Despite positive portrayals 
by historians, Leopold I was unable to “overcome administrative inefficiency and 
corruption.”154 The principal reason was the Emperor himself: during his reign, Leopold I 
continuously appointed bureaucrats to the highest administrative posts, leading to an 
inflation of statesmen at the court. Under Leopold I, the members of the highest 
deliberative body Geheimrat, the Privy Council established by Ferdinand I, increased 
from a dozen to sixty only to soon become ineffective. This resulted in the establishment 
of Geheime Konferenz, or the Privy Conference designed to replace the Privy Council. 
Yet it soon faced the same denouement when Leopold appointed too many of his 
favorites to this new body.155 Nevertheless, in his detailed account of the evolution of 
these decision-making bodies at the court under Leopold I, Stefan Sienell interpreted the 
Emperor’s continuous appointment of statesmen to these bodies as a sign of his absolute 
control over state, seemingly a positive trait. Such a judgment is consistent with 
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prevailing progressivism in the field.156 Given the pervasiveness of the progressive 
paradigm, it is not surprising that Paula Sutter Fichtner more recently attributed 
“somewhat of a worldwide status” to Leopold I’s Austria.157 
The discussion above has focused on the prevalent argument in Habsburg 
historiography that the Peace of Westphalia, Leopold I’s rule, and the victory in 1683 
were major landmarks in the history of the Monarchy. Occasionally, revisionist historians 
have raised questions about assumptions woven into these common premises. Recently, 
Lothar Höbelt denied two major themes attached to 1648’s acceptance as a turning point 
in the Monarchy’s history. Höbelt wrote that the idea that “the Habsburgs lost in their 
capacity as emperors, but won in their capacity as territorial rulers” by 1648 is an “old 
cliché.”158 According to Höbelt, the notion that the Peace of Westphalia resulted in the 
disempowerment of the Habsburgs is questionable. He argued that “the outlines of the 
Westphalian settlement had been in place for quite some time” and “in terms of power 
politics, 1648 was not a harbinger of things to come.”159  Höbelt also noted that “the 
effect of Habsburg solidarity on the European ‘balance of powers’ was massively 
overrated” as shown by the end of the Thirty Years’ War which was, in reality, “a futile 
bid for hegemony by the Casa d’Austria that was bound to fail.” Such a remark is 
especially noteworthy given that the Habsburg historiography in and outside of Austria 
since the nineteenth century has expounded at great lengths the benefits of 1648 to the 
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Monarchy. Lately, Thomas Winkelbauer also agreed that Austria’s “evolution” away 
from the Holy Roman Empire had origins in the sixteenth century and it was not a 
phenomenon of the post-1648 period.160  
Another common paradigm mentioned previously is the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
emergence as initially a territorial power during Leopold I’s rule and then a great 
European power especially after 1683. Such an assumption is even more questionable 
and raises further skepticism. It can be suggested that one of the inspirations behind that 
contention is the notion of absolutism, an already problematic theme in early modern 
European historiography. As shown above, Austria’s emergence as a great power after 
1683 has been established many decades ago as a premise in Habsburg historiography. 
Historians have employed numerous evidence to support this contention, such as major 
military campaigns, imposition of confessional unity, expansion of financial resources, 
administrative centralization, and many other institutional developments. Yet, regardless 
of their intensity, these developments were not peculiar to the early modern Habsburgs; 
their wider implications often laid beyond the capabilities of the Habsburg Monarchy.  
Geographically, debates concerning absolutism relate directly to most of the 
continental Europe and traditionally constitute a “progressive, modernizing force” in 
mainstream European historiography for the entire continent during the century and a half 
after the 1650s.161 Within such a framework, absolutism has served as a convenient 
concept when explaining the formation of modern state. Indeed, for many historians, 
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absolutism has constituted a “necessary stage” on the road to modernity.162  Scholarly 
discussions about structural and institutional developments which lie at the heart of the 
Habsburg Monarchy’s purported emergence as a European great power are essentially 
informed by these assumptions in ‘absolutist’ literature. Therefore, the most 
progressively written period in Habsburg historiography—the years between 1648 and 
1780—almost completely overlaps with the time frame of debates about absolutism. As 
such, specifics of the Habsburg historiography replicate the general European ‘master 
narrative.’ Despite obvious and well-known barriers with which Vienna constantly 
wrestled,163 even the most balanced writers see absolute capabilities in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century Monarchy.164 Habsburg and European history 
textbooks unanimously define the Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and her 
son Joseph II (co-rule: 1765-1780; sole-rule: 1780-1790) as ‘enlightened absolutists,’ 
while their governments are seen as absolutist regimes.165 When one looks within this 
larger framework at Leopold I’s rule and emphasis on military, political, economic, and 
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cultural achievements during his reign, one is actually dealing with an era representing in 
the minds of historians an incubation period for the emergence of the so-called Habsburg 
absolutist regime of the eighteenth century.    
Such a teleological and progressive perspective based upon selective, “outcome-
focused” writing of history underlines independent achievements and sets the stage for 
what happened later in time. To that end, many facts of the Habsburg history must be 
understated. During the entire early modern era, Habsburg victories were gained by 
continent-wide coalition armies formed after cumbersome diplomatic exchanges and 
numerous concessions. Hyperactive Habsburg diplomacy frequently achieved significant 
goals and saved the Monarchy, but there were times of total diplomatic failure such as in 
the Ottoman capital before 1683, despite the ensuing military victory. By the end of 
Leopold I’s rule, the Monarchy’s material resources remained scarce. Eugene of Savoy 
had indicated a bitter reality when he declared that “if the survival depended on the 
monarchy’s ability to raise 50,000 florins at once, it would nonetheless be impossible to 
save it.”166  
Additionally, the cooperation between the court and landholding nobility, crucial 
for the stability of the Monarchy, considerably limited within the Monarchy 
developments in line with western Europe. From the beginning, the Habsburg Monarchy 
maintained its existence through bargaining with such elites in the periphery.167 
Negotiating and bargaining with the nobility and granting concessions to privileged 
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groups were so crucial to the Monarchy’s longevity that historians have emphasized 
Austria’s twofold need for consensus even when imagining the Monarchy as a mighty 
military power.168 Another historian described the political and diplomatic processes of 
the Monarchy as “consensual politics.”169 The same Monarchy persecuted non-
conformist groups (primarily Protestants) and only offered patronage to a few. 
Interestingly, historians attributed even such major drawbacks to the success of the ruling 
house: the Habsburg Monarchy was the “victim of the ruling elite’s own success.”170 But, 
was it not the same elites who intentionally restricted developments in line with other 
western countries? 
 Historians’ frequent mention of details contradicting the established progressive 
narrative demonstrates an interesting phenomenon. The prevailing progressive tone of 
Habsburg literature has become so dominant over decades that, despite the abundance of 
evidence which could be interpreted in diametrically differently ways in other historical 
contexts, Austrian and Anglo-Saxon historians continue to unanimously describe the 
Habsburg Monarchy as a great power. My goal in questioning established themes, 
paradigms, and the progressive language in Habsburg historiography is not to label the 
Monarchy and its historical geography as underdeveloped, thus constructing a negative or 
declinist narrative. On the contrary, such inquiry about the validity and coherency of the 
established perspective stems from a desire to fully comprehend and contextualize the 
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actual historical condition of the Habsburg Monarchy in its idiosyncratic milieu. The 
Habsburg historical geography contained considerable peculiarities throughout the 
existence of the Monarchy which have been intentionally downplayed and often labeled 
by historians as ignorable anomalies for the sake of a ‘positive narrative.’  
In summary, the progressive approaches to the Habsburg Monarchy in the second 
half of the seventeenth century had their origins in the nineteenth-century. During the 
twentieth century, the prevailing progressive trend has hinged on optimistic 
preconceptions of Austrian and Anglo-Saxon scholars about specific developments 
during Leopold I’s reign, while scholars such as R.J.W. Evans and Charles Ingrao have 
sealed that optimism with compelling narratives. I believe that the progressivism of 
modern Habsburg historiography was partially a result of Austria’s recognition by its 
early modern contemporaries as far too strong to assert its will when, in reality, Austria 
was too weak to impose its version of settlements.171 Also, the predomination of 
progressive narratives partially pertains to how early modern Habsburgs perceived 
themselves. Victories against Kara Mustafa Paşa in 1683 and against the French in the 
Spanish Netherlands the next year had inspired Philip Wilhelm von Hörnigk to proclaim 
that “Oesterreich Uber alles wann es nur will.”172  
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The discussion in the previous chapter is important, because progressive narratives in one 
field often exert a butterfly effect within the widest borders of historiography. The effect 
is strongest in fields of study that are thematically and geographically closest to the topic 
that are portrayed progressively. This is most clearly true for the prevailing perceptions 
about the early modern Ottoman Empire. Parallels can be detected between outcome-
focused, progressive interpretations of the early modern Habsburg Monarchy and 
perceptions of the contemporary Ottoman Empire. The trajectories of the two empires 
were so interconnected and their confrontations were reciprocally so formative in this 
period that when we explain the longevity of the Habsburg Monarchy through stories of 
achievement, it becomes easy to view the Ottomans in permanent decline. Especially 
when a reference to the Ottoman Empire is necessary in a study written from the 
Habsburg perspective, the narrative neither presents any awareness of extensive debates 
among Ottomanists on the decline paradigm nor includes even a brief structural 
comparative analysis between the two states. Instead, the so-called Ottoman decline 
seems to typically function as a practical explanatory tool based on reductionist 
assessments of military victories (or defeats) and territorial expansions (or losses).173  
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As illustrated above, the military victory in 1683 has been traditionally regarded 
as one such critical juncture in the balance of power between the Habsburgs and 
Ottomans with direct and indirect impacts on how Ottoman history is researched and 
recorded. For centuries, scholars have thoroughly examined the second Ottoman siege of 
Vienna and produced a vast literature. Studies written by Austrian and Anglo-Saxon 
historians of Europe and the Habsburg Monarchy have a triumphant approach to the 
victory which fits into the broader framework of European historiography and the 
progressive trend among Habsburg historians.  
On the other hand, studies written from the Ottoman perspective on 1683 fall into 
two categories: The first group of studies is written by western historians of the Ottoman 
Empire. Even though none of these scholars has focused on Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa 
Paşa and his career per se, the recently growing “renewal of faith” paradigm influenced 
how they portray the age of Kara Mustafa Paşa. Accordingly, religion is considered the 
key motive in all Ottoman political and social processes during the early modern era; 
hence Mark David Baer’s description of the Vienna campaign as the “failed final jihad.” 
The first chapter of this research has shown in detail that religion-based approaches and 
explanations can be used only if political and strategic processes are fully understood.  
The second group of studies is written by Turkish historians of the Ottoman 
Empire whose writings are usually detached from paradigmatic discussions among 
western historians and lack a balanced view of the siege and the Grand Vizier. The 
notorious defeat in 1683 and the ensuing Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 have been difficult 






1683, the campaign is usually glorified as an attempt to conquer a major European 
capital. 
Dichotomies created on the one hand between progressive Habsburg 
historiography and declinist approaches to the Ottoman Empire and, on the other hand, 
between western and Turkish versions of the Ottoman history and 1683 perpetually 
imprisoned Kara Mustafa Paşa, the historical figure, into the purgatory of the past. Joseph 
von Hammer-Purgstall, the famous Austrian historian of the Ottoman Empire, sealed as 
early as the 1830s the descriptions of Kara Mustafa Paşa in western scholarship: 
“…known to us as dirty racketeer in his treatment of the Catholics and Greeks in Chios 
and Jerusalem, the barbarian born to human, money and skin-flayer,” wrote Hammer-
Purgstall at the beginning of his chapter on Kara Mustafa Paşa.174 In a different passage 
about why the Ottomans had lost at Vienna, he argued that it was because of the Grand 
Vizier’s “arrogance and vanity as well as his weak talent as a commander.” Hammer-
Purgstall added that due to his avarice, the Grand Vizier had not allowed storming and 
plundering of the city by his soldiers because he did not want to share the treasures of 
Vienna with anyone.175 His soul and character were the same colors, that is, schwarz.176  
About a hundred years before Hammer’s history of the Ottoman Empire was 
published, an Ottoman soldier named Esiri Hasan bin Hüseyin wrote an account of the 
siege of Vienna before his death in the 1740s. Esiri had participated in the Vienna 
campaign and, as his own appellation suggests, he had fallen prisoner to the Austrians. In 
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general, just as Silahdar, Esiri was critical of Ottoman statesmen and troops for their 
arrogance before and during the campaign. I will discuss Esiri’s ideas about why the 
campaign was unsuccessful at the end of the present study. Yet, Esiri left for posterity a 
noteworthy remark about Kara Mustafa Paşa: “…The disgrace [the Vienna campaign] 
transmitted to the German lands with the sword of Islam will not leave [Germans’] hearts 
until the Judgment Day and was a lesson for the entire Christian nation.”177  The 
connotations of this remark to this day surpassed the critical appraisals of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa and his term. Generations of Turkish historians have adopted about Kara Mustafa 
Paşa a perspective that praised the Grand Vizier for his attempt to conquer a major 
European capital.     
Such defamatory and laudatory passages are abundant in both the European and 
Ottoman primary and secondary literature, but do they actually convey the historical 
truth? Kara Mustafa Paşa, in the end, was a statesman at a time when “the single and 
most distinctive feature of Europe was that almost everywhere wealth and prestige were 
based on the ownership of land.”178 The Grand Vizier’s ambitions, therefore, should not 
astonish the historian or layman even when ambitions turn into blind commitments. The 
purpose of the present study is to purge the Grand Vizier and his motivations in 
undertaking the Vienna campaign from excessive vilifications and unreasonable 
glorifications based on mono-dimensional reading of sources. Such a perspective 
necessitates one to understand and contextualize how Kara Mustafa Paşa came to power 
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as the third of three powerful grand viziers from the same family who continuously 
occupied the grand vizier’s seat between 1656 and 1683.  
 
“The reign of violence:” seventeenth century before the Köprülüs  
Throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, a total of 217 grand viziers served for a 
total of 292 terms. Between the death of the Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa in 1579 
and the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to this post in 1656, 52 grand viziers had 
served for a total of 68 terms, with each term averaging 13.5 months. The numbers are 
quite telling: the competition was so intense among the political cliques within the court 
during the seventy-seven years preceding Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s assumption of office 
that a quarter of the individuals (24 percent) who were entrusted with the sultan’s seal 
throughout the history of the empire came to this position during that short period. Over 
those three quarters of a century, there were grand viziers who served only for a day, such 
as Ohrili Hüseyin Paşa (May, 1622), or only for several hours, such as Zurnazen Mustafa 
Paşa (March, 1656). The latter, whose appointment was instantaneously annulled upon 
the objections of rebellious sipahis, was one of the five different individuals who served 
at this post during the first nine months of 1656. The sixth was Köprülü Mehmed Paşa 
whose appointment in mid-September of that year finally brought to a halt the musical 
chair game within the court accompanied by decades-long tumult in the capital and 
across the Empire. 
The perpetual chaos in the capital and provinces preceding Köprülü Mehmed 






historians continue to struggle to understand.179 During the first four decades of this 
period, the Ottomans fought protracted battles with the Habsburgs (Der Lange 
Türkenkrieg of 1593-1606) and the Safavids (1578-1590; 1603-1618; 1623-1639). The 
empire faced great difficulties in mobilizing especially the sipahis for the Habsburg 
war,180 while the renewed combats against the Safavids ended without major changes in 
the status quo, despite frequent and reciprocal territorial gains and losses during the war.  
The social and economic repercussions of incessant warfare in the west and east 
were observable in the countryside, especially in Anatolia. Historians have shown that the 
period was marked with inflation and falling tax-revenues and the court was facing 
difficulties in payment of troops’ salaries. As early as the 1590s, the court had begun to 
sell governorships to high-ranking members of the military class in return for advance 
cash payment. Such developments led runaway troops and uprooted peasants to wander 
in the countryside, encouraging an increasing number of troops to desert and peasants to 
leave their homes. The phenomenon was observed through meticulous research on 
population registers. According to the registers of the 1640s, an important proportion of 
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largely single males were “either still in hiding to evade tax registration or active in 
brigandage.”181 In one Anatolian district, 117 villages had disappeared between 1576 and 
1643 from the registers, due to brigandage and other chronic socio-economic 
problems.182 Provincial governors also took a role in the chaos. The runaway troops and 
peasants soon began to join retinues of provincial governors who would use them in 
private armies which then roamed and ransacked rural areas. The ensuing widespread 
chaos in the Anatolian countryside was known as Celâlî rebellions or the ‘Great Flight.’ 
As a result, the first mention of a rebellious paşa in Ottoman history originates from 
sources of this period. Such individuals were governors at different levels (including 
beylerbeyis, or governor-generals) who were incapacitated by other rebellious groups in 
their regions. Thus, one rebellious group bred the other, culminating in the so-called 
“reign of violence.” Such was the situation in the provinces before Köprülü Mehmed 
Paşa rose to power.   
The condition in the provinces was only emblematic of much deeper and chronic 
problems in the imperial capital by the late 1640s and 1650s. In contemporary chronicles 
one reads that the sipahi and janissary commanders as well as guild leaders in the capital 
had their own agendas and they all exerted pressure on courtly appointments, forcing the 
resignation of many statesmen including grand viziers. Unstable social and political 
circumstances in the capital and countryside also left the state vulnerable to foreign 
attacks. Taking advantage of the chaos in the Empire, Cossack ships bombarded the 
Black Sea town of Sinop. As part of the war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire for 
control of Crete and the eastern Mediterranean, numerous Venetian ships blockaded the 
                                                          






Ottomans’ access through the Dardanelles to the Agean Sea and cut supply lines of the 
Ottoman forces.183 In 1655, the Ottomans had lost so many ships to the Venetians that the 
contemporary chronicler Silahdar noted that the Ottoman fleet had never been so 
miserable since the days of Selim II (1566-1574), the reigning Sultan when the Ottoman 
fleet suffered a heavy defeat at the Battle of Lepanto.184 The same year, the Venetians 
even captured Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Limni (Lemnos). The two islands, within hours’ 
reach of the Ottoman capital by sea, were also strategically located at where the Strait of 
Dardanelles meets the Aegean Sea.185    
The appointment of Tarhoncu186 Ahmed Paşa, an Albanian statesman, to the 
grand vizierate earlier in June 1652 had raised hopes for restoration of authority but to no 
avail.187 Tarhoncu’s efforts to balance the budget deeply disturbed the corrupted groups 
in the capital who within nine months extorted an order from Sultan Mehmed IV, at 
eleven years of age at the time, for execution of the Grand Vizier. Nevertheless, 
Tarhoncu’s rise to the grand vizierate probably set a precedent for the appointment of his 
fellow Albanian Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in 1656. Tarhoncu Ahmed Paşa had allegedly 
stipulated certain conditions to Mehmed IV’s mother, Turhan Sultan, before his 
appointment as the Grand Vizier. Also Turhan had agreed, for the first time in the history 
of the Empire, to establish an office building outside of the palace for the Grand 
Vizier.188 Such development meant “pushing the sultan further away from the center of 
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administrative activity.” 189 Yet, it also illustrated the readiness of the mother Sultan and 
her entourage to relinquish the authority to the able hands of a powerful grand vizier. 
Another indication of the desperate conditions in the capital was appointment of 
İbşir Mustafa Paşa to the grand vizierate in the fall of 1654. Described as a calm and 
quiet personality by the chronicler Abdurrahman Abdi, İbşir Mustafa had risen to 
prominence as a provincial governor. Before too long, however, that calm and quite man 
assembled his own retinue formed of rebels and gained esteem from many other 
rebellious groups in Anatolia. Furthermore, he eventually became the grand vizier and 
wedded one of the aunts of Sultan Mehmed IV.190 Yet, İbşir Paşa’s retinue had entered 
Istanbul with him, severely challenging the authority of the sipahis and janissaries in the 
capital. Due to the pressure of these groups on the court, the Grand Vizier was deposed 
again in May 1655.191  Between İbşir’s fall and the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed 
Paşa to grand vizierate on September 14, 1656 six appointments were made to grand 
vizierate without any effect on the prevailing disorder.  
 
The restoration of power: Köprülü Mehmed Paşa 
This administrative chaos finally came to an end with the rise of a new grand vizier. 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s assumption of the grand vizierate in 1656 was a watershed 
followed by an era of relative stability. From that year on, success breed success, and 
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eight individuals linked with the Köprülü family served in this position until 1710.192 
Kara Mustafa Paşa had entered the Köprülü family at young ages and rose to prominence 
in Ottoman politics mainly due to his membership to that household. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
grand vizierate was preceded first by that of the founder of the family, Mehmed Paşa, and 
then his elder son Ahmed. A true evaluation of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s career is possible 
only through a detailed analysis of the Köprülü regime’s main characteristics. 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa himself was born in the Albanian village of Rudnik.193 He 
was raised and educated in the Ottoman palace as a devşirme. Chronicler Silahdar noted 
that probably due to his “egoistic and stubborn” personality he was sent to provinces for 
service after his education.194 He married a woman from a small village called ‘Köprü’ 
(Vezirköprü today) in the Ottoman province of Amasya, hence the epithet ‘Köprülü.’195 
What is written about his purported illiteracy in Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall and 
Nicolae Iorga’s histories cannot be true given his education at the palace school 
(Enderun) and long-time service in the capital and provinces, including a brief period as 
the treasurer of Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa (1628-1631).196 He participated in Sultan 
Murad IV’s renowned Baghdad campaign in 1638 and served under Grand Vizier 
Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa (1638-1644), also of Albanian-origin, as rikâb-ı hümâyun 
kaymakamı (substitute for the grand vizier during the latter’s absence in the capital) and 
mirâhur (chief supervisor of the sultan’s stables). In the late 1640s, during a campaign 
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against a rebel group in central Anatolia, he was captured and fell prisoner, yet he was 
later rescued by İbşir Paşa. Finally, in September 1656, Mehmed IV’s mother, Turhan 
handed over the seal of sultan to Köprülü. 
The story of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s appointment to grand vizierate is often 
embellished with a purported negotiation between him and Turhan. Accordingly, the 
septuagenarian Köprülü, who in late 1651 had been appointed as a vizier but immediately 
lost the rank due to his late arrival in the capital,197 laid down certain conditions to accept 
the seal of sultan. The meeting between Köprülü and mother sultan purportedly took 
place at the latter’s private apartment inside the harem where Köprülü could enter only 
disguised and under directions of the Kızlar Ağası (chief black eunuch, chief officer of 
the harem). At the meeting on September 13, 1656 Köprülü and Turhan made a contract: 
all reports Köprülü presented to the sultan had to be ratified without alterations; as the 
Grand Vizier, he required full authority on allocation of ranks from the lowest to the 
highest so that he could employ individuals most useful to the state. In addition, 
complaints and claims against him by the elite who were wealthy or considered 
respectable would not be paid any attention. Finally, rumors coined by those who disliked 
him would not be tolerated; “everyone would want a share from the government yet it 
would be impossible to please or convince all of them.”198 
Two factors arouse skepticism about the historical accuracy of the contract: first, 
the conversation is only mentioned in the chronicle of Mustafa Naima; second, another 
contemporary source Silahdar stated that the original intention was to appoint Haseki 
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Mehmed Paşa to the grand vizierate who was in Damascus at the time.199 Therefore, as 
noted by Metin Kunt, the encounter between Turhan and Köprülü “should be interpreted 
not as a unique event but rather as a part of a general seventeenth-century trend towards 
restoring the traditional authority of the grand vizier.”200 Nevertheless, even if the verbal 
contract assumed to have taken place between Turhan and Köprülü is not authentic, the 
latter had clearly gained the trust of the ruling house. With the advantage of hindsight, 
one is able to make comparisons between the above summarized conditions of the state 
and the restoration of authority before Köprülü’s administration. As discussed below, 
Köprülü swiftly and with much bloodshed restored central authority, with reverberations 
on the authority enjoyed by subsequent grand viziers. Was Köprülü’s grand vizierate 
merely a historical contingency, an “extraordinary success;” or “is it to be explained in 
terms of personalities?”201  
Indeed, one may attribute the success of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to his ability to 
merge certain characteristic qualities (such as his resoluteness and fortitude) with the 
traditional role assigned to the post of grand vizier since the early Ottomans. In the 
famous code of law issued by Mehmed II (1444-1446; 1451-1481) a grand vizier was 
described as vekil-i mutlak, absolute deputy of the sultan.202 In other words, Ottoman 
tradition assumed irrespective of whether a sultan’s authority was powerful or weak, 
grand viziers would possess unique administrative privileges. Accordingly, a grand vizier 
would have the sultan’s seal in their possession during their term in office and, as often 
told in Ottoman chronicles, they would literally carry and hide this seal inside their 
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garment. The possession of sultan’s seal had such great symbolic importance that when 
Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) decreed in 1580 that grand viziers would no longer be 
given the seal, the people and officials began to question the authenticity and authority of 
the Grand Vizier’s orders, forcing Murad III to withdraw his decree.203  
Observers such as Koçi Bey (d. 1650) and Katip Çelebi (d. 1657) suggested 
similar interpretations in the first half of the seventeenth century when four of the six 
sultans came to the throne at very young ages. Moreover, one of them suffered from a 
mental disorder, while another one, Ibrahim, “was enough of an eccentric to be 
nicknamed “mad” in Ottoman historiography.”204 Koçi Bey argued that “the sultan is the 
heart of the world; when the heart is strong the body too will be strong ... and the grand 
vizier, his deputy, should regain his paramount position.”205 Likewise, Katip Çelebi, 
argued that only a sâhib’ül-seyf (master of sword) sultan or grand vizier could “pull the 
empire out of difficulties.” Another anonymous contemporary observer noted that "no 
one shall know the governmental affairs but the Grand Vizier, [who] are the padishah's 
secretaries, treasurers, deputies, confidants and well-wishers; therefore, it is not 
permissible that the padishah should have closer and dearer servants than they."206 In 
other words, intellectuals in the early seventeenth century “favored a return to a powerful 
grand vizier.”207 In this atmosphere, the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (later 
that of his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and adopted son Kara Mustafa Paşa) marked the 
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beginning of the high time of grand viziers who tested and experienced the broadest 
executive limits of grand vizierate.  
Having received full confidence from Turhan, Köprülü’s first major act was to 
wipe out the defiant groups from the capital after a door to door hunt.208 In order to carry 
out this large-scale, punitive, perilous attack on these groups well-established across the 
capital, Köprülü needed an edict but issued by Sultan Mehmed IV. The opportunity came 
on January 4, 1658 when these groups aimed to foment a capital-wide popular 
disturbance. Out of fear, shops were closed and many were forced to join the rebels’ 
march through the streets. Köprülü swiftly reported the situation to the palace. The next 
day, the Grand Vizier gathered at his office outside of the palace the statesmen and chief 
officers and read the edict signed by the Sultan. The edict ordered the elimination of 
rebel-minded members of the sipahis: 
 
[Sipahis] have rendered excessive encroachments since the sultan’s 
ascension to throne and completely disregarded the dignity of the court. 
The annihilation of such bandits is a duty most important for the state, and 
the responsibility of the issue has been entrusted to the grand vizier. Those 
of you who have been deferential to the state for generations shall not 
back the rebels but aid the Grand Vizier in their punishment.209 
 
 The restoration of the court’s authority began the same day. A retired sipahi 
captain was executed hours after the meeting in the presence of the Sultan. That night, 
city-wide patrols on both halves of the Bosphorus under personal command of Köprülü 
resulted in the capturing and execution of many bandit leaders. Corrupted notables could 
not escape the purge. Ineffective military commanders were punished, while corrupt 
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religious leaders and preachers were exiled to Cyprus and other remote regions of the 
Empire. Even the Greek Patriarch Parthenios III could not escape the rage of the Grand 
Vizier and was hanged due to allegations of arranging plans against the Ottoman state in 
cooperation with the Voivode of Wallachia.210  
 The court’s authority in the capital was restored due to Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s 
resoluteness, but the harshness that marked the Grand Vizier’s early days in the office 
continued to guide his domestic and international policies until the end of his five-year 
term. In 1658, he carried out a punitive campaign on Transylvanian Prince George II 
Rákóczi, who was technically a Turkish vassal, yet had ambitions for the Polish throne 
which also threatened the stability in the Ottoman controlled principalities of Wallachia 
and Moldavia. It is likely that the total disorder within the Ottoman court preceding 
Köprülü’s assumption of office encouraged George II Rákóczi to act without consultation 
to Constantinople when he launched his campaign in Poland. Five months before 
Köprülü’s assumption of office, George II Rákóczi’s envoy Jakab Harsányi had reported 
from Constantinople that “these people have lost their heads, I have never seen 
Constantinople in such a disorderly and confused state.”211 Apparently, Rákóczi had 
assumed that Köprülü Mehmed Paşa would be only another grand vizier among the 
fifteen who had received the seal of the sultan since 1647, the year Rákóczi also put on 
the Transylvanian crown. The developments proved the Transylvanian Prince wrong in 
his assumption. Soon after his assumption of office, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa instructed the 
diet at Erdel Belgradı (Gyulafehérvár) in October 1657 to dismiss George II Rákóczi on 
                                                          







the grounds that he had violated the conditions stipulated to Transylvania as a vassal of 
the Ottoman court. However, George II Rákóczi was the richest landowner in 
Transylvania and was practically the most powerful noble in his lands. The diet could not 
or did not dare to overthrow him while Rákóczi himself refused to abdicate. In the 
summer of 1658, Köprülü’s army supported by the Crimean Tatars as well as 12.000 
Polish-Lithuanian troops conquered Yanova (Ineu; Ger: Jenö).  In October 1658, Ákos 
Barcsai was appointed the Transylvanian Prince and agreed to pay yearly tribute to the 
Ottoman court.212 
George II Rákóczi escaped the Ottomans as a large-scale uprising in Anatolia had 
begun to test the strength of Köprülü and forced him to return from the frontier to the 
capital. In mid-summer that year, rebel leaders gathered in Konya including many former 
and incumbent governors who united under leadership of Abaza Hasan Paşa with their 
retainers of more than 30.000 rebel troops. The rebel leaders not only ignored the orders 
to fight under Köprülü’s command, but they also demanded the Grand Vizier’s dismissal 
and the appointment of Tayyârzâde Vezîr Ahmed Paşa, whose father had earlier briefly 
served as grand vizier.213 However, the course of events showed that both Köprülü 
himself and the rank he represented had gained full thrust of the court. Mehmed IV 
ignored such requests and banished the rebels’ envoys from his presence. Chronicler 
Silahdar remarked that “the sultan had shown such firmness and resilience in protecting 
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the Grand Vizier that no one could dare to speak negatively about Köprülü.”214 After 
several skirmishes, Abaza Hasan Paşa and his retinue was finally captured in February of 
1659. The heads of the rebels with their names written on foreheads arrived in the court 
on March 10, 1659.215 To give a definitive end to the decades-long rebellions in Anatolia, 
Köprülü then ordered a widespread military inspection and investigation in all of 
Anatolia, resulting in the execution of thousands of people (including many judges and 
scholars) and the collection of 80,000 muskets.  
 How did contemporaries interpret Köprülü Mehmed Paşa? Contemporary 
chronicler Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, the author of one of the most important 
chronicles for the second half of the seventeenth century, portrayed the Grand Vizier as 
an extremely immoral and cruel personality to the contrary of conventional wisdom about 
him: 
[Köprülü Mehmed Paşa] was a wealthy, cruel, tyrannical, egoistic and stubborn, 
ruthlessly and unfairly bloodthirsty septuagenarian, a bucktoothed old man. 
Taking advantage of the Sultan’s youth, he unfairly murdered viziers, governor-
generals, and commanders as well as town dwellers and wealthy individuals in 
Anatolia and Rumelia, expropriating altogether their goods and properties. [With 
their money] he constructed landed properties and charities, built up and 
flourished the lands of Islam. He paralyzed many dignitaries across the empire 
and among the military and revoked ranks and lines of service, incapacitating the 
remaining [officials]. To this day, the Sublime State has been breaking down and 
is weakened, because he eliminated prudent statesman able to face the enemy and 
caused the state to be defeated by infidels at every occasion.216 
  
 As much as the chronicle of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa is of primary importance for 
the period, it is also the only contemporary source presenting such a derogatory image of 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. Other contemporary Ottoman chroniclers, historians of later 
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generations, and foreign ambassadors recorded various impressions about the Grand 
Vizier and positive remarks eventually prevailed. Chroniclers Raşid Mehmed Efendi and 
Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa interpreted Köprülü’s term as a most auspicious turning 
point in the Empire’s history and praised him for eradicating the aggressions of rampant 
groups with his “Aristotle-like” style.217 Almost two centuries later, Joseph von Hammer-
Purgstall argued that Köprülü was such an artful leader that no one ever revealed 
“whether his kindness was true or fake,” and indeed he had implemented machiavellist 
policies supposedly without hearing about Machiavelli.218 
Foreign ambassadors, too, left remarks about Köprülü and his resoluteness to 
restore authority and ameliorate the Empire. What one reads in foreign accounts about 
Köprülü is a combination of a shrewd and grim personality tinged occasionally with rage 
and wittiness. A week after Köprülü’s appointment on September 23, 1656 the Austrian 
ambassador Simon Reniger von Reningen (1649-1666) met the Grand Vizier to notify the 
Ottoman court of the goodwill of the Habsburg Emperor. According to Reniger’s report, 
upon the ambassador’s salutation, the Grand Vizier complained about an incursion made 
by 2000 raiders from across the Habsburg border to the Ottoman controlled Budin (Ofen). 
He asserted that “one may think that the Ottoman Empire is in ruins or not as strong as 
before, but it is only a matter of tiniest reason or opportunity to arm another army … 
[against the Habsburg Monarchy].”219 A brief remark in the same report sent to Vienna 
                                                          
217 Raşid Mehmed Efendi, Tarih-i Raşid, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan et al., vol. 1 (İstanbul: Klasik, 2013), 18; 
Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekayiât: Tahlil ve Metin (1066-1116/1656-1704), ed. Abdülkadir 
Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 6. 
218 “...ohne von Machiavell gehört zu haben.” Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, 
1963, 6:43. 
219 “...Man dachte mit Gedenckhen daß das Ottomanisch Reich ruinirt oder kheine creffter mehr, es wehre 







stated about Köprülü that “it is said that he is a person with good inclinations.”220 
Köprülü later indeed carried out a western campaign that brought Varad (Oradea) in 
Transylvania under direct Ottoman control. Almost ten years later when Simon Reniger 
presented his Haupt Relation dated April 27, 1666 to Emperor Leopold I, the ambassador 
referred to by then deceased Köprülü only briefly as the grand vizier who “induced fire 
along the border.”221 
A year after Köprülü’s assumption to office, the Swedish ambassador Nicholas 
Rolamb visited the Ottoman capital. At the time, the Swedish King Charles X Gustav was 
fighting in the Second Northern War (1655-1660) against a northern European coalition 
to realize his ambitions in Poland. Common interests brought Charles X the alliance of 
the Transylvanian Prince George II Rákóczi, but an alliance with a prince whose fortunes 
were closely tied to Ottoman interests in Central Europe made sense only if the Ottoman 
court was gained as an ally. Rolamb’s romantic mission aiming a Swedish-Ottoman 
alliance was diplomatically a total failure. As a result of his disappointment and 
displeasure, his report of the mission, A Relation of a Journey to Constantinople, 
included many derogatory passages and fabrications about the Ottoman state, society, and 
statesmen. Nevertheless, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was still able to impress the Swede: “this 
present vizir Coprili Mehemet passa [is] possessed with true zeal for his sovereign’s 
reputation, and the interest of the Turkish empire.” In fact, Rolamb had elaborated the 
Austrian ambassador Simon Reniger’s brief note about Köprülü’s good inclination: 
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…his credit with the emperor grew to such a height, that he now respects 
him as a father and indeed he is a man of good natural parts in their own 
way, and of great experience by reason of his age; but his behavior is 
rough and tyrannical, which is what creates him the esteem of the Turks. 
The readiness of his wit makes him govern well, and his cruelty awes 
those who might otherwise plot against his life. … To sum up, by rigorous 
and cruel proceedings he has compassed his ends so far, that the Turkish 
army … [is] now so far broke of rebellious humour … for they were 
become sensible that either they must conquer the enemy, or choose 
inevitably to perish by the hands of the vizir…222  
 
Thus, contemporary Ottoman and European sources illustrate that Köprülü 
Mehmed Paşa’s firmness and purposefulness helped the Ottoman court restore authority 
in the capital and provinces. Köprülü, who at the earliest years of his career had served in 
the kitchens of the Ottoman palace, at the end of his life satisfactorily fulfilled the role of 
an expected sâhib’ül-seyf (master of sword) as described by seventeenth century Ottoman 
observers.223 In reality, Köprülü was not a particularly illustrious individual. The courtier 
who had been sent to Köprülü to notify the latter about his appointment later narrated that 
upon first seeing the old man he had asked himself “What in the world does such a 
person have to do with grand vizierate?”224 In that old man’s grand vizierate, “there was 
nothing unorthodox or novel,” but his rise marked “the culmination of a trend of his 
times.”225 Köprülü’s iron fist was clenched when the state needed it and his methods of 
administration became a model for subsequent grand viziers.   
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When the political and social circumstances before his grand vizierate are compared with 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s grand vizierate, his term of office was indeed a great success 
especially in the domestic realm. He rehabilitated the central government, ameliorated 
income and expense balances, and fairly readjusted salary payments inside the court, a 
long-time contested issue among corrupt courtiers.226 Before his death in Adrianople in 
October 1661, the Ottomans had both expelled Venetians from Crete except Candia and 
captured the Transylvanian city of Varad (Oradea) in 1660. At that time, Varad was 
already a European center of historical, cultural, and economic significance. Unlike what 
most sources assume, the direct Ottoman control in Varad and establishment of a new 
Ottoman province there should have been a greater threat to Europe than the capture of 
Nové Zámky by the next Köprülü vizier. 
  
From restoration to the reign of grand viziers: Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa  
“The Sultan shall select and appoint from among the viziers a clever and wise grand 
vizier who is apprehensive of world affairs and serviceable in plenty of tasks; [he shall] 
give him freedom, let no one interfere in his duties, and give permission to his every 
word. … [A grand vizier] is the absolute deputy and highest ranked vizier. In the Sublime 
State no other rank supersedes that rank except the rank of sultanate.”227 Such was 
written by scholar Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi228 about the role of the grand vizier in 
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1669/70 (hijri 1080). As I have shown earlier, similar ideas about the role and rank of 
grand viziers had been expressed by contemporary observers when there was chronic 
administrative crisis in the Empire. In that sense, Hezarfen’s ideas were not new. In fact, 
they echoed another well-known source, Asafname, written by Lutfi Paşa who had served 
as grand vizier (1539-1541) during Süleyman the Lawgiver’s reign (1520-1566).229 The 
restatement of such ideas under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s grand vizierate, however, was not 
mere redundancy.  
Building upon the legacy of his father, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa further expanded the 
scope of the authority and independence granted by the Ottoman dynasty to the 
incumbent grand vizier concerning domestic affairs and international relations issues. 
Examples include Ottoman sources about the meetings before the announcement of war 
against Austria in 1662 and the war council held by the Grand Vizier before the 1663 
campaign. Reports of the peace talks between the Austrian ambassador, Simon Reniger, 
and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa in the winter of 1664/65 complement the narratives in the Ottoman 
sources. In addition, the insistence of the Grand Vizier in continuing the siege of Candia 
in 1668 despite challenging financial impediments is quite enlightening. Finally, the 
rhetorical language Fazıl Ahmed Paşa used in the letters he exchanged with the Polish-
Lithuanian court before embarking on his last campaign is worth noting. I will discuss 
each of these matters based on Ottoman and European primary sources to show that, by 
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the end of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s term of office, the possessor of the seal of sultan had 
virtually become the unrivaled executive authority of the Empire. 
 Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was born in 1635-36 (hijri 1045) in Köprü.230 He moved to the 
Ottoman capital with his father at the age of seven where he began his education among 
the ilmiyye, the men of letters. However, his youth coincided with severe scholarly 
disagreements (probably fomented by Kadızadeli preachers) upon which his father, 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, undisturbed by “things he had heard” from scholars, banned his 
son from a career among the men of letters.231 Ahmed Paşa then began a new career in 
mülkiye, the administrative class. His career among the ilmiyye stayed with him 
throughout his life as his epithet Fazıl (virtuous) was given to him due to his scholarly 
background.232 Fazıl Ahmed Paşa first served as the governor of Erzurum and Şam 
(Damascus). Two months before his father died, he was appointed as the asitane-i saadet 
kaymakamı (governor of the capital). On November 1 1661, he became the second person 
to inherit the post of the grand vizier in the Ottoman Empire.233  
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was entrusted with the position, principally due to his father’s 
success as the grand vizier. Köprülü Mehmed Paşa clearly had increased the dignity of 
the court and the dynasty, both within the empire and international arena. As chronicler 
Raşidi noted, “if someone unfamiliar with state affairs had been appointed, it was clear 
that a state of disorder and disorganization would prevail again. Therefore, for the 
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preservation and continuation of the order established [by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa], the 
Sultan appointed his son.”234         
 The first campaign of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa aimed to restore Ottoman authority in 
Hungary and Transylvania. The course of events eventually led to a major showdown at 
St. Gotthard between the armies of the Grand Vizier and Habsburg general Raimond 
Montecuccoli (later also Hofkriegsratpräsident). The political reasons behind the 
campaign and the consequences of the battle of St. Gotthard have been well researched 
by many scholars.235 Therefore, I will not discuss here the political background in detail. 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s major strategic goal in Transylvania was to bring to a definitive end 
the ongoing double-dealing of Transylvanian princes between Vienna and 
Constantinople, while also testing the waters for independence. Nonetheless, in the early 
1660s, it was not only the fluctuations of Transylvanian princes that eventually brought 
the main Ottoman army into Hungary; Emperor Leopold I also oscillated frequently 
between antagonistic and peaceful policies from 1659 to 1662. Before the Ottoman 
campaign was eventually launched by the late summer of 1662, the Habsburg court had 
supported the election of the pro-Habsburg János Kemény (the counselor of George II 
Rákóczi) as the Prince of Transylvania; then it signed a secret treaty with Köprülü  
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Mehmed Paşa. Upon Köprülü’s death, it took new initiatives ignoring the treaty and 
captured fortresses along the frontier. Then envoys were sent to the Ottoman Empire to 
avoid war.236 Contemporary Ottoman sources, therefore, unanimously accused the 
Habsburg Emperor for his “machinations” in Hungary and Transylvania and justified the 
campaign as a revenge and punishment initiative.237  
In the summer of 1662, the Ottoman army was at Adrianople with the intention of 
launching a land campaign on the Venetians through Bosnia and Albania to expel the 
Venetians from the islands and coastal areas they had captured from the Ottomans. The 
news coming from Transylvania, however, redirected Ottoman attention to Hungary. At 
the meeting held before the announcement of the Austrian campaign, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 
gathered all viziers, commanders, regiment ağas, and other dignitaries within the army. 
First, the edict of the Sultan about the circumstances in Hungary was read aloud; then the 
Grand Vizier addressed those who were present: “Pay attention paşas and ağas! 
Austria[ns] are a strong enemy of the Ottoman state. … [They are] known to receive 
support from all of the Christian nations. It is true that Venice is a peerless deceitful 
wrestler at sea wars; yet they have no courage for front battle on land as they are like 
fishes out of water when they leave their fortresses…What would be your say if we  
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postpone the Venetian campaign and do not leave behind a strong enemy by itself?” It is 
difficult to determine whether the Grand Vizier expressed these words verbatim, but all 
those who were present at the meeting abided by his idea. The Austrian campaign began 
in the autumn of 1662 upon the Sultan’s edict, but it was Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s initiative. 
As the Ottoman army approached the frontier, Austrian peace overtures 
intensified. Peace talks between the Grand Vizier and Austrian representatives as well as 
the letters exchanged between the two parties were recorded by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s 
private secretary, Mühürdar Hasan Ağa.238 Mühürdar’s chronicle illustrated that Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa was the sole decision-maker throughout the entire process. Apparently, by 
time the army reached Belgrade, the Grand Vizier already had the intention of a military 
confrontation with the Austrians. When he met Austrian envoys who inquired about the 
possibility of renewing peace between the two states, he requested the return of Győr to 
the Ottoman Empire and evacuation of fortresses occupied by Austria. Envoys rejected 
both demands. At the last meeting, the Austrian envoy handed a letter to Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa written by Hofkriegsrat Präsident Lobkowicz, which the latter had signed as Duke 
of Sagan.239 The letter repeatedly mentioned friendliness and neighborliness, yet it did 
not promise anything Fazıl Ahmed Paşa expected. After this last meeting, the Grand 
Vizier refused to hold any further negotiations and ordered all Austrian representatives to 
be sent to Buda with guards and imprisoned.240    
 The eventual decision to lay siege to Nové Zámky was the Grand Vizier’s idea. 
Mühürdar Hasan Ağa noted in his history that from the moment the army’s march began 
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in the Balkans, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa ordered soldiers, commanders, and captives to be 
brought to him and conversed with them about Austrian fortresses. At the war council, he 
presented three alternative targets: Komárom, Győr, and Nové Zámky. Viziers and other 
commanders again left the decision to the Grand Vizier who judged Nové Zámky the 
most reasonable objective for strategic as well as climactic and geographical reasons.  
The Ottomans conquered Nové Zámky after a month long siege in the late 
summer of 1663 followed by the capturing of several smaller fortresses in the area. In 
mid-winter, Lobkowicz and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa exchanged mutually hostile letters 
blaming each other for the conflict. The letters made it clear that both decision-makers 
were ready for a major military confrontation.241 Skirmishes and reciprocal sieges laid to 
enemy fortresses continued until August 1, 1664 when a European coalition army 
commanded by Raimond Montecuccoli ambushed the Grand Vizier’s army as the latter 
was crossing the River Raab at Szentgotthárd. Many Ottoman generals and soldiers lost 
their lives. Yet, the Austrians, who had left the battlefield with less damage and 
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commitments against France at the time.242 Ten days after the battle, Simon Reniger and 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had exchanged final drafts of the Peace of Vasvár at the headquarters 
of the Ottoman army. 
  During the peace talks held with the Austrian ambassador, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was 
the only negotiator on behalf of the Ottoman Empire which illustrated the extent of 
authority and independence he retained as the grand vizier. Conditions of the peace were 
agreed upon between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Simon Reniger on August 10, 1664 at a 
confidential meeting at the Ottoman headquarters by Marzelli. The Grand Vizier, who did 
not want anybody except his kahya (chief steward) to witness the occasion, exchanged 
the articles inside his sleeping room and requested from Reniger “alles in gehaimb zu 
halten.” The articles still needed to be ratified by the Sultan and Emperor.243 
According to the next report of Reniger, sent from Neuhäusel on September 25, 
the moment Fazıl Ahmed Paşa disclosed the Peace of Vasvár the rest of the Ottoman  
                                                          
242 Ever since the military confrontation at Szentgotthárd in 1664, European and Hungarian historiography 
have questioned whether St. Gotthard was a missed opportunity to wipe the Ottoman out of Hungary. A 
recent article touching the issue is Katalin Toma, “Die friede von Eisenburg 1664 und seine Auswirkung 
auf die Positionierung der ungarischen politischen Elite,” in Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in 
interkulturellen Raumen: Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie in der Fruhen Neuzeit, ed. 
Arno Strohmeyer and Szabolcs Varga (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2013), 185–95. The war with France 
was a major factor that prevented the Habsburgs from continuing the fight, but it was not the only reason. 
According to a report dispatched by Simon von Reniger from the Ottoman headquarters by Waizen, exactly 
two weeks after the war, explains why Montecuccoli hesitated to chase the retreating Ottoman army. 
Reniger reported that despite the ambush and the damage inflicted, the Ottoman army still included 
100.000 men. Reniger reported that some believed the Turks had lost 10.000 man, but according to other 
“glaũbwürdige Personen” they had only lost 4.000 to 5.000 troops and 8.000 horses. The report also stated 
that a Hungarian renegade named Garba and the Ottoman regiment commander from Naģykanizsa had 
helped the Grand Vizier’s army retreat through forests and inconvenient roads back to safety. Simon 
Reniger von Reningen August 15, 1664, HHStA: Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 137. The information in 
Simon Reniger’s report regarding the shortage of provisions the Ottoman army suffered during the retreat 
from Szentgotthárd remarkably matched the descriptions provided by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s private secretary 
about the condition of the retreating army. Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevâhirü’t-Tevârih, 278.  







headquarters turned into a fine spectacle.244 Before the ratified copy of the treaty arrived 
from Vienna and finally was declared to the entire Ottoman camp, only the Grand 
Vizier’s kahya and few others had heard about the terms agreed upon at the secret 
meeting on August 10. Everybody gathered at the tent of the Grand Vizier to witness the 
occasion. Simon Reniger was welcomed by the Grand Vizier with considerable 
friendliness. Only six sergeants—rather than many more as usual—accompanied the 
ambassador during the meeting, a friendly gesture which also attracted the attention of 
the readers of Reniger’s report at the Hofburg. Reniger notified Vienna that the Grand 
Vizier treated him with “absonderlicher Freundlichkeit” and customarily presented him 
and two persons in his entourage with caftans. Upon a question by the ambassador 
regarding the arrival of the ratified version of the treaty from the Sultan, Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa stated that although he was the humblest servant of the Sultan, he had full power 
and sufficient knowledge from him that the moment Leopold I officially approves the 
determined articles of peace, it would likewise take effect on the Ottomans’ end.245 Thus, 
in the third year of his grand vizierate, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had captured an enemy 
stronghold, barely escaped calamity on the battlefield, and managed to turn the situation 
into an enviable success by taking advantage of the Habsburgs’ reluctance to launch a 
new war in the east. This was certainly an individual achievement; yet it also amplified 
the executive authority of the Sultan’s absolute deputy.  
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Next, the Grand Vizier focused on Candia, the Mediterranean stronghold of the 
Republic of Venice. The eventual surrender of Candia after twenty-five years of siege 
was fruit of the Grand Vizier’s determination during the last two years of the siege 
despite great challenges. Rumors of a campaign on Crete had begun to circulate after 
peace was signed with Austria, upon which the Republic of Venice began to seek 
diplomatic channels to hold on to Candia. In fact, when the campaign on Venice was 
announced, there existed an oppositionary group in the capital in favor of peace with the 
Republic.246 Also, opinions varied regarding how the operation should be carried out.247 
At the same time, such campaigns were realized through great financial difficulties. 
Ottoman sources were silent about social problems created by protracted campaigns 
during Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s time. Yet, as reflected in the report of an English council, it 
was quite possible that extra taxes levied on subjects to finance especially the final years 
of the Venetian campaign forced people to abandon their homes even in close proximity 
to the imperial capital.248 
Venice, too, was inclined to sign a treaty, but on its own terms. According to the 
Grand Vizier’s secretary, Mühürdar, at first the Republic offered to divide Crete into two 
halves controlled by the Ottomans and Venetians. The Ottoman court took this offer 
seriously. The old population and income registries of the island were controlled to 
calculate the financial circumstances that would occur after such a divide.249 Yet, the 
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offer was rejected. In the following months, Ottoman attacks increasingly intensified 
along with diplomatic initiatives of the Republic to hold on to Candia.250 There was 
considerable security on the island against surprise enemy attacks, yet the challenge came 
from elsewhere. One can read in the reports sent by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to the court that, 
by the late 1667, the Ottomans were already struggling with logistical problems as they 
quickly ran out of weaponry, while also suffering hard winter conditions unusual for 
Crete. Casualties were many. The situation obliged the Grand Vizier to stay on the island 
with the army during the winter.251 By early summer 1668, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa dispatched 
a report to the Sultan notifying the court about harsh conditions suffered until then, yet 
emphasizing the clear intention to continue until the city fell or surrendered.252 
 On November 1, 1668, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa recieved a hatt-ı humayûn (imperial 
edict) from Mehmed IV. At the time, the Sultan was in Yenişehir (Larissa) where he had 
moved to get closer to Crete upon news coming from the frontier about the critical 
circumstances. In the letter, the Sultan notified the Grand Vizier of the Venetian envoy 
Alvise da Molin253 who was on his way to the Sultan’s headquarters for peace talks. 
Mehmed IV directly asked Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s opinion about how he should proceed:  
Praise be to God, we have arrived in Yenişehir. Venetian envoy is also 
close by, but he has not yet come to my presence. My lala,254 what is your 
say? What answer shall we give to the envoy? If you really believe that the 
city will fall [soon], we can ask for the surrender of the city; but if the 
siege continues for another year, my ‘well-protected lands’ are unable to 
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provide troops, arsenal, weaponry, and other various needs. Immediately 
confer with [your dignitaries] and respond as soon as possible.255  
 
Mehmed IV’s addressing of the Grand Vizier as “benim lalam,” or “my lala” and 
his direct order asking for Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s opinion suggest that the Sultan respected 
the opinion of the Grand Vizier more than what conventional wisdom assumed about 
sultans’ independence concerning decision-making. Although Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 
expressed his opinions through the customary rhetoric of sultanic glorification (used in all 
reports and petitions presented to sultans), one may comfortably suggest that without the 
directives of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, Mehmed IV would hesitate about how to proceed in such 
a critical situation. In his response, the Grand Vizier emphasized that the city’s fall was 
close and, as a precaution, he also sent letters to various leading dignitaries at the court 
and asked for their support and prayers. 
Meanwhile, Alvise de Molin was offering expensive gifts to the courtiers at the 
headquarters who would agree to abandon Candia to the Republic. Continuation of war 
was becoming particularly intolerable for the Sultan, who would be the first target of 
subjects since extra taxes were depleting their already scarce assets. Mehmed IV sent 
another letter and asked the Grand Vizier one more time if the fall of the city was 
realistically possible. In his response, the Grand Vizier emphasized that “one foot was 
inside of the fortress.”256 
In the late March 1669, the Grand Vizier, who until then had rejected any offer by 
the Alvise de Molin and expected the surrender of Candia, sent a last message to the 
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envoy. It stated that the Ottoman Empire would accept the demolition of Candia and let 
Venice build another fortress somewhere else on the island. Alvise de Molin was not 
authorized by the Venetian Senate for the surrender of the city so he rejected the offer 
and was imprisoned in Chania. The siege continued. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s determination 
paid off on September 27, 1669 when the city surrendered. He entered the city a week 
later on October 4.  
The capturing of Candia was not significant in terms of strategic or financial 
benefits for the Ottoman Empire. After the siege, piracy continued in the Mediterranean, 
while the loss of population led to diminishing agricultural productivity and tax income 
for the Ottoman treasury.257 Yet, the Grand Vizier had resolutely continued the siege and 
achieved his objective despite considerably harsh geographical and climactic conditions, 
extreme financial difficulties in maintaining the siege which threatened the Sultan’s 
position, and the increasing insistence of courtiers and dignitaries who favored signing a 
peace agreement with the Republic. After the surrender of the city, the Grand Vizier 
retained some of the most fertile lands around Candia for himself. His holdings were 
positioned next to that of the dynasty and were referred to on the land registers with 
exactly the same wording as that of the Sultan, establishing “a sort of parity between the 
Sultan and his grand vizier.”258 Thus, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s achievements elevated the post 
of grand vizierate to an effectively peerless level in Ottoman bureaucracy by defeating 
the “peerless deceitful wrestler of seas,” while making the Köprülü line an unrivaled new 
powerhouse in the Empire. 
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During the following years, the Grand Vizier returned his attention to Europe for 
his last campaign. This time the objective was Poland. For the purposes of discussion in 
this section, one does not need to examine the finer details of the Ottoman campaign on 
Poland that began in the spring of 1672.259 However, as a last point, the rhetorical 
language that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa used in the letters he exchanged with the Polish Sejm, 
before launching the Polish campaign in 1672, is crucial to discussion of the Grand 
Vizier’s de facto power.  
Poland and Muscovy, in early 1667, had signed the Peace of Andrusovo. Upon 
being informed about the treaty, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had warned the Polish ambassador in 
Istanbul not to take initiatives against the Ottoman interest in cooperation with Muscovy. 
The ambassador was notified that the Ottoman Empire would not protect Poland, if the 
latter and Muscovy “mutually help each other,” and “sword does not intervene” between 
them.260 Yet peace remained in effect with influences on the Ottoman interests in Podolia 
and the Ukraine. Severely alienated by Poland and Muscovy and exposed to the 
aggressions of both, Petro Dorošenko, the Hetman of Zaporozhian Cossacks (1665-
1672), turned to the Ottoman Empire and asked for protection. In July 1667, his 
representatives had notified the Ottoman court that the Cossacks were ready to serve the 
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Sultan with their 50,000 men and asked for protection and regalia, to which the Ottomans 
concurred.261 However, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth continued its attacks on 
the Cossacks and appointed a new Hetman, Myxajlo Xanenko. To the surprise of the 
Poles, the Crimean Tatars supported the appointment of Xanenko against Dorošenko. 
Developments led to the replacement of the Crimean Khan by the Ottoman court and 
dispatch of a nasihatname (letter of advise) to the Polish court, but to no avail.262 Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa, now virtually the executive head of the Empire, could not condone such an 
act of hostility. In the winter of 1671-1672, the Ottoman Empire declared war on 
Poland.263  
On May 14, 1672, the Ottoman courier who had earlier taken the Sultan’s letter to 
the Polish court returned with a response. The letter emphasized that Ukraine was an 
inherited land of the Polish crown and did not belong to the Cossacks who were brigands. 
People living in Ukraine were Polish subjects just as Petro Dorošenko himself, who was a 
“bandit peasant” and lacked authority to seize an inherited land from Poland, let alone 
hand it over to another nation. The letter also notified the Ottoman court that a Polish 
envoy was on his way to Constantinople to solve the problem. For the Ottoman court and 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, such defiance of their authority was unacceptable. Although the letter 
sent by the Sejm was signed by King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669-1673), the 
Ottoman response addressed to the deputy of the King was written by the Grand Vizier: 
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…You wrote that Ukraine is your inherited estate and that its inhabitants 
your subjects. In reality, the owner of all sovereignty is the Lord of all 
universes. However, God’s sapient custom is such that when he wishes 
safety and fearlessness for the people of a land whose disorderliness and 
unrest is perennial, he brings them under the shadow of an Alexander-like 
ruler’s sword that repels fear…264  
 
That “Alexander-like” ruler was undoubtedly the Sultan. Yet as his absolute 
deputy and the possessor of his seal, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa himself was the actual bearer of 
that “sword that repels fear.” The letter asserted that the day the Ottoman court gave 
Petro Dorošenko regalia, the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their lands had become Ottoman 
protectorates. The Grand Vizier added that as of June 5, 1672, the Ottoman army was on 
its march from Adrianople to the frontier and concluded the letter with an imperious 
statement that was effectively an ultimatum: “Respond to our letter as soon as possible 
for you know that as we get closer to the frontier, each post requires a different verdict 
and response.”265 In the summer of 1672, the Ottoman Empire besieged Kamaniçe 
(Kamieniec Podolski). The city soon fell, forcing Poland to sign a peace agreement. The 
ensuing Treaty of Buczacz was agreed upon in October 1672, making Poland effectively 
an Ottoman vassal. When the Sejm refused to approve the treaty, however, the conflict 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Commonwealth was renewed and lasted until 
October 1676. That same month, the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, bedridden for 
months due to his sickness, died after fifteen years as grand vizier. 
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Contemporary observer Paul Rycaut, who had spent a long time in the Ottoman 
Empire with various assignments from the English crown, left detailed remarks about 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. Rycaut, who wrote that he had often seen the Grand Vizier and knew 
him well, generously praised and even glorified Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. He praised the second 
Köprülü’s ability to deal with his father’s enemies and the mother sultan, as well as to 
“conserve himself in the unalterable esteem of his Sovereign to the last hour of his 
death.” He called him a “prudent and politick person” and wrote that he was gentle and 
moderate “beyond the example of former times.” He was “generous and free from 
Avarice” and was “greatly addicted to all the Formalities” of Law due to his education in 
that field. His justice was practiced punctually and severely. Rycaut believed that the 
Grand Vizier had accomplished many achievements in a short time (“15 years and 8 
days”) and, therefore, when measured by his triumphs, he “might seem to have lived but 
little to his Prince and People.” However, Rycaut added, the Grand Vizier “could not dye 
more seasonable, nor in a greater height and eminency of glory.”266   
If the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa had marked the restoration of the 
court’s authority in the capital and across the Empire by a sâhib’ül-seyf statesman, Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa’s term marked the accumulation of full administrative and executive power 
at the hands of another representative of such a sâhib’ül-seyf archetype. Köprülü 
Mehmed Paşa had faced challenges to his authority from different directions. Yet, as I 
have illustrated above, it was during his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s term in office that the  
                                                          
266 Sir Paul Rycaut, The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677 Containing the 
Reigns of the Three Last Emperours, Viz., Sultan Morat or Amurat IV, Sultan Ibrahim, and Sultan 
Mahomet IV, His Son, the XIII Emperour Now Reigning, Early English Books, 1641-1700 / 437:11 







possessor of the seal of sultan practically possessed unrivaled power in state affairs, if 
only in theory second to that of the sultan. Therefore, in the ninth year of Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa’s grand vizierate, Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi’s reiteration of the privileges given by a 
sultans to his “absolute deputy” was more than rhetorical utterance; it reflected a reality 
of the time as practiced by the incumbent grand vizier. Such increased leverage of grand 
vizierate in Ottoman decision-making mechanism vis-à-vis the sultan would have 
remarkable impact on the next grand vizierate. 
Another significant influence of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s grand vizierate on his 
successor was his physical absence from the capital and the Sultan’s court during nine of 
the thirteen years he held the sultan’s seal. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was away from the 
court, Kara Mustafa Paşa, whom the former addressed as “my brother” in the 
administrative letters they exchanged, would function as the rikâb-ı hümayun kaymakamı 
(deputy for the grand vizier) and accompany Mehmed IV everywhere. Kara Mustafa Paşa 
also substituted Fazıl Ahmed Paşa at dîvan (imperial council) meetings during the latter’s 
illness. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa eventually died, Kara Mustafa Paşa and Mehmed IV 
were no different from two close friends with consequences extending to the decision of 
the Vienna campaign. Therefore, one has to begin a thorough examination of Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’ career from the days he served under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.       
 
Kara  Mustafa Paşa: his career before grand vizierate 
In his campaign chronicle of the Köprülü family, chronicler Hüseyin Behçeti denoted 







the world; Mustafa Paşa received the seal of sultan.”267 Adopted at early ages by 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, Kara Mustafa Paşa was a protégé of the Köprülü family. He 
served at varios positions at the palace, until finally becoming the deputy grand vizier 
under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. During the final months of the latter’s grand vizierate, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa also substituted him at imperial councils, a clear sign that he would assume 
the same position. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa eventually died in the fall of 1676, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa became the second member of the Köprülü line to inherit the grand 
vizierate.  
 Kara Mustafa Paşa was born in Merzifon in 1634/35 (hijri 1044), hence the 
appellation Merzifonlu or Merzifonî, meaning ‘from Merzifon.’268 His father, Oruç Bey, 
was a sipahi who died during Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640)’s Baghdad campaign in 
1638/39. Contemporary sources indicate that Oruç and Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, who was 
a sancak beyi (district governor) at the time were close friends. Upon his father’s death, 
Mustafa entered Köprülü’s household at the age of four and became his protégé.269 
Mustafa and Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s elder son, Ahmed, were of the same age; they grew 
up and received education together. At approximately the age of 20, Mustafa married 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s daughter. During the grand vizierate of Köprülü, Mustafa first 
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served his father-in-law as telhisçi (clerk responsible with writing of grand vizieral telhis, 
or reports presented to sultan) and then as silahdar (swordkeeper page who also 
functioned as a secretary). Upon bringing the news of the conquest of Yanova (Ineu) to 
the court in September 1658, the Sultan appointed Mustafa as küçük mirâhur (deputy to 
the chief supervisor of the sultan’s stables). Two years later, he became the governor of 
Silistre Province, followed by governorship of Diyarbekir Province as a vizier. When 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa became the grand vizier in 1661, Kara Mustafa Paşa was appointed 
kaptan-ı deryâ (admiral) which he retained until 1666. During Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s 
Hungarian campaign, Kara Mustafa Paşa also became the rikâb-ı hümâyun kaymakamı 
(deputy for the grand vizier) for the first time. His second term in this position was during 
the Cretan campaign (1666-1669). He joined the Polish campaign in 1672 and was one of 
the three commanders during the siege of Kamaniçe. After the fall of the city, he held 
peace talks with Polish envoys before the signing of the Treaty of Buczacz. When the war 
was renewed the next campaign season, he commanded raids on Polish fortresses. During 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s sickness in the later months of his grand vizierate, Kara Mustafa 
Paşa was the former’s proxy at imperial councils, a clear sign of his ensuing assumption 
of the grand vizierate. On November 5, 1676, Kara Mustafa Paşa became the Grand 
Vizier. 
 As suggested by this brief overview of Kara Mustafa Pasha’s career before grand 
vizierate, by the time he was invested with the sultan’s seal, he had already established 
himself as an experienced, well-connected, self-assured individual inside the court and 
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within the bureaucracy. Furthermore, Kara Mustafa Pasha built substantial intimacy with 
Sultan Mehmed IV whom he physically accompanied when his predecessor was away 
from the court due to campaigns. His ascent to predominance in Ottoman bureaucracy 
and decision-making processes, however, occurred definitively after his appointment as 
rikâb-ı hümâyun kaymakamı.   
The deputy grand viziers were second in rank to the incumbent grand vizier. 
Therefore, the holder of that position had to be someone who would not plot against the 
grand vizier when he was away from the capital. From the beginning to the end of his 
term, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa usually arranged Kara Mustafa Paşa’s appointment to this post. 
Only during the Polish campaign between 1673 and 1676, a favorite and son-in-law of 
the Sultan, Musahib Mustafa Paşa, briefly occupied that post. Most likely to prevent a 
potential conflict between his own favorite and the Grand Vizier’s favorite, Mehmed IV 
had sent letters to each of the two Mustafas as early as February of 1667. Written in the 
form of hatt-ı hümâyûn (edict with the sultanic sign) and delivered as the two paşas were 
having a feast together at the palace, the letters asked them to develop “further mutual 
understanding and solidarity.”270 However, it was the Grand Vizier’s favorite—not the 
Sultan’s closest companion—who gradually asserted his authority in the absence of Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa. 
As rikâb-ı hümâyun kaymakamı, Kara Mustafa Paşa dealt with many issues 
regarding justice, security, and international relations, at times virtually modifying the 
Sultan’s will. In November 1664, when the Sultan’s pavilion was in Yanbolu (Yambol) 







believed to be his companion were caught in Anatolia and brought to the presence of 
Mehmed IV who ordered their execution. The next day, as Sultan was watching a game 
of jeered.271 Derdhanoğlu was mounted on horseback with flambeaus attached to his 
shoulders, paraded through the town center and bazaar, and then executed. However, 
before the execution of the second person, Kara Mustafa Paşa told the Sultan that they 
“had no knowledge of the man who is accused of Derdhanoğlu’s companionship 
committing acts that require execution according to law.”272 The man was not executed. 
Apparently unhappy with the decision, Mehmed IV later invited Kara Mustafa Paşa to his 
presence and asked why Derdhanoğlu’s companion was not executed. The Sultan thought 
that if the latter was a “good man,” he would not have been caught with a brigand. 
According to Abdi Paşa, who witnessed the conversation, Kara Mustafa responded that 
before the execution the slain brigand had confessed that the second man was innocent 
and that they were not companions. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the Sultan still 
ordered imprisonment of the man and further investigations to be carried out in 
Adrianople.273 At a second instance, the Sultan let Kara Mustafa Paşa inspect and 
investigate the case of a man accused of banditry. Again, Kara Mustafa Paşa decided that 
the man was not culpable. Instead, he ordered the arrest of the governor who had handed 
over the man to the court.274 Both cases are significant examples of Kara Mustafa Pasha’s 
influence on the Sultan’s will. Most remarkably, Kara Mustafa Paşa was one of three 
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individuals who interrogated the false Jewish Messiah Sabbatai Zevi on September 16, 
1666.275 However, it should be noted that although frequently soliciting his opinion, the 
Sultan did not always agree with Kara Mustafa Paşa.276 
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s role as the deputy grand vizier was not limited to judiciary 
issues. He actively participated in the administration of the Empire. He fulfilled 
ceremonial duties during appointments and valedictions. He accompanied the Sultan at 
ceremonies such as the arrival of the Egyptian treasury to the capital.277 The Sultan at 
many times invited Kara Mustafa Paşa to his presence and conferred with him about 
various matters such as complaints about provincial governors.278 Another noteworthy 
aspect of their closeness was the friendship he had established with the Sultan. At all 
hunting sessions, either Kara Mustafa Paşa himself or his pages escorted Mehmed IV. 
When the Sultan wished, Kara Mustafa Paşa played jereed and some sort of a lance 
game, or shot arrows for exhibition with other courtiers.279 
The sultan and kaymakam had a working relationship at other occasions. In 
November 1667, when heavy rainfall halted the advance of the Sultan to Yenişehir 
(Larissa) during the Cretan campaign, the Sultan dispatched a special raincoat to Kara 
Mustafa Paşa. The narrator of the occasion, Abdi Paşa, noted that such a compliment 
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from the Sultan “proclaimed [Kara Mustafa Paşa’s] rank of dignity.”280 Four years later 
in May 1671, mud and puddles interrupted the advance of the Sultan and his entourage at 
Mustafa Paşa Bridge (Svilengrad) by the Meriç (Maritsa) River. As the river flooded, the 
entire army, including the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s pavilion, remained under 
water except that of Kara Mustafa Paşa who then evacuated his tent for the Sultan’s 
use.281 At several occasions, the Sultan went to Kara Mustafa Paşa’s mansion in the 
capital for state ceremonies.282 In 1675, during the festivities held for the birth of a new 
heir to the throne, Mehmed IV promised to wed his sister with Kara Mustafa Paşa, adding 
kinship to their closeness.283  
The most assertive roles Kara Mustafa Paşa assumed as the deputy grand vizier 
were during diplomatic talks and negotiations in addition to during his command of the 
Ottoman-Polish War of 1672-1676.284 The Sultan and Kara Mustafa Paşa privately 
discussed many critical issues, especially before audiences held for foreign envoys and 
ambassadors. It was Kara Mustafa Paşa who—probably after consultation with the Grand 
Vizier—admitted Petro Dorošenko’s request for protection from the Ottoman court.285 In 
the summer of 1669, during negotiations with the Venetian envoy, Kara Mustafa Paşa 
imprisoned the envoy, who then sent a letter to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa for his release. That 
summer, during the meetings held at the presence of the Sultan as the siege of Candia 
was still underway and the Venetian envoy was offering great sums to the Sultan’s 
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courtiers for a resolution, Kara Mustafa Paşa was the only statesman who supported the 
Grand Vizier’s decision of continuing the siege at all costs.286 
During the Polish campaign in 1672, Kara Mustafa Paşa took an active role for 
the first time in the planning and administration of a campaign and the execution of a 
siege. During the march to Kamaniçe (Kamieniec Podolski), the Ottoman army suffered 
severe provisional shortcomings for which the commanders in the army held the Voivode 
of Wallachia responsible. Kara Mustafa Pasha personally faced and reprimanded the 
Voivode, who immediately handled the problem.287 Before the siege was launched, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa inspected the environs of the fortress along with several other paşas and 
determined where each of the three flanks would be positioned. The siege was eventually 
executed according to his report and during the brief siege of Kamaniçe, he was one of 
the three commanders.288 After the fall of the city, Kara Mustafa Paşa—not the Grand 
Vizier who was also present at the army headquarters—held talks on behalf of the 
Ottoman Empire with Polish envoys between October 15 and 18. On October 18, 1672 
Kara Mustafa Paşa and the envoys finally agreed on the articles of the Treaty of Buczacz. 
However, when the Polish Sejm refused ratifying the treaty, the war between the Ottoman 
Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was renewed the following year. During 
the war that lasted until 1676, Kara Mustafa Paşa carried out raids on Polish fortresses 
along the border. Such active roles in all aspects of decision-making and statecraft helped 
Kara Mustafa Paşa become one of the powerhouses at the Ottoman court even before he 
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assumed grand vizierate. Nevertheless, it was not only Kara Mustafa Paşa who rose to 
prominence as he also secured positions for his kapı (plural: kapılar) or household.289 The 
gradual penetration of the members of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s kapı into the Ottoman 
bureaucracy through similar methods even before his grand vizierate also deserves 
attention.  
Indeed, the diffusion of the members of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s household into the 
Ottoman bureaucracy was a phenomenon in its own right and it directly relates to the 
recently growing debate regarding the expansion of the “political nation” in the 
seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire as dynastic authority shrank.290 Earlier researches 
had already shown that the leading figures of this expanding “political nation” were 
members of Ottoman grandee households. Over the seventeenth century, the domination 
of these groups in decision-making processes gradually grew. The trend had actually 
gained phenomenal significance especially with Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, who himself was 
once a protégé of another Kara Mustafa Paşa, a fellow Albanian.291 Nonetheless, despite 
previously published works and recent growing interest especially about individuals from 
ilmiyye (scholarly and judicial circles), the structure of seventeenth-century Ottoman 
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grandee households and their diffusion into the Ottoman bureaucracy are yet to be 
explored panoptically, including that of Kara Mustafa Paşa.292 The thematic boundaries 
of this study do not allow a complete analysis of the expansion of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
household and its members’ diffusion into the Ottoman bureaucracy. For purposes of this 
study, however, it is necessary to show Kara Mustafa Paşa’s relationship with the 
Köprülü family and the gradual penetration of some of his loyal servants to key positions 
in Ottoman administration.  
What enabled the preliminary expansion of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s household in the 
imperial administration was his protection by the Köprülüs. I have already mentioned the 
positions Kara Mustafa Paşa held during the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa 
who was his father-in-law. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s sphere of influence expanded remarkably 
during the second Köprülü regime. Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his deputy Kara 
Mustafa Paşa knew each other since early childhood. Because of this closeness, Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa was able to stay away from the capital for extended periods of time; he was 
virtually safe against plots that could be organized by potential opponents. Official letters 
exchanged between the two illustrate the closeness between the Grand Vizier and his 
deputy. In the letters, the Grand Vizier atypically called Kara Mustafa Paşa “my brother” 
in addition to the honorific formulation used for a vizier. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa also signed 
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his letters as “sincerely loving Ahmed,” while his deputy’s signature humbled himself as 
“your servant Mustafa.”293 Such outspoken expressions added a noticeably humane 
aspect to the otherwise strict hierarchy between viziers and grand viziers. 
Such good relations also benefited to those relatives of Kara Mustafa Paşa who 
entered the larger Köprülü household. An incident recorded in the chronicle of Kamaniçe 
campaign in 1672 mentioned one Hüseyin, a nephew of Kara Mustafa Paşa. Hüseyin was 
the servant of a wealthy man named Hasan Ağa, the incumbent Grand Vizier Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa’s uncle. Hasan Ağa also owned a farm near a location where the imperial 
army camped for a night in June 1672. That evening, Mehmed IV’s Haseki,294 who 
apparently accompanied the Sultan during the early phases of the army’s march to the 
frontier, visited Hasan Ağa’s farm. In the presence of the Haseki, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
nephew Hüseyin rode a horse that performed a special gait, and then he presented several 
bundles of gifts to the Haseki Sultan. Pleased with the performance and gifts, the Haseki 
rewarded Hüseyin with 150 gold coins. As much as it was a rare occurrence, Mehmed IV 
and his Haseki’s visit to a farm in the countryside owned by an uncle of the Grand Vizier 
unmistakably illustrate the trust the Köprülü family had gained from the dynasty.295 At 
the same time, the gold coins that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s nephew received from the Haseki 
Sultan was a prophetic moment foretelling who would inherit the legacy of the Köprülüs.  
Taking advantage of his privileged position as the deputy grand vizier, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa had secured the appointment of individuals from his household as 
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müteferrika (a general career line for viziers’ servants), sancak beyi (district commander), 
and mirâhur.296 However, there were times when he also abused his power to eliminate 
individuals he did not like. In the summer of 1669, one Mehmed Paşa, the commander of 
Nové Zámky, was executed on the orders of the Sultan for not preventing the Austrians’ 
construction of a new fortress on the border. Mehmed Paşa’s head arrived in the capital 
on July 23, 1669. Chronicler Silahdar recorded that the dead paşa was actually innocent. 
Upon hearing about the construction of the fortress, Mehmed Paşa had sent a report to the 
capital and asked for instructions about how he should have handled the situation. Such 
reports were presented to the Sultan through Kara Mustafa Paşa, the deputy grand vizier 
at the time. Apparently a “sworn enemy” of Mehmed Paşa, the deputy grand vizier did 
not present the report to the Sultan. He waited until the construction was finished and 
then presented to the Sultan a false report stating that the commander of Nové Zámky had 
received a bribe from the Austrians and, in turn, had let them build a fortress; then the 
Sultan ordered the execution of Mehmed Paşa.297  
Observations of contemporaries illustrate how Kara Mustafa Paşa diligently 
secured himself inside the court after his appointment to the grand vizierate. Part of that 
security came from his predecessor’s household. In The History of the Turkish Empire, 
Paul Rycaut wrote that, upon Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s death, Kara Mustafa Paşa sent an 
“obliging and courteous Message to the Servants of the deceased Vizier.”298 He consoled 
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them and promised “to take them and their Concern[s] into his Care and Protection.” He 
recruited his predecessor’s kapıcılar kahyası (chief steward) for his own service. His first 
key appointments as the new Grand Vizier was the advancement of Süleyman Ağa, Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa’s kethüda (chamberlein), to the post of büyük mirâhur (chief supervisor of 
the sultan’s stables), which Rycaut described as “a place of not only of honor, but of great 
security.”299 This was certainly a strategic appointment; beyond their duty to take care of 
the Sultan’s stables, mirâhurs traditionally fulfilled many bureaucratic duties on sultans’ 
order and on behalf of the court. At the same time, it was a key rank for later promotions 
within the Ottoman bureaucracy.300 Kara Mustafa Paşa himself had occupied this post 
briefly during the times of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. Also, previously in the summer of 
1671, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s own kethüda Kara İbrahim Ağa had first become küçük 
mirâhur (deputy supervisor of the sultan’s stables) and then büyük mirâhur in a matter of 
month.301 Kara İbrahim Ağa held that position until the death of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. When 
the grand vizierate transferred in November 1676, Kara İbrahim Ağa left his post to the 
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of deputy to Kara Mustafa Paşa.302 Thereby, the new Grand Vizier strengthened himself  
both with his own entourage and the loyal members of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s kapı. 
In his report dispatched to Vienna on November 25, 1676, after these 
appointments were made, the Austrian ambassador Johann Christoph von Kindsperg 
mentioned Kara Mustafa Paşa, Kara İbrahim Ağa, and Süleyman Ağa together. He wrote 
that this “united board of three supervisors” would govern the Monarchy according to the 
Sultan’s pleasure. He also added that these were not the only appointments; other officers 
were also replaced by new ones. According to the ambassador’s interpretation, the new 
Grand Vizier was employing his “creaturas” with the supposition that “he would also bit 
by bit replace, among others, the paşas that did not befit him.” 303  
 When evaluated within the larger trends of seventeenth century Ottoman history, 
the transition of the grand vizierate from Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara Mustafa Paşa was a 
significant event. Having spent two decades with two prudent and successful Köprülü 
grand viziers, Mehmed IV must have been completely comfortable entrusting his seal to a 
protégé of the Köprülü family. In essence, the Sultan’s choice counters widespread 
perceptions about the Ottoman decision-making mechanism’s irrationality in the  
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seventeenth century. As much as it was a manifestation of the dignity the Köprülü family 
had attained by the mid-1670s, Mehmed IV’s handing the seal not to his own favorite 
Musahib Mustafa Paşa but to a member of the Köprülü household proves existence of a 
rational governing mentality that was perceptive and judicious. It also illustrates that the 
guiding principles of that governing mentality were stability and continuity.  
The challenge to the stability and continuity Köprülüs so carefully established 
originated from an unexpected direction: Unlike the Austrian ambassador Kindsperg’s 
assumption that the Empire would be ruled by a “united board of three supervisors,” the 
Empire would be ruled single-handedly by Kara Mustafa Paşa. As illustrated above, 
when Kara Mustafa Paşa assumed office, he was the most powerful executive authority in 
the Empire. What made him so powerful even at the earliest stages of his grand vizierate 
was not any of his earlier achievements; it was the legacy of his predecessors. Few grand 
viziers in the entire history of the Empire inherited the legacy that Kara Mustafa Paşa had 
taken from the Köprülüs. Considering complex human psychology, succession to such a 
man as Fazıl Ahmed Paşa must have been an honor whose career at the highest executive 
office of a massive empire was full of glory. At the same time, such a predecessor who 
managed to survive many difficulties must have been a burden on the next person 
assuming that position; expectations were then much higher. Perhaps, in addition to his 
grand vizieral duties, Kara Mustafa Paşa had to cope with the legacy of Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa, who handled state affairs comfortably and charismatically.  
 In the next chapter, I will illustrate in the light of Austrian diplomatic reports sent 
from Istanbul to Vienna between November 1676 and December 1678 how Kara Mustafa 







office. A report written by the Austrian ambassador Kindsperg in August 1677 notified 
Vienna that the Grand Vizier had become “a vehement man, who satisfied neither 
Christians nor Turks.”304 Given the respect and authority the post of grand vizierate had 
gained under Köprülüs, the appointment of a “vehement man” to that position would be 
conducive to unexpected, unpredicted, and undesired results
                                                          





















PART THREE: AUSTRIAN-HABSBURG DIPLOMACY DURING THE GRAND 






CHAPTER 4: THE ORIGINS OF HABSBURG-OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND 





Pre-1683 Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy 
On December 30, 1672 the Austrian resident ambassador at Constantinople, Giambattista 
Casanova, received a farewell audience in Adrianople from the Grand Vizier Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa. The audience took place at Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s private office. Casanova’s 
successor, Johann Christoph von Kindsperg, who had recently arrived from Vienna to 
Adrianople, was also present at the meeting. Two days after the meeting, on January 1, 
1673 Kindsperg became the new Habsburg ambassador in the Ottoman Empire. The 
arrival of a new Habsburg ambassador to the Ottoman lands and the departure of his 
predecessor was not a novelty for either state.305 There had been a resident Habsburg 
ambassador in the Ottoman capital since 1547 and during the following centuries 
ambassadors regularly dispatched reports from the Ottoman lands to Vienna.  
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Before I embark on my analysis of Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s 
negotiations with Kara Mustafa Paşa, starting from the latter’s assumption of office in 
November 1676, I will first discuss the general patterns of the Austrian-Ottoman 
diplomatic exchanges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
Hyperactivity vs. unilateralism  
A great majority of the Habsburg diplomatic documents concerning the Habsburg-
Ottoman diplomacy between the early 1500s and the end of the First World War are 
today located inside the vaults of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) at 
Minoritenplatz, in the first district of the Austrian capital Vienna. Known as the Turcica 
series, the collections concerning Turkish diplomacy at HHStA consist of eight parts. In 
addition to diplomatic reports and instructions, these series include many other primary 
sources directly related to the Austrian-Ottoman interactions across the centuries. For the 
pre-1683 Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy, there are 152 cardboard boxes under the Turcica 
I series. These boxes hold tens of thousands of reports and instructions written largely in 
German, but also in Italian, Latin, and French, as well as few in Ottoman Turkish.  
Couriers once hauled these documents back and forth between the Habsburg and 
Ottoman capitals. However, the archival sources concerning the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
relations with the Ottoman Empire are but a minute portion of the colossal collection of 
textual artifacts the hyperactive Austrian diplomacy produced during the history of the 
Monarchy. I call the Austrian diplomacy hyperactive, because the more one studies early 
modern Habsburg diplomatic documents the stronger becomes the conviction that given 







had become the key policy instrument at the Viennese court. Historians of Austria have 
usually expressed the primacy of diplomacy in Austrian policy-making by the Rankean 
trope of “Primat der Außenpolitik.” Such dependence on diplomacy was a forced 
outcome of the unique circumstances surrounding the Monarchy rather than being a 
deliberate decision, but it shows that the Habsburgs had successfully turned their 
weakness into a strength and opportunity. The inability of the Monarchy to intimidate 
their prospective enemies on the battlefield inspired the Hofburg to develop a European-
wide diplomatic network. Whenever the Monarchy needed to convince enemies or attract 
potential allies, the Hofburg first intensified the traffic on that diplomatic network, 
frequently attaining its objectives.  
A decision-making mechanism built greatly upon information-gathering through a 
diplomatic network could function effectively only if that network supplied on a regular 
basis the statesmen at the center with reliable facts and observations about the condition 
of enemies and allies. Researchers of Austrian diplomacy will quickly notice at HHStA 
that the dates in the archive’s information system for diplomatic records concerning 
relations with the thirty Außerdeutsche Staaten (mostly European and few non-European) 
go as far back as the early 1500s, with several extending even further back. Starting from 
such early times, Austrian agents in foreign countries operated as the tentacles of a 
massive intelligence and surveillance system. The agents continuously informed Vienna 
about the conditions at all European courts of primary and secondary importance.  
As duly noted by the experts of the Austrian foreign policy, the Monarchy’s 







every direction, only increased the need for such a network.306 Frequently threatened by 
the aggressiveness, expansionism, and whims of its neighbors, the Habsburg Monarchy 
became a conservative state out of necessity, often struggling to preserve the status quo 
along its borders and across the continent. In such circumstances, the preservation of the 
status quo was not the only goal. Austrian diplomacy was also a key instrument in 
attracting allies, because the Habsburgs by themselves could hardly handle existential 
threats to their territorial integrity. Potential allies did not necessarily consist of the so-
called European great powers. Especially after Leopold’s Wahlkapitulation in 1658, 
Vienna increasingly treated the princes in Germany as allies, although they were vassals 
of the Emperor in theory. Moreover, the Habsburgs did not simply request the 
cooperation of the German princes; they wanted to secure “the unanimity of princes [and] 
established a consensual relationship that appealed more readily to the princes’ sense of 
self-interest and independence.”307 In other words, the decision-makers in Vienna knew 
that they could maintain the status quo in international level only through “combined 
consensus of domestic elites and foreign allies,”308 and diplomacy was the most effective 
means to that end.  
Historians have often interpreted the Hofburg’s continuous dependence on 
domestic and foreign consensus as a sign of the so-called “Habsburg clemency.”309 The 
phrase is displeasing for scholars who—intentionally but to a great extent unjustifiably—
view in early modern Austria a great military power. Such a point of view fits to the 
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progressive narrative that I analyzed earlier. R.J.W. Evans, for instance, once described 
the “Austrian clemency” as “a figment of historians’ imagination.”310 Yet, even scholars 
who reject “Austrian clemency” as a cliché and compare the Monarchy’s military 
capabilities to Louis XIV’s France or eighteenth century Prussia admitted that Austria 
was often in need of “double-consensus” (with domestic elites and foreign allies). 311  
The Monarchy’s incessant search for consensus through diplomacy may appear to 
some as a sign of weakness, but the clement Austrians were not ordinary diplomats. The 
Monarchy’s survival through many political and social crises was primarily a result of its 
ceaseless search for consensus augmented by hyperactive diplomacy. There is a 
significant contradiction, therefore, in downplaying the so-called Habsburg clemency for 
the sake of portraying the Monarchy as a mighty power. It is true that many parameters 
that Vienna could not control frequently helped the Monarchy’s preservation, but a 
survey of early modern Habsburg diplomatic artifacts show that if the Hofburg 
successfully orchestrated and employed any of these parameters for survival, it was the 
diplomatic processes. The “outcome-focused” master narrative of Austrian history often 
highlights the products of those diplomatic processes, such as alliances and treaties, and 
neglects to incorporate into that narrative the Monarchy’s diplomatic hyperactivity as a 
major factor behind its longevity.      
The Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic encounters played a very critical role in that 
longevity. The diplomatic contacts and exchanges between the two states were always 
intense and often yielded important consequences, primarily due to the geographical 
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proximity between the Habsburg capital and the Ottoman territory. From the 1520s on, 
the Ottoman military presence was within hours’ reach of Vienna. Therefore, just as the 
Monarchy needed “double-consensus” at home and abroad in Europe, it needed double-
vigilance against the Ottomans. Cognizant of that necessity, the first Austrian ambassador 
arrived in Constantinople in 1546. During the following centuries, the Habsburg 
ambassadors at the Ottoman capital supplied Vienna with reliable facts and observations 
that could be analyzed retrospectively and used instantaneously. The ceaseless 
conveyance of diligently detailed reports from the Ottoman lands not only helped the 
decision-makers at the Hofburg maintain a high level of alertness, but also provided them 
a remarkable advantage in the long-run: there was asymmetrical flow of information. The 
flow of information was asymmetrical, because the Ottomans had a non-reciprocal and 
unilateral diplomatic approach toward Christian states. The Ottoman Empire did not 
modify that understanding even after the emergence of first residential embassies in 
Renaissance Italy.312  
With the lack of permanent Ottoman representatives in Vienna, the Ottoman 
surveillance relied on a variety of other methods. The Sublime Porte’s most important 
information sources were special envoys and couriers sporadically sent to the Habsburg 
                                                          
312 The first residential Ottoman embassies in Europe were opened at the end of the eighteenth century and 
they did not become effectual until the 1820s. J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State 
System,” Middle East Journal 15, no. 2 (1961): 141–52. The Ottoman Empire established its first 
residential embassy in Europe as late as 1793 in London, to be followed by Berlin, Vienna, and Paris. A 
brief survey of the first Ottoman embassies is, Ercüment Kuran, Avrupa’da Osmanlı ikamet elçiliklerinin 
kuruluşu ve ilk elçilerin siyasi faâliyetleri 1793-1821 [The establishment of first Ottoman residential 
embassies in Europe and the activities of first ambassadors 1793-1821] (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1988). The British capital was selected as the first location only because the French Revolution 
prevented the Ottomans from opening an embassy in France, the so-called traditional ally of the Ottoman 
Empire. Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy,” in Ottoman Diplomacy: 
Conventional or Unconventional?, ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave 







capital by the court or the paşa at Buda. Other sources of information were governors 
along the frontier, Jewish and Greek subjects travelling in Europe, captured enemy 
soldiers, the sultan’s European vassals, and the foreign ambassadors in Istanbul.313 Such 
channels provided the Ottoman court with sufficiently reliable information, and the 
system worked effectively as long as the Ottomans were militarily superior. Indeed, 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman statesmen often surprised 
foreign representatives with their knowledge about the European affairs. In the final 
stage, however, the Ottoman methods of information-gathering in Europe lacked the 
personal connections that a resident Habsburg ambassador carefully established in the 
Ottoman capital. Therefore, the Ottoman agents in Europe could not fathom the dynamics 
of the Viennese court as efficiently as an Austrian ambassador could do for the Ottoman 
court; hence the asymmetry in the flow of information and surveillance between Vienna 
and Istanbul.    
Today, the difference between the information-gathering methods of the two 
states is best observed at their archives. The Turcica series at HHStA are rich and 
complete enough to enable the researcher to determine, from the Habsburg perspective, 
the short-term and long-term patterns in Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic exchanges. At 
Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri (Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives, BOA) in Istanbul, 
one is not able to analyze the Ottoman diplomacy in a similar fashion, despite the vast 
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array of material in the Ottoman archives. The reason is that the Ottoman bureaucracy did 
not produce until the early 1800s diplomatic documents matching the Turcica series. The 
closest collection at BOA, the series of Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri (the registers of the 
foreign states), contain analyzable data only for the post-1740 period, and even for that 
period their content is still not comparable to the information available at the Austrian 
archives. The scarcity of early modern diplomatic documents necessitates Ottomanists to 
knit their analyses from piecemeal information scattered across a large variety of archival 
documents. Therefore, the Turcica series at HHStA are of immense significance for a full 
comprehension of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy and its dynamics. 
Based on the Turcica collections, the Germanophone Habsburg historiography has 
produced a vast literature on Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy and delineated the general 
patterns of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic exchanges. 
 
An historical overview of the Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy 
Historians often mention that, in pre-1700 Europe, the Ottomans were regarded as the 
hostis naturalis totius Christianitatis.314 The reality was different. The Ottoman Empire 
had economic importance for England, the Dutch Republic, and Venice. Only for the 
latter did it also pose a military threat. France, too, had economic interests in the Levant 
and it also had a “marriage of convenience” with the Ottomans due to common (though 
mostly unfeasible) political goals, but a break of relations would not harm either party 
significantly. The rivalry between the Spanish and Ottoman fleets in the Mediterranean in 







existential challenge only for Austria, because the Habsburg hereditary lands in Central 
Europe (Erblande) were exposed to the direct and indirect impacts of the so-called 
“natural enemy.”315 It has been argued that one could measure at Istanbul this varying 
intensity of relations between the Sublime Porte and the European states by looking at 
where the ambassador of each respective state resided. There might be some truth in that: 
The English, Dutch, Venetian and French ambassadors customarily lived among the non-
Muslim/merchant dominated quarters of the city, whereas the Habsburg envoys stayed, 
until the 1650s, in the close proximity to the Ottoman palace.316 
The rivalry between the Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire was such that, 
for militarily minded historians, the conflict between the two states was a “crusade-like 
faith and culture war” which involved “total confrontation.”317 It is indeed difficult to 
shun such conflict-based approaches, which have traditionally dominated the 
historiography of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman interactions.318 Inside the 
historical geography of both states, “legends, traditions, collective memory, traumatic 
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experiences, future anxieties and apocalyptic prophecies” as well as the politicization of 
historiography helped the spread of mutually antagonistic perspectives about the assumed 
enemy.319 Accordingly, the diplomatic encounters between the Habsburg Monarchy and 
the Ottoman Empire can only be described as apprehensive. The envoys of both parties 
felt themselves as soldiers at all encounters, as a “tenacious struggle” continued behind 
the scenes for small details that had huge symbolic importance.320  
Despite such symbolic rivalry and frequent military confrontations, the diplomatic 
contacts and exchanges between the Habsburgs and Ottomans often resulted in peaceful 
conclusions. It is often noted that the wars between the two states between 1526 and 1792 
lasted for a total of 80 years. Less emphasized is that fact that the two states also signed 
65 peace treaties and armistices during their respective histories. For that reason, any 
narrative that ignores diplomatic encounters between the Habsburg and Ottoman states 
produces a “distorted picture.”321  
The first Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, Johann Maria 
Malvezzi, had arrived in the Ottoman capital in 1546 as the special envoy Gerhard 
Veltwyck’s secretary. Malvezzi was the first resident Habsburg ambassador in the 
Ottoman lands, but he was not the first imperial agent. The first imperial representative, 
Fiume Hans von Thurn, had visited the Ottoman capital in 1497.322 The first Turkish 
representative in Vienna, on the other hand, had been seen in 1488, but his mission was 
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to the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus, who briefly resided in Vienna between 1485 
and 1490.323 Thus had begun the diplomatic exchanges between the Habsburgs and the 
Ottomans in the late fifteenth century, as the European states system was still in the 
making. Between these earliest contacts and the arrival of the first Habsburg resident 
envoy, Malvezzi, to the Ottoman capital, the diplomatic interactions were largely limited 
to post-war years.  
With Johann Maria Malvezzi’s arrival in Constantinople in 1546, following 
Süleyman the Lawgiver’s (1520-1566) conquests in Hungary, Austria began to formulate 
its policy against the Ottomans independently from the Reich and signed independent 
treaties with the Sublime Porte.324 During the earliest decades of the relations, the 
Ottomans had the upper hand in the diplomatic encounters as a result of their military 
superiority. According to the treaty signed on June 19, 1547 Austria agreed to pay 30,000 
Gulden to the Ottomans in return for the Sultan’s withdrawal of his claims to the 
Habsburg-controlled Hungary.325 The treaty technically made Austria a vassal of the 
Ottoman Empire, but it is also possible that Ferdinand I willingly paid that tribute to the 
Porte to protect his claims on the ancient Hungarian crown.326 Between 1547 and 1606, 
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Austria made 27 payments of 30,000 Gulden to the Ottoman Empire. These payments 
were always accompanied by additional bounties to the Sultan and his courtiers, and the 
two sides constantly disagreed about whether the bounties were meant to be “gifts,” 
“tributes,” or “taxes.”327  
In the sixteenth century, the negotiations between the two parties took place 
inside the Ottoman court, giving the reigning sultan the privilege of dictating the peace 
articles. Indeed, the Ottoman superiority by the mid-1500s was such that Süleyman the 
Lawgiver sent his peace conditions to the Austrian court in the form of an order, or 
hükm.328 However, the situation began to change with the turn of the seventeenth century. 
Since Joseph von Hammer, historians have typically referred to the Treaty of Zsitvatorok 
at 1606, signed at the end of the Langen Türkenkrieg (1593-1606), as the turning point in 
the balance of power between the two states.329 A frequently repeated detail is that with 
the Zsitvatorok Treaty, the Ottomans agreed that the Habsburg ruler was not a kral (king) 
as he was previously referred by the Ottomans, but a çâsar (emperor), thus an equal of 
the Ottoman sultan. Thereby, the two states had become equals. Another sign of Austria’s 
elevated status was that in 1606 the two parties agreed on a final and one-time payment 
of 200,000 Gulden by Austria to the Sublime Porte, ending the former’s vassal status. 
One can indeed argue that, politically and militarily, there was more of a balance between 
the two states after 1606, although the Ottoman documents continued to refer to the 
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Habsburg ruler as kral in the decades following 1606. In addition, in the post-1606 
period, the peace negotiations were held near the border, another sign of the ‘new 
normal’ in the seventeenth century.330  
Although Zsitvatorok was an important landmark, certain aspects of this well-
studied treaty were routines in the Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic encounters throughout 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Zsitvatorok lacked definitive borderline articles, 
a trademark of many other treaties signed between the Habsburgs and Ottomans. In the 
borderlands between the two states, there were many fortresses controlled by one of the 
states but had adjacent territories extending into the enemy land, making the borderland 
effectively a Doppelherrschaft, or a condominium.331 Also, due to the conflicting claims 
on strategic fortresses and their surrounding areas, the peace negotiations usually took a 
long time and ratifications of the treaties was often delayed.332 Disputes often continued 
even after a peace was concluded, as neither party withdrew their claims on certain 
strategic locations; hence, the ceaseless Kleinkrieg along the border, often in the form of 
kidnappings and thefts.  
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However, there were certain differences between the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The Ottoman diplomacy was reportedly more “calculable” 333 in the sixteenth 
century and not as much in the seventeenth century, probably as an outcome of 
continuous circulation of statesmen from the 1580s and the resulting lack of continuity in 
policies. Other factors could be the continuous warfare against the Habsburg and 
Safavids as well as the recurring rebellions in Anatolia. It is often reiterated that for the 
same reasons, the Ottoman Empire did not launch a campaign against Austria during the 
Thirty Years’ War.334 Nonetheless, one should also note the Habsburg determination to 
avoid a war with the Ottomans in the first half of the seventeenth century. The Habsburg 
special envoys played a key role in repeated renewals of the Zsitvatorok Treaty in 1618, 
1625, 1627, 1642, and 1649, saving the Monarchy from potentially calamitous 
consequences of an Ottoman campaign into central Europe.335    
The heavy burden of maintaining such undulating relations was on the envoys and 
ambassadors who, in addition to their daunting diplomatic tasks, wrestled with numerous 
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334 Petr Štepánek, “Zitvatorok (1606) ve Vasvar (1664) Anlaşmaları Arasında Orta Avrupa’da Osmanlı 
Siyaseti [Ottoman Policy in Central Europe between Zitvatorok and Vasvár],” in Türkler, ed. Hasan Celal 
Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca, vol. 9, 21 vols. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 730–37. 
335 The envoy Ludwig von Kuefstein had received strict orders not to jeopardize the peace in his mission in 
1627/28. Karl Teply, Die Kaiserliche Grossbotschaft an Sultan Murad IV im Jahre 1628. Des Freiherrn 
Hans Ludwig von Kuefsteins Fahrt zur Hohen Pforte (Wien: Verlag A. Schendl, 1976), 29. Czernin von 
Chudenitz’s critical mission in 1644/45 was called the “Austrian miracle” even by contemporaries due to 
the Chudenitz’s success in preventing a potential Ottoman land campaign into Europe. Instead, the 
Ottomans launched a war against Venice. Czernin had originally left Vienna with a sealed letter of 
Ferdinand III which probably included significant offers to the Ottomans such as tribute payments in case 
the latter decided to attack on the Monarchy. Georg Wagner, “Otuz Yıl Savaşları Döneminde Osmanlı ve 
Avusturya İmparatorluklarının Politikası [The Ottoman and Austrian Policies During the Thirty Years’ 
War],” Osmanlı Araştırmaları 2 (1981): 147–66. During the last years of the Thirty Years’ War, the 
Habsburg resident envoy in Vienna was Johann Rudolf Schmid. For an analysis of his ambassadorship, see 
Peter Meienberger, Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in Konstantinopel 
in den Jahren 1629-1643. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Österreich 







other challenges. At every diplomatic encounter, agents of both states displayed 
premeditated patronizing gestures that had immense symbolic importance. During the 
audiences in Vienna and Istanbul, or at the exchanges of envoys at the frontier, both sides 
religiously abided by such symbolism. The entrance of the Ottoman special envoy Kara 
Mehmed Paşa and his entourage to Vienna in the summer of 1665 was one such occasion. 
In his ambassadorial takrîrât (report), Kara Mehmed Paşa wrote that, before the Ottoman 
delegation’s entry to the city, the Austrian internuncio asked the Ottomans to remove 
flags and banners and carry only drums, because no Ottoman delegation hitherto had 
entered Vienna according to their own custom. There was a brief disagreement between 
the two sides. Kara Mehmed Paşa argued in his report that the issue was resolved 
according to the Ottomans’ request, who did not remove their banners.336 An identical 
scene had occurred on August 26, 1628 when the Austrian envoy Ludwig von Kuefstein 
was on his way to Istanbul. Kuefstein met the Turkish delegate in Raab for the envoy 
exchange. Customarily, the exchange of envoys took place after both envoys walked 
toward each other from an equal distance to meet at a predetermined middle point. 
Whoever arrived first at the predetermined point was assumed to have lost the “duel.” At 
this instance, the Turkish agent stopped in the midst of his walk, obviously to perplex 
Kuefstein, upon which the Austrian threatened the Ottoman party with leaving the 
scene.337 Upon the Austrian’s proclamation, the Turkish agent again continued his walk 
and the two representatives met in the middle as planned. 
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Another ritual dutifully practiced between the two parties was gift-giving. The 
archival documents in Turcica catalogues give one a solid idea of how especially the 
Ottoman court regarded gifts an important aspect of the symbolic rivalry. Gift lists were 
usual attachments to the reports of the Austrian ambassadors during the entire early 
modern era. In general, it is difficult to determine whether it was the Habsburg (and other 
foreign) envoys who habituated the Ottoman statesmen to receiving gifts so as to achieve 
objectives in Istanbul, or whether the Ottoman courtiers routinely solicited gifts from 
foreign representatives. The recipients of gifts were not only sultans and viziers; valides, 
kahyas, mirâhurs, nişancıs, and Janissary leaders all received gifts from the Habsburg 
ambassadors and special envoys. Gift-giving was sometimes overwhelming for the 
ambassadors. In the autumn of 1677, the Austrian ambassador, Johann von Kindsperg, 
complained to Vienna that at the Ottoman court ministers outrageously asked for 
presents.338 Unsurprisingly, there were often disagreements regarding the value of the 
items brought by the envoys.339 
Another symbolic act that the Ottoman court diligently observed was the forced 
stay of the Austrian envoys at Nemçe hanı, the so-called German inn, until the mid-
seventeenth century.340 Typically, the French and Venetian ambassadors stayed in Pera, 
the non-Muslim quarter on the eastern side of the Golden Horne, which certainly  
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provided to the foreign agents the privacy they would seek. The Austrian ambassadors, 
however, resided close to the Ottoman palace and were kept under close scrutiny. The 
Ottomans finally modified that policy after the 1650s. Johann Christoph von Kindsperg, 
who stayed in Istanbul between 1673 and 1679, resided in the outskirts of the city, away 
from the watchful eyes of the Ottoman court. The question of whether Kindsperg’s 
relative physical freedom provided him any advantage against the erratic politics of the 
Ottoman capital under Kara Mustafa Paşa’s government is what I will deal with next. 
 
Preemptive diplomacy in Istanbul: the critical first year of Kara Mustafa Paşa  
Johann Christoph von Kindsperg was born in 1638 in Graz.341 His father, a clerk named 
Daniel Kindsperg, had worked as a Gegenschreiber (clerk) at Obereinnehmeramt in 
Triest between 1635 and 1658. Later in life, Daniel Kindsperg was promoted to the 
Hofbuchhalter (book-keeper) position at Inner Austrian Hofkammerat and died in 1683, 
“the year of the Turk.” His son Johann Christoph von Kindsperg was appointed as the 
imperial ambassador to the Ottoman Empire on January 28, 1672 and left Vienna on May 
19, 1672 along with twenty assistants and twelve other travelers, on a total of four loaded 
ships.342  
Kindsperg’s first audience with the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, on December 
30, 1672, was also the last of his predecessor, Giambattista Casanova. According to 
Kindsperg’s Diarium, it was Casanova—technically still the ambassador at that 
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moment— who talked with the Grand Vizier at the meeting. After the salutation, 
Giambattista Casanova notified Fazıl Ahmed Paşa of Leopold I’s “peaceable thoughts” 
and gave the Emperor’s good word that the Habsburg Monachy wanted to hold on to 
peace with the Porte as long as the latter would not act to the contrary of the peace 
concluded between the two sides.343 Fazıl Ahmed Paşa responded that the Sultan did not 
wish less than the Emperor to maintain the peace and friendship with the Germans if no 
reason was given for adversity.344 
 The conversation then shortly paused as “Serbet, Ambra Rauch, und schmeckende 
Wässer” was served. Before the Austrians departed, Casanova complained to Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa about the incessant plundering and robbery committed along the border 
from the Ottoman side. He said that such acts were against the existing peace, the issue 
needed resolution, and those who fomented rebellions and supported rebels needed 
punishment. Moreover, he informed the Grand Vizier that against the insolence of the 
rebels the Emperor was assembling an army.345 In response, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa stated that 
he had resolutely ordered the Transylvanians and all Ottoman frontier paşas to maintain 
peace with the Germans and not to support the “evil” rebels, who, as Kindsperg noted, 
had recently solicited help at the Porte several times.346 The conversation continued for 
another “three whole quarter of an hour” as Casanova and the Grand Vizier talked about 
other border issues with “shared gentleness,” upon which the old ambassador and seven 
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other individuals in his entourage received caftans before they eventually left.347 The next 
day, the two ambassadors joined a ceremony organized by some of the court members for 
Casanova’s departure.348  
Thus had begun Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s embassy in the Ottoman 
capital on the first day of 1673. Kindsperg’s narrative of his first meeting with Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa illustrated that the rebellion in Hungary and Transylvania was the primary 
concern for the Hofburg at the time. Given Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s cooperative manner 
concerning the border security, it was a very promising first meeting for the Austrian. 
Despite frequent solicitations of the Transylvanians for support against the Habsburgs in 
the early 1670s, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had not violated the existing peace with the Monarchy 
and did not modify his Hungarian policy until his death. The issue became especially 
critical for the Hofburg and Kindsperg, however, with Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption 
of office in November 1676.  
The situation in Hungary itself was a key parameter in the change of the 
Ottomans’ Central European policy. Unlike Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, Kara Mustafa Paşa 
welcomed Transylvanian agents and honored them at the Ottoman court. This alarming 
shift in the Ottoman policy also influenced the Habsburg diplomatic strategy in the 
Ottoman capital. From November of 1676, the Habsburgs’ objective in Istanbul was to 
break the ties between the Transylvanian rebels and the Ottoman court. The most 
effective way of achieving that goal would be to extend the peace with the Ottoman 
Empire, and thus prevent an Ottoman campaign into Hungary. The Habsburg diplomacy 
in Istanbul, therefore, quickly acquired a completely preemptive character in the late 
                                                          







1676. At all costs, the Viennese court wanted to avoid a military confrontation with the 
Ottomans because of ongoing campaigns against France in the west. Many predecessors 
of Kindsperg were highly successful in executing preemptive missions at the Ottoman 
capital, but none of the previous Austrian agents at Istanbul had to deal with a statesman 
as ambitious and powerful as Kara Mustafa Pasha.   
I will further explore in the discussion below Kara Mustafa Paşa’s ambitious 
personality, which was the key difference between him and his predecessor, Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa. Here, I first would like to briefly recap the course of events in Hungary during the 
1670s, because the adjustment in the Ottoman strategy in Hungary after 1676 was closely 
related to the developments in Hungary as much as it was an outcome of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa’s character. The course of events in Hungary in the 1670s is well-studied. After the 
Peace of Vasvár in 1664, many Hungarian magnates had deeply resented the 
disadvantageous peace signed with the Ottomans. According to the frequently repeated 
assumption in the literature, the magnates had interpreted the signing of a peace with the 
Ottoman Empire after a military victory as a lost opportunity to reconquer Turkish 
Hungary. The grievances were doubled by the signing away of the estates owned by 
several influential magnates, who had thus lost their income resources. In addition to 
ignoring the magnates’ interest in 1664, the Viennese court was religiously repressing 
predominantly Protestant Hungarians. In fact, there were many wealthy Protestants who 
had expressed their willingness to side with the Ottomans before Vasvár.  
Two years after the signing of the Vasvár Treaty, anti-Habsburg magnates sent 
Peter Inczedy as emissary to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa in 1666 with special instructions signed 
                                                                                                                                                                             







by Count Ferenc Wesselényi (a Catholic and former opponent of the Ottomans). The 
instructions stated that the magnates were ready to become Ottoman subjects on the 
condition “that the sultan would recognize the age-old rights of the Hungarian nobility in 
a written charter (ahdnâme).”349 The mission was unsuccessful. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was in 
Crete, where the situation was quite already precarious. He simply disregarded the 
Transylvanians.  
In March of 1667, Ferenc Wesselényi died. Another influential magnate, Ferenc 
Nádasdy, took the leadership. Despite Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s reluctance to intervene, the 
magnates’ attempts under the leadership of Nádasdy to adjoin Hungary to the Ottoman 
Empire turned into a popular anti-Habsburg movement, known as the Magnate 
Conspiracy. Vienna responded severely. Three magnate leaders were executed.350 Yet, 
the executions marked “only the beginning of a much bigger crackdown in Hungary.”351 
From 1671 onwards, Vienna aimed to establish confessional absolutism in Hungary, 
much as it had successfully applied in Bohemia. Leopold I’s Hungarian policy over the 
1670s was guided by his Jesuit advisers, who argued that the recalcitrance of the 
Hungarians had nullified the contract made with the Hungarian nation at the Emperor’s 
coronation. Leopold himself also once recorded his own view: “Most Hungarians are 
suspect, unfaithful and disobedient; whenever misfortune and danger are at their height, 
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then they create the gravest annoyances. It would be best to get rid of them and to leave 
them to their own kind.”352 
The developments inspired modern historians of Hungary to call “ten dark years” 
the decade following 1671. Violating the constitution of Hungary, Leopold converted the 
government of Hungary into a seven-member Gubernium, controlled by Vienna and 
“overflown with German mercenaries” who had replaced soldiers dismissed from the 
defense line fortresses.353 Protestants were harshly prosecuted and the Hungarian treasury 
was brought under the control of Hofkammer. These developments led to the formation of 
the Hungarian guerilla forces known as Kuruc (“crusaders”) which sporadically attacked 
the “foreign” Habsburg garrisons during the 1670s. 
When Kara Mustafa Paşa took the sultan’s seal in 1676, the Kuruc were still 
seeking foreign support, as the anti-Habsburg movements in Hungary posed a serious 
threat to Vienna itself only when the malcontents attracted foreign allies. Along with 
France and Sweden, the Ottoman Empire was one of the three prospective candidates. 
One after another, the Kuruc envoys visited the Porte and declared submission to the 
sultan. When the new Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa openly showed support for the 
rebels, it sounded an alarm for Vienna and Johann Christoph von Kindsperg. Maintaining 
the peace with the Ottoman Empire was crucial to deterring it from supporting the 
magnates. Accordingly, the instruction and reports sent back and forth between Vienna 
and Istanbul frequently mentioned “maintaining good friendship and neighborliness.”  
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Meeting the new Grand Vizier and first impressions 
On November 6, 1676, Johann Christoph von Kindsperg dispatched Vienna a brief 
notice. The “weit berühmte” Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had died at a village nearby 
Burgas on November 3, 1676 as the Ottoman army was returning to Istanbul from the 
four-year long Polish campaign.354 Kindsperg wrote that Kaymakam (deputy) Kara 
Mustafa Paşa, who had married the Sultan’s daughter the previous year, succeeded Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa. The only other replacement Kindsperg mentioned in this first report was the 
appointment of Kara Hasanoğlu as Yeniçeri Ağası (Janissary Agha). Kindsperg added 
that he would soon send another report detailing all the other appointments made by the 
new Grand Vizier.355 As a postscript, the ambassador also noted that on October 15, 1676 
the Ottomans and Poles had closed a treaty at a place not far from Kamianets-Podilskyi 
(Kamaniçe).356 
The detailed report that Kindsperg had promised was written on November 25 and 
sent from Ponte Piccolo.357 This second report informed Vienna about the recent 
appointments made by the new Grand Vizier. Kara İbrahim Ağa, a protégé of Kara  
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Mustafa Paşa and the chief supervisor of the Sultan’s staples, had advanced to paşa rank 
and become the new Grand Vizier’s deputy, while Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s chamberlain, 
Süleyman Ağa, was appointed as the new chief supervisor of the stables. As earlier 
emphasized, Kindsperg believed that this “vereinigte triumviri” would govern the Empire 
in line with the Sultan’s desires. 
Kindsperg argued in his report that he was the first foreign representative to 
congratulate Kara Mustafa Paşa: “I have congratulated the new Grand Vizier with a 
written letter which he gladly received. Upon reading my letter he said that among all 
[foreign] representatives I was the first one to congratulate him because of his exaltation, 
and whenever I wanted to see him I would be welcomed.” Kindsperg had not presented 
the letter personally because he pointed out in the same report that he was on his way to 
Adrianople, where he would request a personal audience from the Grand Vizier and 
congratulate him in person. The ambassador wanted to hand over the gifts in person and 
work on leaving a good impression and establishing friendship. Kindsperg’s remarks 
regarding Kara Mustafa Paşa’s reaction after reading the letter, therefore, suggests that 
either one of his resources at the Ottoman court informed the ambassador about Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s alleged reaction after readıng the letter or Kindsperg simply envisioned 
the new Grand Vizier as a friendly personality. During the following months, these initial 
positive remarks about Kara Mustafa Paşa determined the approach of the Hofburg to the 
Ottoman court. 
Further details in the same letter regarding the relations between Hungary and the 
Ottoman Empire must have raised suspicion at the Hofburg. On November 17, 1676 







Mihály I’s chamberlain, named Ballo, had brought the yearly tribute of 80,000 Thaler and 
declared to the new Grand Vizier that his prince did not wish anything other than the 
welfare of the Sultan. Ballo was not alone at the audience. Two “rebels,” as Kindsperg 
referred to them, accompanied him. They requested support from the Grand Vizier 
against the “Teŭtschen.” Kindsperg noted that the “rebels” did not receive any formal 
endorsement, but the Grand Vizier stated that if the Germans attacked them or molested 
Transylvania, such acts would require resistance. The report generally pleased the readers 
at the Hofburg. An undated and unsigned opinio expressed satisfaction with Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s compliment upon reading Kindsperg’s congratulatory letter. Regarding 
the Hungarian “rebels,” the same opinio stated that the Hofburg had decided to warn Graf 
von Strasoldo, the captain-general of Upper Hungary, to maintain good relations with the 
Ottomans and not present any reason for hostilities from the other side of the border.   
In response to Kindsperg’s letter, the Hofburg sent an instruction on March 8, 
1677.358 It is clear from the instruction that Kindsperg’s positive portrayal of Kara 
Mustafa Pasha, whom the ambassador was yet to meet in person, raised the hopes in 
Vienna that the existing peace between the two states could be extended. The Hofburg 
was pleased to have learned that the ambassador had exchanged compliments with the 
new Grand Vizier and also heard positive things from him, a good sign to receive the 
long-suspended audience by the Sultan. The instruction ordered Kindsperg seek in every 
way the cooperation of Kara Mustafa Paşa, expecting decisive success at the end. 
Kindsperg was also ordered to learn on why the audience had been suspended. 







informed Kindsperg that Colonel Graf von Strassoldo was ordered to maintain good 
neighborliness and conserve peace on his side of the border. The letter then gave a brief, 
optimistic account of the operations against Louis XIV in the Saar and continued as 
follows: “Praise be to God, we are in such situation that in case of a war with the Turks, 
we will be superior by means of divine grace; and thereby things in Hungary can be in a 
better, quieter, and safer state. To that end, the Christian forces would be unhindered 
where emergency requires; but as long as the Porte does not give us a reason to do so, 
you can assure them that we give our Imperial Promise not to undertake anything against 
the existing peace.” 
Before that optimistic instruction arrived to Kindsperg, the ambassador sent 
another report to Vienna. It was written on March 16, 1677 and was sent from Adrianople 
through courier Phillip Adams.359 This relatively long report included very important 
information and observations that determined the nature of the relations between the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire in early 1677. Kindsperg’s report opened 
with a note about the arrival of the Polish delegation to the Ottoman capital, and 
summarized the articles of the Treaty of Żurawno signed on October 17, 1676 between 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire. Then, Kindsperg 
continued with a detailed historical summary of the developments in Ukraine, starting 
from the Cossack Hetman Petro Dorošenko’s resort to the Ottoman Sultan. I have already 
explained in the previous chapter the course of events in Ukraine in the late 1660s and 
early 1670s. In 1675, Petro Dorošenko, who had accepted the Sultan’s suzerainty upon 
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being neglected by the Poles and Muscovy at the Peace of Andrusovo in 1667, renounced 
his allegiance to the Sultan and acknowledged Muscovy’s sovereignty in 1675.360 In the 
fall of 1676, Muscovy also captured the Cossack stronghold Chyhyryn (Tr: Çehrin, Rus: 
Чигири́н). Located at the immediate northern hinterland of Crimea, the city was 
considered a strategic stronghold by the Ottomans.  
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s first reaction to the Russian occupation of Chyhyryn was to 
assign Vizier İbrahim Paşa and the Crimean Khan Selim Giray with the task of 
recapturing the fortress.361 Kindsperg noted that the Ottoman court had issued in early 
1677 an order of sürsat, a special war-time tax for this campaign.362 At the same time, the 
Ottomans appointed Yurii Khmelnytsky as the new Cossack Hetman. He was the son of 
the famed Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and had been residing at the Ottoman capital 
for several years. The physical captivity of such influential alternatives to the crowns of 
the Sultan’s Central European vassals was a typical Ottoman policy. Petro Dorošenko’s 
readmission of Muscovy’s sovereignty had presented an opportunity to take advantage of 
one such name held captive at the Ottoman capital. The Ottoman court sent Yurii 
Khmelnytsky along with the regalia to İbrahim Paşa and commanded the latter to declare 
Khmelnytsky’s hetmanate in Ukraine.  
                                                          
360 Dimitrie Cantemir ((1673-1723), twice the Voivode of Moldavia in 1693 and in 1710-1711, wrote in his 
history that Dorošenko had shifted sides when his desire to participate in the Polish campaign on the 
Ottoman side was rejected. Dimitrie Cantemir, The history of the growth and decay of the Othman Empire. 
Part I. Containing the growth of the Othman Empire, from the reign of Othman the founder, to the Reign of 
Mahomet Iv. That is from the year 1300, to the Siege of Vienna, in 1683. Written originally in Latin, by 
Demetrius Cantemir, late Prince of Moldavia. Translated into English, from the author’s own manuscript, 
by N. Tindal, M.A. Vicar of Great Waltham in Essex. Adorn’d with the heads of the Turkish Emperors, 
ingraven from copies taken from originals in the Grand Seignor’s Palace, by the late sultan’s painter 
(London: Printed for James, John, and Paul Knapton, at the Crown in Ludgate Street, 1734), 287. 
361 Raşid Mehmed Efendi, Tarih-i Raşid, 1:198–199. 







According to Kindsperg, Ukraine was not only a source of tribute and 
contribution for the Porte, but also a means of overwhelming and subduing Poland in 
years to come. Nevertheless, the earliest operations did not yield any favorable results for 
the Ottoman court. Vizier Ibrahim Paşa’s twenty-three day siege in the summer of 1677 
would be unsuccessful, resulting in both İbrahim Paşa and the Crimean Khan losing their 
positions. The vizier was imprisoned at Yedikule (Seven Towers), whereas Selim Giray 
was banished to Rhodes. Murat Giray would be eventually appointed to the khanate in 
the fall of 1677.363 
Having concluded his account of the events in Ukraine, Kindsperg again turned 
his attention to Transylvania and Hungary, Austria’s principal eastern concern at the 
time. Apparently, due to the urgency of the situation in Hungary, Kindsperg did not wait 
until he received an audience from Kara Mustafa Paşa, but immediately after arriving in 
Adrianople he contacted the Grand Vizier through the Habsburg internuncio Marco 
Antonio. Kindsperg notified the Grand Vizier of the efforts of the “rebels” in 
Transylvania and the initiatives of the French ambassador Marquis de Béthune in 
Poland.364 Kindsperg was referring to the ongoing negotiations between Transylvania, 
Poland, and France as per the Fogaras Accord signed on March 19, 1675 among the three 
parties. Mainly a product of the French ambitions, the treaty had “treated the Hungarian 
exiles as a distinct power-group” in the European politics.365 The aim of the accord was 
to eventually unite Hungary and Transylvania under a pro-French king elected according 
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to Hungary’s ancient customs. Thereby, Louis XIV was hoping to surround Austria with 
enemies.366  
It would be difficult to conceal such initiatives from the Austrian diplomats. The 
Transylvanian ambassador in Istanbul, Kristóf Paskó, reported to his prince that the 
Austrian ambassador had “purchased” a copy of the Fogaras Agreement from the French 
ambassador’s deputy in Adrianople.367 That Austrian ambassador was probably 
Giambattista Casanova, Kindsperg’s predecessor, but it is certain that Kindsperg himself 
was well-informed about the developments. Kindsperg wrote to the Grand Vizier that 
great border confusions would follow such enterprises in Transylvania. Moreover, he 
argued that the Transylvanians would prefer to become subjects of France rather than the 
Porte. The ambassador also added that, if the “rebels” were not eliminated immediately 
through a military campaign, the “restless French nation” would become a neighbor to 
the Ottoman Empire and intervene with the border issues in Hungary.368 In case, the 
“rebels” were eradicated and Marquis de Béthune’s “machinations” were prevented, 
however, then the remaining imperial forces would also be dissipated from the Upper 
Hungary except in places that were occupied out of necessity. Thereby, tranquility would 
be restored along the border. In response to the internuncio’s communication, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa reported that the French intervention in Hungary was unacceptable. Just as 
the Habsburgs would not want to have the French as neighbors, the Porte would also not 
want to see them as neighbors.  
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According to Kindsperg, the Grand Vizier had heard about the accord signed 
between France, Transylvania, and Poland through the ambassador’s communication. If 
one relies on the Austrian’s account of what happened next, upon learning these secret 
initiatives the Transylvanian representative, named Kubuni Laslo, an agent of Count Paul 
Wesselényi, was dismissed by the Ottoman court without receiving an audience. The next 
day, the Grand Vizier ordered the commander at Eger (Tr: Eğri, Ger: Erlau) to avoid 
confusion along the border. Thus, after the first communication between Kindsperg and 
Kara Mustafa Paşa, there was no sign of modification in Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s Central 
European policy.    
On February 22, 1677 Kindsperg received his first audience from Kara Mustafa 
Paşa, who was still in Adrianople with the main army since their return from the Polish 
frontier.369 The audience took place at Kara Mustafa Paşa’s house office in Adrianople. 
Two stools of equal shape and height were prepared in the second floor meeting room. 
The ambassador first entered the room, took his seat, and waited for Kara Mustafa Paşa. 
Then the Grand Vizier walked into the room and sat across from the Austrian 
ambassador, who stood up and congratulated his host: 
  
Upon the new Grand Vizier’s entrance into the room I congratulated him 
because of his assumption of office, hoping that during his grand vizierate 
the subjects of both sides, who are repressed by un-peace-loving rebels, 
will recover and praise God due to his good government. In response, [the 
Grand Vizier] said that his vizierate was a gift of God.370 
  
 Kindsperg then continued to explain to Kara Mustafa Pasha that the continuous 
bloodshed along the borderlands necessitated an ultimate resolution. The Emperor 









certainly wanted to preserve the existing peace with the Porte, if in that way the 
intolerable hostilities and pressures [in borderlands] would be brought to an end. The 
Austrian ambassador, whom Kara Mustafa Paşa’s kahya notified before the meeting not 
to negotiate openly during the audience and instead to prepare a written statement, 
presented a six-page report to the Grand Vizier. That report included a list of peace 
violations committed throughout the last year by the Ottoman commanders in Oradea, 
Eger, Nové Zámky, Buda, Nagykanizsa, and Bosnia. Upon receiving the report, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa responded that he would read the letter and added that the Ottoman Empire 
also wanted to maintain and strengthen the peace by all means possible.  
Then, the Austrian ambassador provided Kara Mustafa Pasha with a brief account of the 
recent campaigns in the Dutch War (1672-1678), where two allied camps fought each 
other, one formed around the Dutch Republic (also called the Quadruple Alliance) and 
the other led by France. The Habsburg Monarchy was an ally of the Dutch Republic. The 
previous year, the highlight of the campaign for the Quadruple Alliance was the 
successful siege of Phillipsburg, a strategic fortress located on the eastern bank of Rhine 
and held by France since 1644. Kindsperg told the Grand Vizier that the allies had 
successfully laid siege to Phillipsburg and defeated the French. Also, the Swedes were 
brought to the ground and had lost their fleet.371 There were many other successful 
campaigns, and new territories were captured. Kindsperg described Kara Mustafa Pasha’s 
reaction as follows: 
The [Grand] Vizier showed great satisfaction on account of [our] success, 
and asked if all that had happened in one year. In response, I said that 
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most of it had happened during the last campaign season. The Grand 
Vizier said that he was pleased [to hear all this]; the Ottoman Empire is 
always glad to learn that its friend prevails and prospers against enemies, 
and [the Porte] certainly desires to preserve the peace. 
 
 The audience was soon over.372 Kindsperg was customarily served coffee and 
şerbet, and smoked amber tobacco before he stood up, showed reverence, and left the 
meeting room. The communication about the situation in Hungary, however, continued 
between the ambassador and the Grand Vizier, who was preparing to leave Adrianople 
for Istanbul.373 On February 26, Kindsperg sent his internuncio Marco Antonio to Kara 
Mustafa Paşa with “great exaggerations” against the “rebels” who “were the reason 
behind the ruin of both sides’ subjects, and, therefore, had to be abolished.”374 The main 
request of the ambassador from the Ottoman court concerned the communication method 
between the Ottoman commander in Buda and the Austrian fortresses on the other side of 
the border. In line with Kindsperg’s instructions, Marco Antonio reported to Kara 
Mustafa Paşa that previously when border issues necessitating urgent resolution occurred, 
the paşa at Buda would himself send “unnecessary delegations” to Vienna without 
waiting for “express” or “immediate” orders of the Ottoman court.375 The internuncio 
requested from Kara Mustafa Paşa, however, to authorize the present paşa at Buda to 
communicate through letters with the Austrian controlled Raab or Tottis about such 
“small affairs.”376 In this manner, the old border custom would be maintained and “the 
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poor subjects lying on streets … would rise up.”377 At the first glance, meetings between 
the two sides appeared to be a more preferable way of resolving urgent issues. 
Nonetheless, the Austrian decision-makers considered visiting delegations unnecessary, 
likely because the problems were not resolved at a single meeting and necessitated 
multiple sessions, each already interrupted by exchange of letters with superiors.   
Kara Mustafa Paşa thereupon admitted that it would be the “right” thing to 
authorize the paşa at Buda to communicate through letters rather than sending çavuşs or 
ağas. However, in a quite interesting remark, which I will further analyze below, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa questioned whether the rebels themselves were causing so many 
problems.378 In response, as instructed by Kindsperg, Marco Antonio said that the 
“rebels” were the source of the ruin along the border. Upon that comment, Kara Mustafa 
Paşa gave several orders to his courtiers present at the meeting. He ordered his 
reisülküttab (chief of scribes) to initiate an investigation into the previous and present 
conditions at the border. He also ordered another courtier to compose a prohibition letter 
(Verbotschreiben) to the frontier based on the verbal and written information provided by 
the Austrians and dispatch it to the Ottoman border commanders. In addition, he ordered 
an inquiry into the French-Transylvanian cooperation and the Polish involvement in that 
contact. The ultimate goal was to avert the disorderliness along the border.379 Marco 
Antonio’s meeting with Kara Mustafa Paşa had thus ended.  
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Kindsperg also notified Vienna of a confidential conversation he held with kahya, 
who told to the ambassador that the Grand Vizier was inclined to get rid of the rebels. 
According to kahya, however, Kara Mustafa Paşa first wanted to gather satisfactory 
information about the situation and inform the Sultan about the disorderliness. Kahya 
also shared some very interesting information with Kindsperg: one of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa’s plans was to discredit the “badly guided” ministry of his predecessor, and remove 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s dependents, without exceptions, from the high positions they were 
occupying. Every border paşa would be replaced at the end, but the replacements had to 
be approved by the Sultan.380  
Kindsperg’s first report following his first audience with the Grand Vizier 
included some very interesting details that beg for interpretation. First, the positive 
descriptions of Kara Mustafa Paşa certainly convinced the Hofburg to extend the peace 
with the Ottoman Empire. The new Grand Vizier had sincerely welcomed the Austrian 
ambassador on February 22, 1677, as well as the Austrian interpreter on February 26. The 
overall atmosphere during the first audience, and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s manner toward the 
Austrian interpreter, was so positive that Kindsperg compared Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara 
Mustafa Paşa and praised the latter: “The [Grand] Vizier is a quite friendlier, better, and a 
more straightforward character than the previous vizier. After my departure, he spoke 
positively about me at the imperial council [dîvan].”381 One cannot know for sure 
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whether Kara Mustafa Paşa spoke positively about the ambassador at the imperial 
council. However, Kindsperg’s portrayal of Kara Mustafa Paşa as a better character than 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who was portrayed in contemporary Ottoman and European sources 
as a calm, judicious, and charismatic statesmen, illustrates that the Grand Vizier 
displayed a friendly and temperate personality during the earliest months of his term in 
office. That was hardly surprising. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s previous expertise inside the 
court at the highest echelons of bureaucracy had made him a self-assured statesman long 
before his rise to the grand vizierate. The condition of the state only strengthened his 
hands. In the last two decades, the Ottoman Empire had emerged stronger from all major 
military commitments under the Köprülü regime. The state was safe against domestic and 
foreign threats more than any time in the seventeenth century. By the mid-1670s, the 
strongest prospective enemy, the Habsburg Monarchy, was pressing the Ottoman 
government to renew the existing peace between the two states. Moreover, Kara Mustafa 
Paşa was much safer than many pre-Köprülü era grand viziers. He certainly had enemies, 
but none of them were strong enough to challenge the heir of the mighty Köprülüs. When 
considered within this broader framework, Kindsperg’s first impression of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa as a friendly and comfortable character is therefore hardly surprising. During the 
following months, these observations continued to guide the Monarchy’s Ottoman policy, 
which focused on renewing the peace with the Porte at all costs. 
The second important section in the report was Kara Mustafa Paşa’s question to 
Marco Antonio regarding the extent of the anti-Habsburg movement in Hungary and his 
orders for investigation of the situation along the border. His question and the 







was not well-informed about the disruption that the Kuruc rebels had caused in Habsburg 
Hungary and Transylvania. In reality, it was simply impossible for Kara Mustafa Paşa to 
be unaware of the extent of the rebellion. The Ottoman court regularly received reports 
from the borderland commanders regarding the situation in the region. Also, the 
Hungarian malcontents had sent many delegations to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa over the past 
decade. Kara Mustafa Paşa, as the deputy grand vizier, had met the agents of the 
malcontents several times, and was certainly aware of the severity of the Kuruc 
operations in Hungary by the mid-1670s. Moreover, in November 1676, only two weeks 
after his appointment to the grand vizierate, he had met with the representatives of the 
malcontents, who requested protection from the Ottoman court. Such background 
information suggests that Kara Mustafa Paşa was well-informed about the extent of the 
anti-Habsburg movement in Hungary, but he wanted to give the impression to the 
Habsburgs that he was uninterested in the developments.  If that was the case, the Grand 
Vizier was probably trying to gain time by misleading the Austrians, because the 
situation in Chyhyryn demanded a quick intervention. Petro Dorošenko’s betrayal of the 
Sultan after spending seven years as his protectorate, and his entrance to Muscovy’s 
sphere of influence in the fall of 1676, could not be ignored at Istanbul.  
Nonetheless, although it is difficult to determine definitively whether Kara 
Mustafa Paşa had any plans in his mind regarding the Hungarian affairs only several 
months into his term, a third and most interesting detail in the report raises strong 
suspicion. According to the confidential conversation between the Grand Vizier’s kahya 
and Kindsperg, Kara Mustafa Paşa was planning to replace all border paşas who were 







court an individual’s escalation in the decision-making mechanism often also meant the 
rising fortunes of his household members. Thus, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s desire to work with 
his trustees was not a novelty. What makes his plans to replace “alle Gräniz Passen” in 
Transylvania so noteworthy, however, is that, despite the affinity and mutual trust that 
existed between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Kara Mustafa Paşa during the former’s grand 
vizierate, the latter apparently disagreed with his predecessor’s Hungarian policy. One 
can only conjecture about the matter due the limited reliability of a foreign ambassador’s 
report on the dynamics of the Ottoman court, but it may be reasonably assumed in the 
light of Kindsperg’s report dated March 8, 1677 that Kara Mustafa Paşa had certain plans 
regarding Transylvania and Hungary from the earliest days of his grand vizierate. If any 
such plans existed as early as March 1677, including a campaign into central Europe to 
resolve matters definitively, they could only be realized through loyal and credible 
commanders whose fortunes depended on the Grand Vizier. The story of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa’s career as the Grand Vizier and his negotiations with Kindsperg during the 
following months will further strengthen the judgment that there indeed existed such 
plans. During the following months, Vienna continued to believe that the peace with the 
Ottoman Empire could be renewed. 
 
Raimondo Montecuccoli’s congratulatory letter to Kara Mustafa Paşa  
Kindsperg’s report from March 8 arrived in Vienna in less than four weeks, because his 







discussed in that report.382 First, Kindsperg was instructed to gather precise information 
about the conditions of the peace between the Ottoman Empire and Poland. Vienna 
wanted the ambassador to keep alert eyes (“wachtsambes Augen”) on the meetings 
between the two parties, while inquiring whether the Polish envoy had any additional 
matters to discuss with the Ottomans. Eventually, he was expected to retrieve a copy of 
the ratified treaties. Second, the Hofburg was expecting reliable information about the 
next possible move of the Ottomans. Since the Polish campaign was over, Vienna wanted 
to know if there was a possibility of an Ottoman campaign on Muscovy.383  
 The third and the most important issue the instruction touched upon was the 
situation in Hungary. Vienna emphasized that regarding the “silencing” of the turmoil in 
the Hungarian Kingdom, the new Grand Vizier made “good and peaceful” offers, yet 
“did little for the observation of the good neighborliness.”384 Kindsperg was told that, 
despite his note about the abolishing of Count Paul Wesselényi’s agent, Kubuni Laslo, 
from the Ottoman court without audience, there was continuous ransacking in Upper 
Hungary around Oradea (Tr: Varad; Ger: Wardein), where the rebels were “provided 
accommodation.” Therefore, Kindsperg was expected to work constantly for the Grand 
Vizier’s words to take effect and result in the eradication and obliteration of all the 
“rebels.” To that end, Vienna authorized Kindsperg to give a special present to Kara 
Mustafa Paşa, but he was also instructed to wait until the problems in Hungary were 
solved definitively and the resolutions took full effect. 
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 The instruction had a significant attachment. In his above analyzed report, dated 
March 8, Kindsperg had recommended to Vienna that Raimondo Montecuccoli, the 
Habsburg War Council President, should send a letter to Kara Mustafa Paşa to accelerate 
the resolution process in Hungary. That letter was attached to the instruction written on 
April 9 and was sent to the Ottoman capital.385 
Devletlü ve saʻadetlü muhibb ve dostumuz hazretlerinin huzur-u 
ʻizzetlerine selamlar ve ʻarz-ı muhabbetler iblağ ve ithâf olundukdan 
sonra cenâb-ı ʻizzetlerine lâyık ve mahsus olan münir-nişîn sadâret-i 
ʻazamî mertebesine nâil olduğuna ʻatebe-i ʻâliyede mümekkin olan 
ʻazametlü Çâsâr’ın kapu kethüdâsı [Johann Christopher von Kindsperg] 
mektubuyla bize iʻlâm eylemişdür. İmdî mübârek sulh ve ko[m]şuluk şartı 
budur ki mesrûr ve mahzûz olduğumuzu iʻlâm eyleyeyüz. Hemân Hakk 
Sübhane ve Teʻala saʻadetlü ve kudretlü Âl-i Osman pâdişâhına sadâret-i 
ʻazamî mertebesi cenâb-ı ʻizzetlerine dâim ü devlet ve saʻadetle ʻömr-ü 
tavîl müyesser eyleye. Mezbûr kapu kethüdâsı tafsîl üzere cenab-ı 
ʻizzîlerine böyle ʻazîm mertebeye lâyık olduğundan meʻada sulh ve salâha 
ve emn ve emâna meyl ve muhabbeti ve Macar serhadleri izdiyâd-i 
refâhiyyet üzere olmaları babında sâdıkâne ve vaʻadleri olduğu babında 
bildirmişdir. Böyle olduğu içün sulh ve salâha takayyüdümüz zuhurun 
bulunması içün cemʻ-i serhadde kapudanlara muhkem fermanlar irsali ile 
tenbih idüb tâ kim nâmaʻkul olan ʻadâvetden ve çeteden menʻ idüb ve iki 
ʻazametlü ve kudretlü pâdişâh arasında ʻakd olunan mübârek sulh ve 
salâhın maddeleri lâyıkı üzere hıfz eyleyeler. Yetmiş seneden berü ʻatebe-i 
ʻâliye ile ʻakd olunan izdiyâd üzere olan mübarek sulhun şartları üzere 
eğer ʻasî olanlara ki size tarafdar olmuşdur, bu ana değin bizimkilerden 
kovulmuş ve firar itmiş sizin memleketlere kabul ve himayet olunmazlar 
ise reʻaya fakirlerine olan zarar ve ziyan ve zulm ve taʻaddi sebebi defʻ 
olunur ve serhadde artırdığımuz ʻaskeri bundan sonra refʻolunub ve bu 
vech ile tekrar dostluk ve ko[m]şuluğa lâyık olan kâʻideleri pekiştirmeğe  
mübâşir olunur ve reʻaya fukarâsı kel-evvel asûde-hâl olub emn ve emâna 
bâʻis olanlara duʻâcı olalar. Mezbur kapu kethüdaları sulha müteʻallık 
olan müsâlahaları vâkîʻ oldukda mesmuʻ-u izzetleri olub ve hüsn-ü  
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nazarları ve muhabbetleri diriğ buyurmayalar. Bâki hemişe ʻizz ü devlet, 
der seney-i sadaret (...) Be-makam-ı Beç. Mah-ı Aprilin dokuzuncu günü 
be-tarih-i Hazret-i ʻİsa, sene 1677. 
Mahlas: Azametlü Çasarın başvekili ve seraskeri Raimondo Montecuccoli.  
 
The content of Montecuccoli’s letter essentially repeated the border issues that 
Kindsperg had discussed in detail with the Grand Vizier. The letter opened with 
salutations exalting Kara Mustafa Paşa for his assumption of office and stated that the 
ambassador Kindsperg had notified Vienna of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s willingness to 
maintain the peace along the border. Accordingly, the War Council President requested 
the Grand Vizier’s cooperation and wanted him to send firm decrees to the Ottoman 
border commanders to refrain from “unacceptable animosities and guerilla activities” and 
not patronize the rebels banished by Vienna in violation of the “seventy-year” long peace. 
If such precautions would be taken, which were the requirements of good friendship and 
neighborliness between the two “sublime and powerful rulers,” Austria too would 
withdraw the reinforcements deployed at the border and work to consolidate the peace.    
When evaluated simultaneously with the instruction to which it was attached, 
certain aspects of the letter made it a diplomatically and historically significant 
document. The letter bore the signature of the Habsburg War Council President and 
officially reflected the Habsburg policy toward the Ottoman Empire at the time. By early 
1677, the Monarchy principally aimed to preserve the status quo on its eastern border and 
avoid a war with the Ottoman Empire at all costs. To that end, Kindsperg was even 
advised and allowed by Vienna to give a special gift, or bribe, to Kara Mustafa Paşa and 
other individuals at the Ottoman court. In fact, Kindsperg’s instruction specifically 







interpreter would contribute to the realization of the Austrian plans.386 Rhetorically, the 
letter was quite deliberate and purposeful. The Austrian court neglected the monumental 
confrontation between the two states at St. Gotthard in 1664 and directly referred back to 
the Treaty of Zsitvatorok from 1606 as the beginning of the peace between the two states. 
As an unquestionably intentional diplomatic gesture, the reference to Zsitvatorok 
illustrated the willingness of the Habsburg Monarchy to forget the most recent hostilities 
to renew the peace. 
Austria insisted on renewing the peace with the Ottomans largely due to its 
commitments in the west, but the recurrent peace requests and the Austrian’s readiness to 
pay a high price for that peace must have influenced the long-term the decision-making 
processes at the Ottoman capital. Only several months into Kara Mustafa Paşa’s term in 
office, Austria appeared to be ready to make material sacrifices by disbursing gifts at the 
Ottoman court. More significant were Vienna’s intangible concessions. Although the 
diplomatic initiatives in Istanbul subtly synthesized the unremitting quest for cooperation 
with a steadfast diplomatic posture, Vienna displayed itself as desperate, therefore more 
vulnerable and fragile, than it would want to appear to the Ottoman statesmen. It is 
probable that in the long term, the ever-intensifying peace inquiries of Vienna paved the 
way in Istanbul for the formulation of an aggressive Central Europe policy that aimed to 
take advantage of the seemingly desperate condition of the Habsburg Monarchy.  
Despite the individual request of the Austrian War Council President from the 
Grand Vizier to renew the peace and cooperatively abolish the “rebels,” Kara Mustafa 
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Paşa continued to honor the Kuruc envoys as they frequented the Ottoman court. The 
circumstances at the Porte were starting to get tougher for the Austrian ambassador. 
Kindsperg’s next report, sent on May 28, 1677 from Constantinople, informed Vienna 
that three Transylvanian “Haubt Rebellen” had again received an audience at the 
Ottoman court on May 5.387 The delegation included two individuals named Melchiorn 
Kezer and Gabriel Kende, and a third one who, along with his twelve servants, requested 
to remain at the Porte as the Transylvanian ambassador. At the meeting with kahya, 
according to Kindsperg’s report, the Transylvanians told him that since their “rebellion” 
had begun eight years ago, all of their possessions had been spoiled by the “Germans.” 
The Porte had promised to support their movement, but due to the lack of such support, 
some of the Transylvanians had defected to the “Germans.” The majority, however, was 
still loyal to the Ottomans and needed a place to take refuge in and protect themselves. 
Kahya reported all this to the Grand Vizier, who then decided to send two ağas to the 
border to gather information about all the border affairs. He also ordered the ağas to look 
for a place for the “rebels” where they cannot be discharged or hurt. Kindsperg’s 
“exclamations” were fruitless.388 
Before the two ağas returned from the frontier, two couriers with complaints from 
the paşas at Oradea and Eger arrived at Istanbul, as well as a commission from Debrecen 
consisting of three persons who came with old and new complaints. Upon signing of the 
Fogaras Accord in 1675, the Privy Council had taken precautions to preclude the 
prospects of a French-Transylvanian alliance. Through Tamás Pálffy, Austria’s 
Hungarian chancellor, Vienna approached Apafi Mihály I, the pro-Ottoman Prince of 
                                                          







Transylvania, and offered to negotiate. The talks were fruitless. Apafi rejected Vienna’s 
offers and stipulated his own conditions for the resolution of the ongoing problems. 
Meanwhile, as another precaution, Graf von Strasoldo, the Monarchy’s captain-general of 
Upper-Hungary, occupied Debrecen and “held it to ransom, as if to demonstrate that the 
Habsburg emperor disposed of vastly greater forces than Apafi.”389 The Debreceners 
reported to the Grand Vizier that a “German” regiment of 5,000 soldiers had plundered 
the city and the territory around it. The “Germans” had done the same the previous year 
and did not yet refund the loss. Kindsperg noted that, as a result of the reports and 
complaints which were cemented with verbal indictments at the audience, Kara Mustafa 
Paşa had gained a bad impression against the “Germans.”390 Before too long, Kindsperg 
also received a summary of these complaints from the Grand Vizier. 
When Apafi’s agent notified the Grand Vizier of the Austrian presence in 
Debrecen, the latter was not happy about what he had heard. Kindsperg’s response to the 
summary of the complaints was therefore very important. In response to the Grand 
Vizier’s inquiry regarding the situation in Debrecen, Kindsperg reported that he was not 
aware of the developments there. The Emperor’s most recent instruction from March 8th 
had not mentioned the matter. Moreover, according to the same instruction, Graf von 
Strasoldo had received sharp orders from Vienna to preserve the peace in his territory. 
Nonetheless, Kindsperg stated that Debrecen was a “robber’s den” and the “rebels” there 
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were robbing from the subjects of the Emperor.391 He didn’t believe that the Germans 
would affront the Transylvanians without reason.392 
Upon Kindsperg’s response, Kara Mustafa Paşa suggested to Kindsperg to 
dispatch to the Emperor an express courier, who would be escorted by a Turkish guard 
and use post-horses. What Kara Mustafa Paşa essentially wanted to learn was the reason 
behind the Austrian incursions into Debrecen, a Transylvanian city, hence a protectorate 
of the Sultan. Also, there were issues that awaited a response, such as whether the people 
living in the area would be compensated for the harvest seized by the Austrians the 
previous year.393 The Grand Vizier next gave a warning to the ambassador: if the 
hostilities continued, if the subjects in Debrecen were not refunded for their losses, and if 
they were further molested, all the Turkish fortresses along the border would be 
commanded to carry out attacks across the border, such that everything would be in ruin 
with fire and sword, as a prelude to war.394 In response to that open threat, Kindsperg 
requested the Grand Vizier to wait until the aforementioned courier returned from Vienna 
before sending such incursion orders to the Ottoman border paşas. Kara Mustafa Paşa 
agreed to Kindsperg’s offer.    
Meanwhile, there were other issues between the Transylvanians and the Ottoman 
court. The agents of Apafi Mihály I had brought 2,000 ducats to Kara Mustafa Paşa and 
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500 ducats to kahya, and they had certain requests from the Porte.395 They wanted the 
paşa at Oradea not to intervene with subjects and territories belonging to the principality. 
At the same time, Apafi wanted the Ottoman court to return Dávid Zólyomi to 
Transylvania with all of his properties. The Ottomans rejected that request on the grounds 
that Zólyomi was a guest at the Porte. In fact, Dávid Zólyomi was “kept in reserve as a 
prince-in-waiting in Constantinople,” a precaution against Apafi Mihály I.396  
Such disagreements between the Transylvanians and the Ottoman court, however, 
did not change the fact that the two parties were becoming increasingly closer, severely 
handicapping the Austrian ambassador’s mission at Istanbul. The next instruction sent 
from Vienna only increased the pressure on Kindsperg, while also demonstrating that 
Vienna, severely threatened by the operations of the Hungarian malcontents, wanted to 
resolve the matter immediately. Dated June 18, Kindsperg’s instruction opened with a 
broad analysis of the ambassador’s previous reports starting from January 1676.397 
Through very sharp language, the Hofburg stated that the ambassador had numerous 
times (on January 18, April 2, and July 5, 1676; March 16, 1677) reported that the 
Ottoman border commanders had received orders from Constantinople to stop 
aggressions and maintain good neighborliness. The ambassador had also written that the 
new Grand Vizier was inclined to get rid of the “rebels.” However, many orders that were 
allegedly sent to the Turkish commanders and “contestations” expressed by the Turkish 
side did not have the “least effect” on the situation. The Hofburg was wondering if the 
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Ottoman court was “outwardly” making “fictitious” promises, or whether the orders were 
not observed by the court’s subordinates.398        
The instruction then replicated the points emphasized in the instructions sent to 
Kindsperg since November 1676. The disorderliness and excesses along the border would 
ultimately result in the ruin of the subjects, and therefore necessitated a quick resolution. 
As per the Zsitvatorok Treaty, which had been reconfirmed since 1606 and was known 
throughout the country, the “rebels” could not be offered shelter (receptaculum), not only 
along the Turkish border but also in Transylvania. The Hofburg emphasized one more 
time that the Monarchy stoutly desired to preserve the peace with the Ottomans, in case 
the latter did not cause any adversity. If, however, the hostile intentions continued to exist 
and one would need to use arms in Transylvania and elsewhere as “the war became 
close,” then, the instruction stated, “we want to be excused from all the evil.” 
The instruction also touched upon, with further details and more precision, to a 
previously considered method to convince the Grand Vizier for a renewal of peace: a 
special gift or bribe. Kindsperg was authorized to give away as “adoration” to the Grand 
Vizier sixty or more pouches of money or something else that will please him.399 
Kindsperg’s orders were strict. The gift could be handed over on the condition that the 
Austrian demands in Transylvania (the elimination of “robbers” and “rebels” and the 
“bridling” of the Transylvanians) would be realized.  
The instruction was written and signed, but before it was handed over to a courier, 
Kindsperg’s report dated May 28 arrived at Vienna. As earlier emphasized, that report 
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included Kara Mustafa Paşa’s inquiry regarding the Debrecen affair. The Viennese court 
thereupon attached a postscript to the concluded instruction, an explanation of the 
developments in Debrecen from the Austrian perspective. Vienna was surprised at how 
passionately Kara Mustafa Paşa received the complaints coming from Debrecen, and how 
“outraged” he was, unlike his predecessor, about the complaints.400 Kindsperg was 
notified that the Grand Vizier was wrong regarding the Ottoman sovereignty in 
Debrecen, but neither did Vienna claimed authority over the city, suggesting that the 
Austrian presence was indeed a political and military precaution. Rather than making any 
promises, the Hofburg expressed its optimism one more time about the renewal of peace. 
In the meantime, the Porte received a report from the governor of Buda. The 
report consisted of complaints from the Ottoman subjects at several frontier locations. 
Kindsperg communicated those complaints to Vienna with a letter dated June 25, 
1677:401 the Ottoman regiment commander in Simontornya was imprisoned at the 
Austrian fortress of Raab; the garrison from another Austrian-held city, Komárom, was 
inflicting damages to the Ottoman subjects nearby; and the hajduks based in Veszprém 
were carrying out incursions as far as Osijek. In addition, a Hungarian “rebel” group of 
200 cavalry were daily plundering the villages around Pest. There were also reports 
arriving in the Ottoman capital about the Austrian activities. The Monarchy was 
reportedly taking defensive precautions against a possibility of aggression from their 
extended eastern frontier. For instance, the Ottoman paşa at Nové Zámky had informed 
Istanbul about the construction of an Austrian fortress on Ottoman territory. When 
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questioned about the matter, Kindsperg responded to the Ottoman court that the aforesaid 
fortress was not new; it was an old castle and was only being renovated.        
 The letter of the paşa at Buda was not the only letter that arrived to the capital. 
Apafi Mihály I was also sending letters one after another, seeking support from Kara 
Mustafa Paşa. Through a letter, Apafi had informed the Grand Vizier about the new 
Habsburg proposals.402 Emperor Leopold I, who had been repressing the Protestants in 
Hungary for more than a decade, was now offering the Transylvanians to let them rebuild 
their churches to appease their anger against Vienna. Apafi wrote to Kara Mustafa Paşa 
that, if the promised Ottoman support would not be delivered soon, Transylvania would 
make an agreement with Austria. According to Kindsperg, the letter still did not provoke 
a definitive move by the Ottoman capital. Kara Mustafa Paşa kept on waiting for the 
couriers he had dispatched to the frontier. 
 A month later, on July 23, Kindsperg composed another report.403 The Grand 
Vizier’s couriers had finally arrived back from the frontier, but, to Kindsperg’s surprise, 
they reported that everything was fine at the frontier, except the operations of the 
“rebels.” The ambassador had a chance to discuss the matter with Kara Mustafa Paşa at 
another audience. Kindsperg repeated the Austrian concerns one more time: the French 
and Poles were the masterminds behind the trouble at the frontier, and they were planning 
to seat a pro-French king on the Hungarian throne. Kara Mustafa Paşa reminded 
Kindsperg one more time that Apafi could not take such initiatives by himself, and 
neither did the couriers bring such news. When Kindsperg wanted to discuss the matter 







condition of the imperial army against France. Kindsperg attempted to open the matter 
for a second time, but this time he was interrupted with the beverage service. Next, the 
Grand Vizier left the room. Thus, Kara Mustafa Paşa still had not disclosed his intentions 
in Hungary to the Austrian ambassador. Kindsperg later learned that the Grand Vizier had 
ordered the court interpreter Alexander Mavrocordato to compose a letter to Apafi and 
ask him to dispatch an envoy to the Porte, but the ambassador did not yet have any 
information about the content of the letter. 
 
“The Vizier has completely changed his mood and demeanor” 
By the end of July 1677, Kindsperg still had not provided Vienna with any decisive 
information regarding the Ottoman intentions in Hungary. There was a remarkable 
inconsistency between the words and actions of the Ottoman court. Both the Grand Vizier 
and the highest-ranked Ottoman bureaucrats were telling Kindsperg that the Ottoman 
Empire’s intention was to extinguish the fire in Hungary. Yet, since his ascension to 
office, Kara Mustafa Paşa was openly welcoming the rebels in Istanbul, raising 
suspicions that could not be ignored by Vienna. Despite frequent written and verbal 
remonstrations by the Austrian ambassador, the Grand Vizier did not change his attitude 
toward the Hungarian malcontents. The discrepancy between the Ottomans’ verbal 
pledges and their actions convinced the Hofburg that the circumstances in Hungary 
would not change unless the Ottoman court’s interest in Transylvania waned and the 
Grand Vizier stopped making assuring vows to the “rebels.” It was true that France and 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were also involved in the anti-Habsburg 








movement in Hungary, but the Ottoman Empire was the only patron situated suitably to 
take full advantage of the setback. During the following months, the Habsburgs decided 
to lure Kara Mustafa Paşa with material promises to prevent further Ottoman 
provocations in Hungary. In the meantime, the Austrian ambassador found a Grand 
Vizier who was becoming increasingly harder to deal with. 
 Kindsperg’s next report from the Ottoman capital was dated August 13.404 The 
developments in Hungary were yet again the central issue covered in the report. 
Kindsperg recently had a meeting with kahya and reisülküttab (chief of scribes) to whom 
he complained once more about Apafi’s initiatives. The two courtiers reported to 
Kindsperg that the aforesaid letter sent by Mavrocordato to Apafi asked the Prince to 
terminate all the treaties signed with France and the Commonwealth and break up 
relations with them. Apafi was also commanded not to mobilize without the Ottoman 
Empire’s knowledge or order. Furthermore, the Ottoman courtiers hinted to Kindsperg 
that they would also strive to convince Kara Mustafa Paşa to banish the “rebel” agents 
from Istanbul. Kindsperg knew that letters had already been sent to the frontier, to no 
effect. Likewise, the Ottoman courtiers’ optimism about the Grand Vizier’s tendency to 
abolish the “rebels” was not conducive to any meaningful results for the Monarchy. In 
order to convert the Ottoman court’s ostensible pledges into reality, Vienna had earlier 
considered bribing the Grand Vizier. This time, Kindsperg proposed that Vienna also 
reward the Ottoman courtiers who served the Austrian interests, and he dispatched to 
Vienna a list of bureaucrats who could be bribed at the Ottoman court.  
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 Nonetheless, Kindsperg was negative against giving a special gift to the Grand 
Vizier. Kara Mustafa Paşa was still “warm” to the idea of war due to the situation in 
Debrecen, and was demonstrating “inhumane caprices” about the problem there.405 In 
fact, the Grand Vizier’s capriciousness was not limited to the issues at Debrecen. 
Kindsperg wrote that “the Grand Vizier has completely changed his mood and demeanor 
since he arrived in Constantinople. He is vehement toward Christians and Turks, treats all 
quite harshly and stubbornly; he satisfies no one; and argues with everybody. And, since 
he is inclined to do evil, it can be assumed that he will find a cause and opportunity by 
means of the [Transylvanian] rebels to break with the imperial majesties.”406  
It is difficult to guess what might have led to such change in Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
attitude. At the very first audience, the Grand Vizier had treated Kindsperg in so friendly 
manner that the ambassador thought Kara Mustafa Paşa was a friendlier and a more 
straightforward character than his predecessor, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. Only ten months later, 
Kindsperg described the new Grand Vizier as a “vehement” individual who pleased no 
one and quarreled with everybody. Perhaps the severity of the existing challenges at the 
time, such as the situation in Transylvania and the unsuccessful Chyhyryn campaign, had 
increased the pressure on Kara Mustafa Paşa, causing him to develop an irritable 
disposition. However, it is also possible that what altered was not the Grand Vizier’s 
disposition, but rather Kindsperg’s thoughts about him. By August 1677, the 
ambassador’s mission to renew the peace with the Ottomans had turned into an 
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exasperating struggle to discredit the Hungarian malcontents at the Ottoman court. The 
contradiction between the verbal promises of the Grand Vizier and his actions must had 
further frustrated the ambassador, leading him to simply denigrate the Grand Vizier in the 
eyes of Vienna.  
Although one can only conjecture about the real reason behind Kindsperg’s 
changing description of Kara Mustafa Paşa in August 1677, during the following months, 
there were developments the ambassador interpreted as the harbingers of an Ottoman 
assault directed toward west. Kindsperg noted that a letter from Transylvania that had just 
arrived at Istanbul “pleased” the Grand Vizier. The letter stated that the “rebels” had been 
“fed” by the Porte for nine years already and should not be forsaken. Rather, the letter 
proposed, the “rebels” should be supported by a paşa and 500 men, who along with 
thousands of Hungarians would carry out surprise attacks and capture garrisons and 
fortresses in the close vicinity of Eger. It would allegedly be easy, because there was only 
limited military presence in the area. Thereby, the Ottomans and Hungarians would 
establish a stronghold in the region without paying a price. The letter concluded that such 
operations would be greatly beneficial to the Porte.  
Kindsperg believed that the deliberation was written by the Turkish subjects 
around Eger, where there were other places that the Turks contemplated attacking and 
occupying. Although nothing was yet determined at the Sublime Porte, in the face of such 
prospective threats Kindsperg urged Vienna to issue military emergency warnings and 








A decisive moment: Kara Mustafa Paşa’s treatment of Jan Gninski  
Kindsperg’s next letter confirmed the ambassador’s concerns about Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
changing complexion.407 In the mid-summer of 1677, the Polish envoy Jan Gninski, the 
Voivode of Chelmno, visited the Ottoman capital with an entourage consisting of 300 
men. The envoy had a special mission as part of the Polish King Jan Sobieski III’s 
ambitions in central and northern Europe. As mentioned, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and France had signed an accord in 1675 to cooperate in Transylvania. 
Sobieski knew that designing the principality according to the Polish interests could not 
be achieved without the approval of the Ottoman court. Besides, the King had other plans 
in the Baltic area which could not be realized unless the southern border of the 
Commonwealth was safe. Jan Gninski’s first objective in Istanbul was to strengthen the 
assumed friendship between the Ottoman Empire and Poland, as the French-Polish 
initiative was taking further steps in Transylvania. The reconfirmation of this amity 
would contribute to the envoy’s second goal: safeguarding of the Commonwealth’s 
southern frontier against the Ottoman aggressiveness before Sobieski embarked on his 
operations in the Baltic. In the meantime, Gninski, as a third goal, was expecting to 
integrate as much land as possible in Podolia back into the Commonwealth. The ongoing 
skirmishes between the Porte and Muscovy must have appeared to Jan Sobieski as a 
perfect opportunity to achieve these goals.408 
Jan Sobieski, the so-called future “savior of the Christendom,” was fond of the 
eastern culture; “positively disposed toward the Muslim neighbor;” he had no intentions 
                                                          
407 Johann Christoph von Kindsperg, August 28, 1677, HHStA: Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 148. 








to initiate hostilities with the Porte.409 He had once established close relations with the 
Crimean Khan Islam Giray (1644-1654), and could reportedly speak Turkish, Arabic, and 
Persian. He had belonged to a “fraternity of magnates” from Volhynia, a territory in the 
southeast of the Commonwealth “the fortunes of which [were] irrevocably bound to the 
prosperity of the frontier.” It has been argued that “the ‘oriental tradition’ held pride of 
place” in Sobieski’s conduct of public affairs.410  
Yet, Kindsperg’s reports to Vienna demonstrated that the Polish King’s cultural 
familiarity with the Ottoman world did not ease his envoy’s mission at Istanbul. Gninski 
stayed in Istanbul for more than a year. He was greeted with great suspicion by the 
Ottomans due to the ongoing Polish-French “machinations” in Transylvania. Moreover, 
to Kindsperg’s surprise, the Polish envoy was not considered a plenipotentiary (“Gross 
Botschafter”); the Grand Vizier treated him quite highhandedly and with deliberate 
disregard. His request to stay at a mansion that was formerly used by the Austrian special 
envoy Walter Leslie was rejected on the grounds that Gninski was representing a king, 
not an emperor. Instead, the envoy stayed at a small room inside an inn. Kindsperg noted 
that Gninski was bedridden (“bethlägerig”) because of his frustration.411  
Gninski’s actual negotiations would not be more promising. The first audience 
with the Sultan took place on August 16, where, to the pleasure of Kindsperg, the Polish 
envoy’s chair was placed further away from the Grand Vizier than where Kindsperg’s 
chair had stood during the Austrian’s most recent audience. The first meeting between 
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Gninski and the Grand Vizier took place a week later, on August 23. According to 
Kindsperg’s account, Kara Mustafa Paşa became so angry upon the Polish envoy’s 
complaints about Ottoman rule in Podolia and positive remarks about the French King 
that the Grand Vizier abruptly ended the meeting. Nonetheless, Gninski stayed in Istanbul 
during the rest of 1677 and much of 1678 and had other meetings with the Grand Vizier, 
even though the treatment he received did not change. The major issue that the two 
parties ostensibly disagreed about was the possession of two fortresses, Bar and 
Międzybórz. Yet, Kindsperg believed, according to his report dated November 21, 1677, 
that Kara Mustafa Paşa was intentionally delaying the talks, because he was probably 
considering a new campaign against Poland.  
Kindsperg actually had a chance to express that idea to Jan Gninski himself in 
Istanbul, when, in a rare and remarkable moment Gninski and his fifteen servants visited 
the Austrian ambassador for lunch, on October 23, 1677.412 The Polish envoy had 
supposedly visited Kindsperg to exchange opinions about his ongoing negotiations with 
Kara Mustafa Paşa. Upon Gninski’s statement that, despite many weeks he had spent in 
Istanbul, the negotiations were fruitless, Kindsperg responded that Gninski should not 
modify the conditions he stipulated for peace. However, the Austrian added, the Grand 
Vizier’s intention was to drag the talks out until spring and act according to what the 
conjuncture would necessitate then. In any event, Kindsperg concluded, Kara Mustafa 
Paşa’s inclination toward Poland was not better than his approach to Muscovy. The 
Hofburg, when notified about the meeting, recommended that Kindsperg be extra careful 
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with Gninski for he was a “devious” man and eventually a subject of his king about 
whom he would not hesitate to talk badly to uncover the Austrian’s mindset.413 
Jan Gninski eventually returned to Poland after approving Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
conditions. His mission was a diplomatic calamity. He was unambiguously humiliated by 
Kara Mustafa Paşa, for whom the visit was nothing more than a display of homage by an 
inferior ruler. Gninski’s account of the journey and negotiations opened dramatically: 
“Shall I speak, or merely weep?”414 He recorded in his diary a statement, with attribution 
to the Crimean Khan, which summarized the Ottoman attitude toward him: “we do not 
care about your anger or your plea; we will not regress a nail wide.” During the 
audiences, when requesting rectifications along the border, he was told: “whatever you 
want, take it yourself!”415 Gninski, who had traveled to Istanbul to renew the peace with 
the Ottoman Empire, ultimately urged Sobieski to dispatch envoys to the Pope, Emperor 
Leopold I, Louis XIV, and to Muscovy. A war with the Ottoman Empire was looming in 
the horizon.  
It is difficult to know whether Kara Mustafa Paşa’s manner toward Jan Gninski 
was a result of the Ottomans’ recent encounters with the Poles. Ottoman-Polish relations 
since the Peace of Andrusovo had been quite strained. Chronicler Hacı Ali Efendi 
portrayed Kara Mustafa Paşa, the deputy grand vizier, as a lenient negotiator during the 
peace talks before the Buczacz Treaty in 1672.416 Yet, when the Polish Sejm refused to 
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ratify the treaty and war renewed, Kara Mustafa Paşa participated in the campaigns as a 
commander. Jan Sobieski, who would eventually send Jan Gninski to Istanbul, had 
become the Polish King mainly as a result of his success against the Ottomans during 
these campaigns, especially his victory at Hotin in the fall of 1673. The campaigns 
continued until Kara Mustafa Paşa became the grand vizier in the fall of 1676, shortly 
after a peace was concluded between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Several months 
after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of the grand vizierate, Gninski met the Sultan’s 
new “absolute deputy” in Istanbul to further ameliorate relations. One can only 
conjecture that perhaps these personal connections to Polish affairs frustrated the Grand 
Vizier and resulted in his contemptuous attitude toward Sobieski’s envoy. Another 
possibility is that the Polish-French partnership in Transylvania about which Kindsperg 
frequently complained further instigated Kara Mustafa Paşa’s anger toward Poland. Or, 
perhaps, it was Jan Gninski’s attitude toward the Ottoman court. According to Dimitrie 
Cantemir, the Polish envoy’s presumptuousness was the reason behind the Grand Vizier’s 
attitude. Cantemir wrote that Gninski, before his entry to Istanbul, requested that the 
grand vizier meet him at the city gate. When that unreasonable request was rejected, 
Gninski allegedly delayed his entry. Later, the envoy made an ostentatious public entry to 
the city “designed for his honor,” but, as Cantermir noted, by irritating the grand vizier, it 
“turned to his disgrace.” When informed about the arrival of the Polish envoy along with 
seven hundred persons, Kara Mustafa Pasha allegedly said that “if [Gninski] meant to use 







intended to salute the lofty threshold of the Sublime Port, he had brought too many with 
him.”417   
One cannot know for sure whether one of the above explanations led to Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s highhanded demeanor toward Gninski. It is certain, nonetheless, that 
neither the Ottoman Grand Vizier nor the Polish envoy knew in late 1677 that the 
former’s treatment of the latter would eventually become a critical historical juncture and 
pave the way for extraordinary outcomes in Central European history. Six years later, on 
September 12, 1683, Jan Sobieski III, who had once willfully applied to the Ottoman 
court to rebuild friendly relations, only to be neglected by Kara Mustafa Paşa, would 
command the European coalition army that reversed at Vienna the centuries-long 
Ottoman expansion into Europe.  
Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s reports, sent from the Ottoman capital between 
November 1676 and December 1677, illustrated that during the thirteen months following 
the transfer of the sultan’s seal from Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara Mustafa Paşa, the 
atmosphere at the Ottoman court had changed significantly, mainly as a result of the 
alterations in Kara Mustafa Paşa’s disposition. The Polish envoy Jan Gninski was not the 
only foreign representative suffering the results of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s altering 
temperament. On September 13, 1677, Kindsperg notified Vienna that Kara Mustafa Paşa 
was harassing all foreign representatives “through all kinds of inventions.” He was 
treating everybody by simply saying “I want this; I order.”418 At the Ottoman court, there 
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was neither “reasonable persuasion” nor “lenient treatment” nor “assistance” to the 
foreign representatives. The Turks were ridiculing all the Christians, as the Christians 
were humbling themselves against them.419 The delivery of the previously mentioned 
special gift to the “eigensinnig Vesier” would be useless, because, given his manners, a 
gift would have no effect. On October 16, 1677, Kindsperg wrote to Vienna that, sooner 
or later, the Ottoman Empire would achieve its objectives against Poland and Muscovy. It 
was certain that the Ottomans would then turn their face to Hungary.420 There, the air and 
land was much familiar to them for they many times marched in and out of it, and, 
therefore, they would fight more comfortably.421 For the first time since Kara Mustafa 
Paşa assumed the grand vizierate about a year ago, Kindsperg was speaking with such 
certainty about the possibility of an Ottoman campaign into central Europe.  
Whether the very conditions that caused Kindsperg to write with such conviction 
also situated the Ottomans expediently for a campaign on Hungary or Austria was highly 
questionable. By December 1677, the Ottoman Empire was surrounding itself with 
enemies throughout the entire western and northern frontier. There was an ongoing war 
with Muscovy in the north. Poland, despite its willingness to renew the existing peace 
with the Porte, had turned into a prospective enemy. The Grand Vizier’s attitude toward 
Hungarian malcontents was dragging toward another war in Hungary, while Venice, 
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which had recently suffered the loss of Candia to the Ottomans, was waiting for an 
opportunity to retaliate. 
How did Kara Mustafa Paşa, only within a year after his assumption of office, 
expose the Ottoman Empire to such threats? The recently growing “renewal of faith” 
paradigm assumes that these circumstances were a result of religious revivalism that 
supposedly guided important decision-making moments during the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Accordingly, Kara Mustafa Paşa was motivated by a timeless 
phenomenon of jihad against Christendom. This explanation, at the first glance, appears 
reasonable, but it is actually quite misleading. As Kindsperg noted, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
“vehemence” was not directed only toward the “Christian” representatives. The Grand 
Vizier was harsh toward the “Turks,” too. Therefore, explanations based on religious or 
ideological motives are rather reductionist.  
Another possible explanation is that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s absentmindedness or his 
capriciousness toward foreign envoys, about which Kindsperg had also complained, 
trapped the Empire in that vulnerable position. Such an explanation, however, would 
mean that Kara Mustafa Paşa was an unskillful, inexperienced leader. In fact, the Grand 
Vizier had considerable experience as a statesman during his pre-grand vizierate career, 
which must have equipped him with adequate knowledge in both domestic and foreign 
policy issues. How do we, then, explain the Grand Vizier’s handling of the foreign 
envoys and the resulting dangerous international conjuncture which actually indicated the 
lack of long-term strategic intentionality?  
It appears that the recurrent skirmishes in Podolia and the decade’s long tumult in 







matters by fighting these enemies all together. However, such a decision could not be 
made without underestimating the capabilities and resourcefulness of the existing and 
prospective enemies, while overestimating the limits of the Ottoman Empire’s actual 
radius of operational power in Central Europe. This assessment may seem to contradict 
the foregoing statement about the  
expertise of the Grand Vizier, but it was not so given that the Köprülü regime had 
victoriously survived many similar threats. This double-sided miscalculation continued to 











Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s reports from the Ottoman capital during the late 
summer and fall of 1677 raised strong suspicions at the Hofburg about the likelihood of 
an Ottoman campaign into Central Europe. The situation necessitated Vienna to maintain 
the regular flow of information from Istanbul while retaining maximum watchfulness 
along the border. In early 1678, Kindsperg received sharp orders to inform Vienna 
regularly about developments at the Porte. However, the fortunes of the House of Austria 
in the next several years would be partially tied to an insidious enemy: the plague. Within 
two years following Kindsperg’s first severe warning about the possibility of an Ottoman 
campaign into Hungary, four Austrian representatives including Kindsperg himself lost 
their lives to the plague. That was before they could conclude the peace Austria strongly 
desired. One can only speculate about whether Kara Mustafa Paşa or other courtiers at 
the Ottoman court interpreted the coincidence “as a divine omen against renewing the 
treaty.”422 Yet the Ottoman grand vizier’s manner during the same years left no room for 
speculation concerning his intentions. Until the appointment of Georg Christoph von 
Kunitz, the Consul of the Austrian Oriental Company, as the Habsburg  
                                                          







ambassador in the winter of 1680, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court did not take any initiatives 
to extend the peace treaty with the Habsburgs. Likewise, they did not take any action to 
stop the  ongoing restlessness in Transylvania that had become the most important matter 
Austria wanted to resolve along its eastern frontier.  
During 1678, the Viennese court continued to send orders to Kindsperg and 
commanded him to strive for the renewal of the peace with the Ottoman Empire. On 
January 15, 1678, Kindsperg received new instructions.423 The Hofburg notified the 
ambassador about the defensive preparations underway along the border which had 
begun after Kindsperg’s reports in the fall of 1677. The preparations included inspection 
of the weaponry and strengthening of the fortifications along the border as well as 
deployment of reinforcements while maintaining strict vigilance. The Hofburg expected 
Kindsperg to be alert and commanded him to maintain similar watchfulness. Yet, the 
ambassador had to observe developments “with a grain of salt” for each party in the anti-
Habsburg movement in Transylvania, (“rebels,” Porte, Poland, and France) had different 
goals and ambitions. 
Kindsperg signed his first letter from 1678 on January 22.424 At the Ottoman 
capital, there were opposition groups from Transylvania. Apafi Mihály’s agent, Cappi 
Georgi, had recently brought his prince’s annual tribute to the Porte. Kara Mustafa Paşa 
asked the agent about the general condition in Hungary. Georgi responded that 
everything was in order except those who were “defending” themselves against the 
Germans. Concurrently with Apafi’s agent, another Transylvanian envoy, Christoph 







complained to Kara Mustafa Paşa about the initiatives of Apafi and Mihály Teleki, the 
former’s chancellor and a key figure in the French ambitions in Transylvania.425 The 
letter asked the grand vizier to stop the “rebels,” who, with the support of the Polish 
troops, were planning to attack the Germans. Transylvanian magnates had neither advised 
the “rebels” to attack the Germans nor had consent for such aggressive initiatives.  
In his report, Kindsperg included an account of his meeting with Christoph Pasco 
as an ordinary moment, suggesting that Pasco’s mission to the Ottoman capital was, most 
likely, a combined initiative of the Hofburg and the pro-Habsburg magnates in 
Transylvania, aiming to increase the negotiation power of Austria at the Ottoman court. 
The Austrian advised the Transylvanian to ask the grand vizier to dispatch an ağa to 
Transylvania with a written decree commanding the “rebels” to expel the Poles and 
French from the land. Pasco also could demand the punishment of Teleki along with his 
companions, or at least their banishment from the principality. Kindsperg promised that 
he would verbalize these demands at his next meeting with the grand vizier. Thus, if the 
Ottoman court would apply these measures, the problems along the border would end 
without battle.  
Further details in Kindsperg’s report illustrated that though the grand vizier 
verbally declared a friendly position, due to his actual direct and indirect tolerance of the 
Transylvanian “rebels” Vienna could not completely eliminate the possibility of an armed 
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conflict between the two states. Indeed, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s response to Kindsperg at the 
last audience, on December 22, 1677, must have given stronger impressions to regarding 
the probable course of events in Hungary as long as the grand vizier possessed the 
sultan’s seal. Upon Kindsperg’s words about Polish and French initiatives in 
Transylvania and the Hofburg’s disapproval of these two nations’ presence in the 
principality, Kara Mustafa Paşa responded that the Sultan was not responsible for the 
actions of foreign sovereigns. The Ottoman court would neither ask foreign nations to be 
involved in such actions nor could prevent them. Apafi and Teleki, on the other hand, had 
already received two prohibitive commands. The grand vizier promised to send a third 
one that forbid Apafi from hosting foreign agents in the principality and implementing 
other modifications destructive to the land’s order; otherwise, he would be responsible 
for the consequences. As per Kindsperg’s request, Kara Mustafa Paşa assured that he 
would send this prohibitive command with an authorized ağa, lest Apafı and his courtiers 
ignore the decree as they had previous ones. Kindsperg expressed his appreciation to 
Kara Mustafa Paşa who responded that he, too, was glad to know that the emperor 
approached the Ottomans peacefully. 
The mutual gestures and friendly exchanges, however, did not dispel the tension 
during the rest of the conversation. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s statement that the Ottoman court 
had not initiated any adversity caused Kindsperg to oppose such a claim: The Ottoman 
subjects in Oradea were collecting tribute, unlawfully, from villages under the 
jurisdiction of Szatmár and Szabolcs, two counties reserved for the Monarchy according 
to the second article of the existing peace treaty. The Ottoman subjects in Eger were 







Furthermore, the Ottoman paşa at Nové Zámky had ignored his troops’ attacks on 
villages in the vicinity. Also, the Ottoman subjects living in Székesfehérvár and 
Esztergom were committing similar atrocities.  
To his remonstrations, Kindsperg received the typical dilatory response that he 
was used to hearing from the grand vizier. Kara Mustafa Paşa said that he would send a 
courier to Hungary to investigate who had initiated the aggression. If the initiatives of the 
Ottoman subjects were in essence defensive, instigated by aggression from across the 
border and performed out of necessity, he would act accordingly. If, however, the 
Ottoman subjects committed any acts in defiance of the decrees previously dispatched by 
the court, he promised to take action accordingly. 
A detail that Kindsperg communicated to the grand vizier illustrated that the 
Ottoman policy toward Hungary had gradually transformed since Kara Mustafa Paşa had 
assumed the grand vizierate. Kindsperg told the grand vizier that the Ottoman 
government had annually appointed a new paşa Nové Zámky who arrived as a poor 
person to his seat. These paşas then sought ways to get rich; for instance, by unlawfully 
forcing the villages belonging to Nitra to pay taxes to the Ottoman Empire. Kara Mustafa 
Paşa disagreed with any such claim; yet the ambassador had personal examples. He 
mentioned that one Yamalı Mustafa Paşa, a former commander at Nové Zámky, had 
forced villages as far as in Moravia that never rendered homage to the Ottoman Empire to 
pay tax. Reportedly, he also committed many other destructive excesses. Kindsperg 
added that when he had formerly reported Yamalı Mustafa Paşa’s acts to the Ottoman 







the same Yamalı Mustafa Paşa at the time was a member of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
household. Therefore, the grand vizier was totally displeased to hear the complaint.  
Indeed, such cloaked violations of the peace terms along the border by the 
Ottoman commanders were enough to cause a major confrontation between the two 
states. Kindsperg, who knew that such border encroachments were unacceptable under 
any condition, had a simple demand from the grand vizier: The villages on the Ottoman 
territory as determined in the last treaty should continue to pay tax to the Ottoman 
Empire; whereas those that had never paid tax to the Ottomans should not pay any kind 
of tax to the Ottoman garrisons. Kindsperg wrote that the conversation had “heated up” 
both of them, but, ultimately, there was still no sign of a decisive solution for the 
situation along the border. Mavrocordato told Kindsperg after the meeting that the grand 
vizier, who was getting ready to march to Chyhyryn, did not want to meet with 
Kindsperg again. 
Kindsperg then had a private meeting with the chief of scribes.426 “I am here for 
more than six years,” the Austrian said; “I have been sick for more than four years of that 
time.” He added that he wanted to return to Christendom; yet he also wanted to conclude 
his mission successfully by signing a peace treaty between the two great sovereigns 
before he departed. To that end, he was ready to hand a special remuneration to the grand 
vizier in case both parties agreed on eradication of the “rebels” and reinstitution of 
tranquility along the border. The chief of scribes said that two decrees, one signed by the 
Sultan and the other by the grand vizier, would be sent to the border. The decrees 
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commanded the Turkish garrisons not to abet and assist “rebels.” Also the chief of scribes 
asserted that the governor at Buda, İbrahim Paşa, had restored control in the principality. 
Kindsperg knew that these verbal reassurances had no impact on the actual situation or 
did not even provide palliative precautions. He requested from the Ottoman court a copy 
of the decree that both the grand vizier and the chief of scribes mentioned. Along with his 
report, Kindsperg dispatched to Vienna a copy of this decree in Ottoman Turkish.427  
Apparently written by an Ottoman scribe, the long document listed numerous 
border violations committed by Ottoman garrisons and subjects and the Transylvanian 
“rebels” during the last year. Kidnappings, illegal tax collection, burning of villages and 
harassment of villagers, and storming of Austrian fortresses without reason were some of 
the infringements enumerated in the decree. The sultan had given his “glorious promise” 
to the emperor’s representative at the Porte that such actions would come to an end. One 
finds it difficult to determine whether Kara Mustafa Paşa government sent such an order 
to the frontier paşas and commanders or whether the Ottoman scribes penned the decree 
to hand it to the Austrian ambassador. Even if the Ottoman court dispatched such orders, 
given Kara Mustafa Paşa’s general attitude, perhaps the Ottoman court sent them only as 
a formality. By the winter of 1678, Kara Mustafa Paşa was continuing to welcome 
Apafi’s representatives, as he did days before Kindsperg’s audience in December, 1677. 
There were neither preparations to appease the Hungarian malcontents nor any indication 
that the grand vizier had such a plan. In fact, the circumstances in Transylvania and Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s negligence about the Polish and French presence in the principality  
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indicated the contrary. Though his intentions were not clear yet, as Kindsperg had stated 
to Jan Gninski in the fall, he was deliberately delaying the talks. In fact, the penning of 
such a decree by the Ottoman scribal office, only possible with the knowledge of the 
grand vizier, indirectly meant the admission of accusations Kindsperg directed at the 
Ottoman court. Therefore, most probably, this decree was written only to alleviate the 
Austrian ambassador’s unremitting plea for peace and did not reflect the actual stance of 
the grand vizier. 
Kindsperg’s account ended with a brief evaluation of the Porte’s relationship with 
Poland and Muscovy. Kindsperg wanted negotiations with the Poles would extend 
indefinitely, leaving the Ottomans insecure, and prevent them from undertaking other 
initiatives. He also hoped that Muscovy would defeat the Ottomans in the ensuing battle 
for Chyhyryn. If that were to happen, then Poland and Muscovy could form an alliance 
that the Ottomans feared and attack the Ottoman Empire.  
In addition to the political and diplomatic situation, Kindsperg’s report revealed a 
new impediment for the Hofburg: Kindsperg’s health condition was deteriorating. The 
pestilence that must have contaminated the ambassador had already hit a Polish 
delegation, who had lost 40 of the 60 individuals on their way to Istanbul to finalize the 
new peace treaty. When the Hofburg received the news about Kindsperg’s failing health, 
preparations began in Vienna to send a new envoy to the Ottoman capital. Kindsperg 
stayed in the Ottoman Empire during much of 1678 and continued to send reports to 
Vienna. The new representative, Peter Franz Hoffmann von Ankerkron, who was an 
internuncio rather than an ambassador, received detailed instructions in February which 







Meanwhile, the courier Adam Schönberger reported to the Hofburg the first 
rumors of a planned Ottoman campaign against the Austrian capital.428 He had left 
Vienna in October 26, 1677 for Istanbul. On his way back to Vienna, the governor of 
Buda told Schönberger that as soon as the Ottoman army was victorious against 
Muscovy, the same army planned to march through Transylvania to Vienna without 
losing time with other fortresses. Such intelligence was the first news of a likely Ottoman 
campaign on Vienna since Kara Mustafa Paşa had assumed office, yet it did not alert the 
Viennese court. In fact, a brief War Council instruction from January 23 which 
commanded Kindsperg to intensify remonstrations about the situation along the border 
illustrated that preemptive diplomatic initiatives would continue to serve as the Hofburg’s 
major instrument at the Ottoman capital.429  
 
Peter Franz Hoffmann’s mission to Istanbul as internuncio  
Peter Franz Hoffmann’s assignment to Istanbul marked the beginning of a two-year 
period during which the regular flow of information from the Ottoman capital to Vienna 
was interrupted due to the pestilence that would take the lives of many Austrian agents. 
These unpredicted deaths caused Austrian peace initiatives in Istanbul to severely lose 
their momentum between the spring of 1678 and the beginning of Georg Christoph von 
Kunitz’s ambassadorship in February 1680. Meanwhile, Kara Mustafa Paşa spent much 
of 1678 with the campaign against Muscovy. During the next year, the Ottoman court 
again sent orders to the provinces for another campaign to the north, but 1679 would 
lapse without military action when the news of a Russian peace delegate’s departure from 
                                                          







Moscow arrived in Istanbul. Thus, three major causes, including the epidemic that took 
the lives of Austrian agents between the spring of 1678 and February 1680, Kara Mustafa 
Paşa’s extended absence from the capital, and the uncertainty of the Ottoman-Muscovy 
relations throughout 1679 resulted in two lost years for Habsburg diplomacy.  
The same period also marked gradual deepening of the tension between the 
Habsburg and Ottoman courts. Kara Mustafa Paşa, whose stance on the Transylvanian 
matter had been rather ambiguous and at times contradictory during 1677, adopted a 
more supportive stance toward malcontents. However, he also avoided declaring open 
war on Hungary or Austria, leaving room for the Hofburg to maintain the position that 
the peace with the Ottomans could be renewed. Accordingly, the new internuncio 
Hoffmann’s directions did not include any modification of issues that necessitated urgent 
resolution for the Habsburg Monarchy.430 Essentially, Hoffmann’s instructions essentially 
compiled the grievances that Kindsperg had been vehemently expressing to Kara Mustafa 
Paşa. Yet, the instructions deserve special attention; the Hofburg clearly saw Hoffmann’s 
expedition as a new opportunity to delineate these grievances collectively. In the 
following years, the instructions Vienna dispatched to the subsequent Habsburg envoys in 
Istanbul often referred to “Hoffmann’s instructions” and asked them to negotiate with 
Kara Mustafa Paşa based on the conditions outlined by them. 
The instructions stated that Hoffmann’s mission was an indication of the 
Monarchy’s “love of peace and good neighborliness.”431 Many “machinations” had 
occurred that upset the peace between the two states. The French were continuing to 
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provide assistance to the Poles and Transylvanian “rebels” in Upper Hungary. The 
French intention was to crown the Polish Queen’s brother or another pro-French 
candidate in Hungary. The King of France was so ambitious that he wanted to rule over 
the sultan and emperor’s villages, leaving “no other ruler in the world.” The Hofburg had 
raised the issue during the talks with the previous grand vizier and ministers: together the 
French and the Poles would cause trouble along the Ottoman borders. The sultan and 
emperor had to keep especially the “restless” French nation away from their borders at all 
times. The Porte had to consider its own convenience and stop offering shelter and 
quarter to the French, Poles, Transylvanian “rebels,” and any other affiliates. At the same 
time, the Ottoman garrisons in Hungary had to stop collecting tax from the villages in 
Habsburg territory. These were the conditions of a fair peace since the Zsitvatorok 
settlement. The Porte could realize all this using its authority, if it wanted to arbitrate 
Transylvanian affairs. In case these remonstrations yielded the outcome the Hofburg 
desired and the Ottomans agreed to extend peace, a 20-year settlement would be the most 
beneficial.  
Vienna also commanded Hoffmann to meet in Istanbul with the representatives of 
all Christian nations that did not intend to break with Austria. The Hofburg wanted the 
internuncio to be extra cautious with the Polish envoy and not trust him, as an earlier 
communication from January 15 had also notified Kindsperg. In the meantime, Hoffmann 
had to collect surveillance regarding the Ottoman army and its motives in the next spring, 
while also observing the developments in Ottomans’ relations with Poland and Muscovy.  
                                                                                                                                                                             







 As Hoffman was on his way to Istanbul, the Ottoman court’s war preparations 
against Russia continued during the spring. The Sultan’s banner that marked the 
declaration of war to Muscovy began to wave at Davut Paşa in early March. Although the 
declared destination of the army that summer was Chyhryn, the aftermath of the 
campaign deeply concerned Kindsperg. His report from March 28 reflected his 
anxiety.432 Kindsperg noted that a Russian ambassador who had just arrived and asked for 
peace boosted the Turks’ ambition and pride. The ambassador believed that once the 
Ottomans defeat Muscovy, their plan was either to winter at Oradea to eradicate the 
Germans from the area or, as many suspected, they could directly march on Komárom 
and Győr. What especially fed Kindsperg’s fear were the recent orders of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa for shipment of ammunition and provisions to Belgrade, the main Ottoman supply 
center for European campaigns. Kindsperg asserted that the Ottomans’ intentions to 
march into Hungary were so strong that it would be impossible to ward off the campaign 
through diplomacy or treaties. Only God’s hand and a reunion of Christendom with a 
general peace could thwart and crush the Ottoman army. Kindsperg recommended that 
such a treaty should be signed as soon as possible and the allied army should attack the 
arrogant enemy on its own soil in Belgrade. 
 On April 24, Vienna had sent a letter to Kindsperg stating that a new ambassador, 
Johann Maximilian Sattler, was on his way to Istanbul.433 Yet Sattler died in Belgrade 
before he could even reach the Ottoman capital. Vienna did not name another person to 
replace Sattler, extended Kindsperg’s commission, and notified him that Peter Franz 
Hoffmann was on his way to Istanbul as internuncio. As this instruction was on its way to 
                                                          







the Ottoman capital, on May 7, Kindsperg sent another report to Vienna which showed 
that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s support to the “rebels” was gradually becoming evident. Apafi 
and Teleki had sent six representatives to Istanbul, all Calvinist and Arianer. They said to 
Kara Mustafa Paşa that as long as the Turkish flags waved in Hungary, the entire land 
(including Catholics) had to submit to the Sultan. Just as several months ago, a pro-
Habsburg group was also in Istanbul. They requested from the Ottoman court the 
replacement of Apafi with David Zolyomi, whom the Ottomans held as prince-in-waiting 
prisoner in Constantinople, a typical Ottoman policy to secure loyalty of the sultan’s 
central European vassals. In response, Kara Mustafa Paşa ordered the imprisonment of 
Apafi’s opponents. At the same time, Apafi was apparently informed about the journey of 
his opponents to the Ottoman capital and had sent 200,000 Thaler to Kara Mustafa Paşa. 
Having witnessed Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unequivocal support to the “rebels,” Kindsperg 
increased the tone of his warnings compared to his previous report in January. There was 
no time to lose against the “Erbfeind.” The Emperor had to immediately take all the 
required precautions in Hungary, though not in open violation of the peace with the 
Ottomans, but as “the harrowing events of the time” necessitated. He added that the 
arrogance had risen to such a height inside the Ottoman court that one could even 
presume, “what goodness!,” a march on the imperial capital, Vienna. This time, Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s chief steward, Süleyman, had also verbalized the idea to the Austrian 
ambassador.     
 In early May, Hacı İbrahim Çavuş, a Turkish courier from Buda, visited Vienna 
and notified the Habsburg court of the Ottomans’ desire to maintain good neighborliness 
                                                                                                                                                                             







with the Monarchy but, given the circumstances, the Hofburg must have interpreted the 
visit at best as a duplicitous formality. Now that Kara Mustafa Paşa openly supported the 
malcontents in Hungary and Apafi openly submitted to the Ottoman sovereignty, the 
Austrian ambassador suspected every move at the Ottoman capital and potential 
consequences. On May 23, Kindsperg notified Vienna of the arrival of a new French 
ambassador, Gabriel de Guilleragues, to Istanbul.434 Despite the low esteem the former 
French ambassador, Marquis de Nointel, had in the eyes of Kara Mustafa Paşa and the 
uneasy relations between France and the Ottoman Empire in general, Kindsperg highly 
suspected Guilleragues’ objectives in Istanbul. Kindsperg noted that one could even 
suspect the setting up of an alliance between the two states as Süleyman I and Francis I 
had established a century and a half ago. 
 An opinio recorded during a War Council meeting and attached to Kindsperg’s 
report showed that the news finally induced the the Hofburg to consider non-diplomatic 
action against the Turks.435 The council recommended that the court contact the Papal 
nuncio in Vienna, Francesco Buonvisi, and ask for Rome’s help to further uncover the 
“track of France’s foolish deceitfulness.” This initiative could be considered the first step 
of a general peace “worthy of praise” across Christendom. However, since the Emperor 
could not take such actions by himself, he had to convince other princes at the 
Regensburg diet and, through the Pope’s aid, ask for reinforcements from other Christian 
potentates. Approximately two months later, the end of the Dutch War and the beginning 
of the peace negotiations in western Europe multiplied the Hofburg’s hopes to realize a 
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“universal” peace and union against the Turks.  The War Council reported this “useful” 
information to Kindsperg, apparently assuming that such information would give the 
ambassador an edge in the peace negotiations. Then the Monarchy could turn its face 
fully to the east.436  
  Nevertheless, the closing of the western front did not mean that the Hofburg was 
now ready to militarily challenge the Ottoman Empire. By July, the sultan relocated to 
Adrianople. According to Ottoman customs necessitating foreign ambassadors to follow 
the sultan’s pavilion, Kindsperg and Hoffmann followed the sultan to Adrianople. There 
they had received the War Council’s instruction which stressed that Vienna was 
cognizant of the potential consequences of an Ottoman victory against Muscovy. Vienna 
expected the Austrian agents to work diligently to ward off the plausible disadvantages of 
an Ottoman victory. To that end, through third persons, Kindsperg and Hoffmann had to 
contact the Russian envoys at the Porte and tell them that it would be “unseemly and 
disgraceful” to leave the Ukraine to the Ottomans; it was unheard of among the Christian 
nations to leave such important land to the Turks. Vienna also hoped that the war would 
last years, expecting the Turkish troops to perish due to the cold climate of the north and 
revolt. Moreover, Vienna believed that the Greeks, due to religious parity between them 
and Russians, would also revolt if there were a Russian victory. 
 Yet the Hofburg’s expectations were not fulfilled on the battlefield. On September 
13, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s letter which notified the Ottoman court of the capture of 
Chyhyryn arrived at the capital.437 The Ottoman victory at Chyhryrn and the Polish 
envoy’s recent approval of the Ottoman conditions for peace meant for Vienna that the 
                                                          







Ottomans would soon disengage themselves from their commitments in the north and 
turn to Hungary, as many Austrian agents in Istanbul expected. The situation necessitated 
the House of Austria to continue employing preemptive diplomacy, their most effective 
tool. The rest of 1678, however, passed without any major talks between the Austrian 
agents and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court. During the absence of the grand vizier in the 
summer and fall, Kindsperg and Hoffmann continued to submit complaint letters through 
the deputy grand vizier, Kara İbrahim Paşa, and the Ottoman court interpreter, Alexander 
Mavrocordato.438 By mid-October, the grand vizier and the sultan had returned to 
Adrianople where Kindsperg and Hoffmann were waiting to submit their complaints to 
him in person.439  
 Perhaps, the greatest loss of 1678 for the Viennese court at the Ottoman capital 
was the demise of Johann Christoph von Kindsperg. Hoffmann reported to Vienna on 
December 16 that Kindsperg died on December 14 from a stroke and was buried at the 
Ragusan Church in Adrianople.440  Kindsperg had arrived in Istanbul in 1672. He 
witnessed the transfer of power from Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara Mustafa Paşa in the fall 
of 1676. One may argue that, among other reasons, Kindsperg’s positive and promising 
reports about Kara Mustafa Paşa during the earliest months of his term in offıce had an 
important role in setting the tone for the Habsburg policy toward the Porte. The death of 
Kindsperg meant for the Hofburg the loss of an experienced and well-connected resource 
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at the Ottoman capital. Time showed that the scope of the Hofburg’s negotiation power in 
Istanbul diminished after the death of Kindsperg until a new ambassador was appointed. 
 While Kindsperg was near death, the internuncio Hoffmann was aware of the 
necessity to establish personal connections with the Ottoman courtiers. He also knew that 
inside the Ottoman court, delivery of gifts often marked the beginning of such personal 
connections between a foreign ambassador and a courtier.441 Accordingly, he notified 
Vienna that he had presented 300 ducats to Mavrocordato as a welcome gesture and 
requested him to arrange an audience with the sultan and the grand vizier. The meeting 
took place on December 7 before the death of Kindsperg, during an open ceremony at the 
Ottoman court. No formal negotiations took place because Kara Mustafa Paşa told 
Hoffmann that he wanted to speak privately with the internuncio at another meeting.  
Another lesson the internuncio quickly learned at the meeting with Kara Mustafa 
Paşa was the grand vizier’s tactics to gain time. He wrote to Vienna that, due to the high 
risk in delay of negotiations, a new ambassador with full credentials had to be dispatched 
to Istanbul. He added that Georg Christoph von Kunitz, the Consul of the Austrian 
Oriental Company, would be the most suitable person for the position. Kunitz knew the 
Ottoman lands and was experienced in Turkish affairs; thus, he had the qualities an 
imperial ambassador at the Porte needed. 
As Hoffmann was waiting for the arrival of a new ambassador, again the epidemic 
struck the Austrian diplomacy in Istanbul. The internuncio became sick in December  
                                                          
441 After Hoffmann’s arrival in Istanbul the last summer, Kindsperg had told him that he had not brought 
enough bracket clocks for the ministers at the court. The internuncio reported the issue to Vienna and asked 
for another shipment of them to Istanbul. Peter Franz Hoffmann, July 16, 1678, HHStA: 







1678 and remained almost bedridden henceforth. Indeed, he participated at a meeting in 
the presence of the Sultan on December 27, followed by another brief talk with Kara 
Mustafa Paşa on January 30. However, due to his sickness, he could not report the 
meetings to Vienna until May 17.442 Despite this considerable delay in communications, 
there was not any significant development. At the audience with the sultan in December, 
Hoffmann stated that the peace and friendship between the two rulers had been 
maintained. The emperor had dispatched the internuncio for preservation of such peace, 
despite so many machinations that had taken place and upset the good neighborliness 
between the two mighty sovereigns. The House of Austria wanted a definitive end to all 
these problems. Cognizant of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s deliberate disregard for the 
Monarchy’s peace initiatives, Hoffmann also contended in the presence of the sultan that 
he also wanted to meet the grand vizier. He requested from the sultan that the grand 
vizier listen to him with good will. 443  
At the meeting between the internuncio and Kara Mustafa Paşa at the end of 
January, the two discussed the border issues Vienna had previously outlined in 
Hoffmann’s instructions. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s neglectful manner and dilatory resolution 
offers about the complaints and requests of the Austrian agents had not changed: He 
denied the accusations directed at the Turkish garrisons, but he promised to investigate 
the situation. Upon Hoffmann’s statement that the House of Austria desired to extend the 
Vasvár peace for another 20 years, the grand vizier responded that the issue required 
great consideration, and he had to discuss the conditions Hoffmann stipulated with the 
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sultan and ministers. The courtiers, too, echoed the grand vizier’s remarks and promises. 
Süleyman, the grand vizier’s kahya (chief steward), reported to Hoffmann after the 
meeting that a Turkish courier recently had arrived at Istanbul from Nové Zámky and 
asked the court’s opinion regarding the presence of Austrians in close vicinity to the 
town. According to the kahya, the court returned the courier to Nové Zámky with sharp 
orders to avoid animosity with Austria. 
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s negligence was not the only difficulty for Vienna. 
Hoffmann’s health condition continued to deteriorate. He wrote to Vienna that a new 
ambassador should soon go to the Ottoman capital, because he could not stay any longer 
in the Ottoman Empire without risking his life. Indeed, the Austrian couriers had already 
notified the Hofburg about Hoffmann’s condition. The Viennese court, through the 
courier Adam Schönberger, had dispatched on April 5 a letter to the internuncio about the 
assignment of a new ambassador who would depart from Vienna within the next 14 days. 
The appointment was not Kunitz, as Hoffmann had recommended. Vienna had named 
Johann Carl Terlingo von Guzman as the new resident ambassador to the Ottoman 
Empire. The internuncio wrote that he wished Guzman left earlier and hoped that the 
paşa at Buda would not delay the new ambassador’s journey with “intentional malice” as 
he did to Hoffmann the previous year. 
Guzman was on his way to replace Hoffmann, but the internuncio, as ordered by 
Vienna, met the grand vizier once again on June 3, 1679 and reported the meeting to 
Vienna on June 11.444 This time the grievances were not limited to Apafi and Teleki. The 







committing atrocities. Again, the grand vizier did not surprise Hoffmann. He responded 
that Apafi could not engage in actions he was accused of without the Ottoman’s court 
consent. He promised to send orders to the border to prevent Turkish garrisons from 
assisting the “rebels.” The grand vizier added that the Ottoman court had a peaceful 
approach to Vienna. Hoffmann, in response, said that he hoped these orders would finally 
be effective. 
Despite Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unmistakable reluctance to extend peace and his 
support to the Hungarian malcontents, his intentions remained unclear. The Austrian 
agents had hitherto reported three possible campaign objectives: the environs of Oradea, 
the strategic strongholds Komárom and Győr which protected Vienna from direct Turkish 
assaults, and the imperial capital itself. The Hofburg’s peace initiatives continued during 
the following months, but the severity of threat led to preparations in Istanbul what could 
be interpreted as preliminary peace overtures between the enemies of Kara Mustafa Paşa. 
On June 19, Hoffmann sent a letter to Vienna and solicited further instructions 
concerning visitations to the representatives of Christian nations that did not intend to 
break with the Monarchy.445  
Hoffmann’s next report, dated August 19, illustrated that the Hofburg would 
benefit from such visitations.446 The Ottoman court interpreter, Mavrocordato, had 
recently met Hoffmann at the internuncio’s residence who remained ill at the time. 
Mavrocordato reported to Hoffmann that the Ottoman court decided to defer talks about 
peace conditions that the Monarchy stipulated, including the renewing of the Vasvár 
                                                                                                                                                                             
444 Peter Franz Hoffmann, June 11, 1679, HHStA: Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 149. 
445 Peter Franz Hoffmann, June 19, 1679, HHStA: Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 149. Hoffmann’s original 







treaty for 20 years. The ambiguity of ‘deferring’ the talks notwithstanding, this was the 
first response Austria had received to the relentless push to extend peace since Kara 
Mustafa Paşa assumed the grand vizierate. The answer unambiguously meant that the 
Ottoman court was considering various alternative strategies.  
Mavrocordato also had a question for the internuncio about the developments in 
Vienna. The Ottoman court interpreter said that the Ottomans had recently heard about 
the visitations of Polish and Muscovite envoys to Vienna, reportedly to establish a “liga” 
with the emperor against the Turks. Hoffmann responded that the emperor never intended 
to break the peace with the sultan. The internuncio knew about the Muscovite envoy’s 
visitation and added that the visit had solely complimentary purposes. Yet he did not 
have any information regarding the visitation of the Polish envoy.  
Mavrocordato’s inquiry meant that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court, which had hitherto 
avoided renewing the peace with Austria, was now also implying that the Viennese court 
was not friendly toward the Ottoman Empire. Hoffmann and Mavrocordato’s 
conversation must have indicated to decision-makers in Vienna that the negotiations in 
Istanbul would become even more difficult in the future. In fact, a postscript note 
Hoffmann had attached to his report conveyed to Vienna a little optimism for the first 
time in months. Recently a Transylvanian “rebel” envoy, Russai Andreas, had met the 
new French ambassador, Guilleragues, in Istanbul and asked for protection during the 
talks with the Ottoman court. Allegedly, Guilleragues, responded to Russai Andreas that 
France had just signed a peace treaty (Nijmegen) with the emperor; he added, according 
                                                                                                                                                                             







to the internuncio’s formulation, that the “rebels” should submit themselves to the 
emperor’s graciousness.447  
However, given that the Ottoman court also had begun to hint at an Austrian 
offensive, neither optimism nor arrival of the new ambassador in Istanbul at the end of 
July promised any possibility of altering the obstinacy of the Ottoman court. In addition, 
Guzman was already sick when he arrived in Istanbul. There he found a bedridden 
internuncio who, on August 25, had sent an apology to Vienna for the previous 
interruption in communication between December 1678 and May 1679.448 Nonetheless, 
despite his sickness, Hoffmann dutifully solicited another meeting with the grand vizier 
which took place a week later on September 2.449 As per the “revised and approved” 
articles Guzman had brought from Vienna, Hoffmann submitted Austria’s protests due to 
the ongoing restlessness in Transylvania, emphasizing that the emperor wanted to extend 
the existing peace with the Ottoman Empire. 
Kara Mustafa Paşa, who by then was habitually deferring talks with Austria, this 
time answered that signing of a peace was “not a matter of one, two, or three days; it 
required a long time for scrutiny.” Hoffmann responded to Kara Mustafa Paşa that the 
Hofburg had already analyzed the suggested articles at length. The articles were based on 
the previous treaties. They were only modified according to the conjuncture at the time; if 
the grand vizier wished to examine the former capitulations, he would not be able to find 
anything different. The most urgent issue the Monarchy wanted to resolve through the 
peace renewal was the open and secret assistance and shelter offered to the “rebels” in 
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Transylvania by the Ottoman court and Turkish garrisons along the frontier. Austria 
would not give up its right to militarily confront “rebel” infiltrations into the emperor’s 
territory, while also expecting the Ottoman authorities to forestall incursions into the 
sultan’s territory. Unless these issues were resolved, a definitive peace was impossible. 
The news that the couriers recently transmitted from Istanbul to the Austrian 
capital was not welcomed by the Hofburg, except for the brief note about the French 
ambassador’s recent refusal of a Transylvanian rebel’s protection inquiry. As Vienna’s 
next instruction illustrated, dated September 17, the last War Council meeting had paid 
special attention to the brief note about Guilleragues’ reaction to the Transylvanian 
envoy. It emphasized that France’s political withdrawal from Transylvania would be a 
new opportunity to extinguish the fire in Hungary.450 Yet Vienna actually knew that as 
long as Kara Mustafa Paşa refused to extend the peace, where the French positioned 
themselves in Istanbul did not have much importance.  
On October 14, the Hofburg dispatched new instructions to Istanbul which 
demonstrated that the Viennese court was quite suspicious about Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
intentions.451 The soberly written directive emphasized that if the grand vizier were 
willing to renew the peace treaty, he immediately would offer a meeting with the new 
ambassador, Terlingo von Guzman. The Hofburg stated that Austria only wanted to 
maintain the peace with the Ottoman Empire and always observed requirements for it. 
The most recent War Council meeting had emphasized yet again that the expulsion of the 
“rebels” from Turkish soil was an essential condition for peace. Otherwise, a resettlement 
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in Hungary was impossible to expect. Yet the Hofburg doubted that such a resettlement 
would ever occur. The directive stated that the last meeting of Hoffmann with Kara 
Mustafa Paşa, unlike the previous, was unfriendly. At the time, the Turks wanted to keep 
the status quo and intentionally delayed the peace talks so that they could judge the 
outcomes of the current situation and move according to their own best interest. Most 
probably, the instruction stated, once Muscovy and the Porte would conclude the peace, 
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s intention was to smash the peace and bring desolation to the 
Erblande. Vienna was aware that the Ottomans’ best interests and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
ambitions could be detrimental for Austria. 
  As all these concerns coming from Istanbul were requiring maximum attention, 
the plague once again hit the Austrian diplomats. Terlingo von Guzman was already 
sickly when he had arrived in Istanbul. In Guzman’s assignment the urgency of the 
situation and lack of an authorized ambassador at the Ottoman capital prevented the 
Viennese court from making a judicious decision. The directive from September 17 had 
briefly discussed Guzman’s condition. Terlingo von Guzman was old and already 
physically in poor condition when Vienna decided to assign him to Istanbul. “His misery 
and meagerness are so great,” wrote Vienna, “that we believe if he continues his mission 
it will only cause further inconvenience for him.”452 Yet the continuation of the directive 
showed that an early modern diplomat’s life was a matter of secondary importance 
compared to his state’s interests and his sovereign’s orders. “Terlingo von Guzman is 
already in position,” the instruction continued. “He got there by great expense, so we do 
not think, as discussed in the recent War Council, he will be completely incapable.” 
                                                                                                                                                                             







Vienna believed that Hoffmann’s “indigence” was more urgent and required his recall 
home. Hoffmann, however, never saw Vienna again. The internuncio died on September 
27, 1679, twenty days prior to the penning of the above statements in Vienna. The 
internuncio had become the third high-ranked Austrian diplomat, after Sattler and 
Kindsperg, who lost his life within the last year and a half.  
Terlingo was not only sick but considerably inexperienced in Ottoman affairs. 
What he could achieve under such circumstances was questionable. In a report dated 
November 22, 1679, he notified Vienna that he was sick and unable to meet the grand 
vizier; once fully recuperated, he would request a meeting with the grand vizier to discuss 
peace conditions Hoffmann had presented to the Ottoman court.453 Yet, unlike what both 
Vienna and the ambassador hoped, his condition became worse in the following weeks. 
Only two days after Terlingo’s first report as the ambassador, Johann Baptista Bodesta, a 
member of the Austrian delegation in Istanbul, penned another report (dated November 
24) stating that whether Terlingo would recuperate at all was doubtful.454 The Venetian 
Bailo’s doctor had checked Terlingo’s health and said that “although god is all-powerful, 
it would be very difficult for Terlingo to gain his health again.”  
As both Vienna and the Austrian delegation in Istanbul were preparing for 
Terlingo’s ensuing death, the Hofburg’s diplomatic initiatives at the Ottoman court had 
come to a standstill. Yet the epidemic could not stop the restlessness along the border. On 
November 18, the Habsburg captain at Komárom reported to Vienna that Turks from 
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Esztergom had attacked a trade caravan, killing three and taking eight captives.455 Vienna 
urgently needed to solve the representation crisis in Istanbul to restart diplomatic talks 
and to maintain regular flow of information. On December 31, 1679, the Hofburg sent a 
communication to the Ottoman capital addressed to Terlingo von Guzman.456 The 
instruction was asking for information regarding the most recent situation at the Ottoman 
court and whether Kara Mustafa Paşa was continuing to preserve peace with the emperor. 
Preparations in Belgrade were already quite suspicious, but the decision-makers at the 
Hofburg were particularly curious this time, because they had recently received a report 
from one of the Austrian interpreters at the Ottoman capital, Marco Antonio, who had 
participated at Hoffmann’s last audience with the grand vizier in September. Marco 
Antonio’s account included details that Hoffmann had ignored. Accordingly, at the last 
meeting, Kara Mustafa Paşa had asked Hoffmann why there was an Austrian army in 
Transylvania; Hoffmann responded that they were looking for “rebels.” The answer had 
incensed the grand vizier who fulminated that it was a worthless talk and abruptly ended 
the audience. Vienna believed that the dismissal of the internuncio was emblematic of 
intentions deeply embedded in the mind of the grand vizier. The directive commanded 
Terlingo to gather information through third parties and learn why the grand vizier had 
treated the internuncio harshly. At the end of the instructions, the Hofburg also notified 
the Austrian delegation about its plan if Terlingo were unable to perform his mission. 
Vienna authorized Georg Christoph von Kunitz to take over the ambassadorial duties 
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from Guzman, as the internuncio Hoffmann had recommended to Vienna the previous 
year.    
Johann Carl Terlingo von Guzman, who died on January 13, 1680, never saw the 
directive addressed to him.457 Kunitz, along with his authorization letter, had also 
received a copy of that instruction. In his acknowledgement letter addressed to the 
Hofburg, the new ambassador wrote: “I, obediently and subserviently, express my 
gratitude…I will diligently, eagerly, and loyally serve my emperor.” He added that he 
would immediately deal with the issues mentioned in Terlingo’s last instruction and learn 
if the grand vizier were planning a campaign to Hungary the following spring.458 
Until Kunitz was fully settled at the Ottoman capital, the Hofburg relied on the 
narrative accounts of the interpreters among the Austrian delegation in Istanbul. Marco 
Antonio sent one such report to Vienna that narrated the developments between 
September, 1679 and January of 1680.459 A significant message the interpreter 
communicated to Vienna was dissatisfaction a Polish envoy recently verbalized at the 
meeting with the grand vizier. Also, the envoy had submitted a list of complaints to the 
Ottoman court concerning violations along the Ottoman-Polish border. Marco Antonio 
added that he learned that many members of the szlachta were considering annuling the 
treaty with the Porte. Regarding Hungary, another passage in the report showed that the 
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Ottoman subjects themselves were quite anxious due to the commotion the “rebels” were 
causing. The grand vizier had admitted a Turkish group from Eger who complained about 
the “rebels” and Germans. Kara Mustafa Paşa told them to be patient; soon their 
problems would be solved. 
The Hofburg still did not know what the grand vizier’s plan for resolution, but the 
decision-makers in Vienna were resolute to ameliorate the condition in Transylvania 
through diplomacy. In fact, reports the couriers delivered to Vienna since Kara Mustafa 
Paşa took over the sultan’s seal frequently mentioned that the Ottomans were strongly 
considering a military intervention in Hungary, prompting Vienna to take precautions 
along the Ottoman border. A directive Vienna dispatched to Kunitz in April, 1680 had 
again emphasized Vienna’s acknowledgement of the military threat.460 It asserted that the 
Porte would not have any barriers if they wanted to march into Hungary, once they 
signed a peace with Muscovy at the end of the ongoing negotiations. Therefore, the army 
had to be ready; fortress walls had to be strengthened and supplies replenished. Vienna 
could apply additional security measures depending on the new ambassador’s reports.  
Yet these preparations, by the spring of 1680, lacked a state of emergency. Even 
after the signing of the Nijmegen Treaty and the closure of the western frontier in the 
summer of 1679, Austria continued to use diplomacy as its main policy instrument in the 
east. Time would show whether the ‘primacy of diplomacy’ would pay off during 
Kunitz’s ambassadorship in Istanbul. 
                                                          










Georg Christoph von Kunitz, the last resident Austrian ambassador in Istanbul during the 
grand vizierate of Kara Mustafa Paşa, began to dispatch reports to Vienna in May of 
1680. Kunitz was the former council of the Austrian Oriental Company; he was not new 
to the Ottoman court’s unpredictabilities. The ambassador’s task in Istanbul was 
determined by the Hofburg’s pressing needs to protect the status quo along the 
Monarchy’s eastern frontier. In the spring of 1682, the Hofburg reinforced Kunitz with 
Alberto Caprara, a special envoy authorized to make last minute offers to Kara Mustafa 
Paşa. Just as their predecessors, Kunitz and Caprara incessantly worked to extend the 
armistice with the Ottomans. Their initiatives continued until August of 1682, when Kara 
Mustafa Paşa declared war on Austria. Within the broader trends of seventeenth century 
Habsburg and Ottoman history, the last two years of negotiations between the Austrian 
agents and the Ottoman court were remarkably illustrative of the two empires’ distinct 
administrative structures and governmental mindsets. The Hofburg, governed through 
multi-layered consultative bodies, was not able to modify its established policies in 
Istanbul despite the ever-increasing warnings of the ambassadors. The Ottoman court also 
maintained a considerably linear, albeit aggressive, policy, as it moved with utmost 







On April 28, 1680, Kunitz had his first public audience with the grand vizier who treated 
him politely. The ambassador’s first private audience took place on May 20 when he also 
presented his credentials to the Sultan. Kunitz did not hold any peace negotiations during 
these meetings, but he believed that the sultan and the grand vizier’s kind attitude 
indicated that they were willing to extend the peace.461   
While waiting for an invitation by the Ottoman court to begin peace talks in June, 
Kunitz met the Polish ambassador, Samuel Proski. Especially due to the Polish crown’s 
involvement in the Transylvanian affairs in cooperation with France, relations between 
Austria and Poland were tense at the time. Proski introduced himself to Kunitz as a loyal 
servant of Austria in a manner that could be considered a preliminary alliance overture. 
The Polish envoy asked the Austrian why Emperor Leopold had completely withdrawn 
his support from Poland. Kunitz responded that the emperor had many good reasons: For 
instance, the Polish Queen, a sister-in-law of the emperor, was badly treated by the Poles. 
Also, the French faction in Poland had been a source of trouble for the Monarchy. Proski 
did not object to Kunitz’s explanations. Yet, he added, the loss of Poland for the emperor 
would not be beneficial to Austria. When Kunitz responded that Poland willingly fell into 
that situation, Proski allegedly confessed that French money had corrupted the szlachta. 
Kunitz knew that for a rapprochement between Austria and Poland, both countries 
needed more than a resentful conversation between their respective ambassadors at the 
Porte, where Kunitz’s primary mission was to convince the grand vizier to a peaceful 
resolution. What Kunitz did not know at the time was that the rest of the year would pass  
                                                          








without any significant progress in peace negotiations. Kara Mustafa Paşa, who had 
mastered procrastination tactics against Austrian ambassadors’ requests, delayed the talks 
until the beginning of 1681. In the meantime, Kunitz continually remained in contact 
with the Ottoman court. Yet all he heard was uncertain promises and at times 
contradictory rumors that he continued to report to Vienna. 
On June 18, Kunitz notified Vienna that, reportedly, Sultan Mehmed IV was 
willing to sign a treaty with Austria. The sultan asked the grand vizier whether he would 
soon hold peace talks with Kunitz.462 Expecting an audience, the Austrian ambassador 
did not let his courier leave Istanbul until early July. Yet the reisülküttab (chief of 
scribes) told Kunitz that the grand vizier was overwhelmed with many important issues 
and would not be able to hold a meeting for a while.463 One of these important issues was 
the news that an Ottoman courier from Nové Zámky had brought to the court. 
Accordingly, hundreds of villages around the town had stopped paying tribute to the 
Ottoman Empire. Kunitz reported the complaints that the courier brought to Vienna as an 
ordinary development. He was unaware that the grand vizier would soon take advantage 
of this news and treat the issue as if it were the greatest problem for the two empires to 
resolve. 
 During the next month, Kara Mustafa Paşa had a new reason to defer talks: the 
ambassador’s credentials. The grand vizier communicated to Kunitz through his 
interpreter that he had doubts about the ambassador’s authority to negotiate. Kunitz knew 
that it was only a pretext to gain time; the grand vizier was intentionally delaying the 







Polish and Muscovy matters.464 In fact, Kunitz’s next report mentioned another obvious 
indication of the grand vizier’s intentions. Kara Mustafa Paşa had instructed the border 
generals to retaliate against any incursions.465 The ambassador, however, continued to 
wait, expecting to reinitiate the peace talks based on the articles Peter Franz von 
Hoffmann had presented to the grand vizier. Toward that end, the interpreter Marco 
Antonio was soliciting audiences from the Ottoman court. By the end of August, all 
Kunitz had heard from the court was that Kara Mustafa Paşa was planning to meet the 
ambassador soon. Once again, he notified Vienna that both the sultan and grand vizier 
wanted to renew the treaty with Austria.466   
   Since early spring, Kara Mustafa Paşa was waiting for the arrival of the 
Muscovite envoy who had already departed Moscow. Yet the envoy died on his way to 
Istanbul, prompting the Ottoman court to begin preparations for a new campaign against 
Muscovy. In his reports from October and November, Kunitz feared that this army could 
at any time divert its path into Central Europe. For Kara Mustafa Paşa, the delays only 
meant that he would have more time to consider his plans. He again postponed the 
meeting with Kunitz and declared that he would like to talk with the ambassador in 
Edirne, where the Ottoman army would gather before winter. Actually, Kunitz would not 
be able to meet the grand vizier until the end of December. The ambassador, for the first 
time, was losing his optimism about the possibility of renewing the peace. On December 
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18, he reported to Vienna that whether the grand vizier wanted to sign a treaty with 
Austria was uncertain.467  
The new year did not bring the good news the Viennese court wanted to hear. In 
reality, developments in 1681 marked a turning point in peace negotiations and 
eventually prompted Austria to send a special envoy, Alberto Caprara, to Istanbul. 
Caprara’s task was to dissuade the grand vizier from his undisclosed intentions. On 
January 3, 1681, the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy signed a peace accord. Andreas 
Bokow Wobdonowich, a secretary in the Muscovite delegate, had taken over the 
deceased envoy’s duty and continued the journey to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman 
Empire and Muscovy signed the Treaty of Bakhchisarai and agreed to a 20 year truce.468 
The Muscovite campaign was abolished and a general order was issued for the sultan and 
court’s return to the capital.469  
Day after the signing of the treaty Kunitz wrote that Kara Mustafa Paşa was 
displeased about the dispersal of the army. He tried to convince the sultan about the 
necessity of a campaign into Hungary.470 The Austrian added that many people rumored 
that the grand vizier had sent one of his clients to the paşa at Buda and instructed him to 
provoke the Austrians to initiate a conflict. Thus, the grand vizier expected to convince 
the sultan about a new campaign. In fact, agents of the Turkish subjects and Hungarians 
from Oradea and other locations along the border had visited the Ottoman court in 
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January and submitted complaint letters. Yet these were not legitimate reasons for a 
campaign.471 
Meanwhile, despite such discouraging developments, Kunitz continued to expect 
to change the grand vizier’s mind. Kara Mustafa Paşa, relieved about the Muscovite 
question (the two states still had not yet exchanged ratified copies of the treaty), finally 
gave an audience to the Austrian ambassador on January 27, 1681.472 The meeting was 
simply another fruitless step that served nothing but Kara Mustafa Paşa’s objectives. As 
usual, Kunitz asserted that the Monarchy resolutely wanted to renew peace with Austria. 
The grand vizier, who had been stubbornly ignoring such pleas, set forth another concern. 
He said that he first wanted to have a translation of the proposed articles from Latin to 
Turkish so that he could see if the articles were actually based on and modified from 
former treaties. Kunitz responded that nothing in the treaty was new except two articles 
and added that independent directives could resolve these matters. These explanations 
had no importance to Kara Mustafa Paşa; his only goal was to gain time. He wanted 
interpreters Alexander Mavrocordato and Marco Antonio to meet together with the 
reisülküttab (chief of scribes) and work on a translation of the Latin text. 
Before the report of the last meeting arrived in Vienna, the Hofburg sent an 
instruction based on the Kunitz’s reports from December, 1680 and January, 1681.473 The 
instruction clearly demonstrated that the decision-makers in Vienna suspected the 
rumored aggression toward Hungary and Austria to become reality. Perhaps, the 
instruction stated, the shipment of provisions and ammunition to Belgrade was part of a 
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regular supply distribution. Nonetheless, it continued, the last War Council meeting had 
discussed the urgent need to communicate with Christian nations, because a cumulative 
analysis of the recent news from Istanbul erased all questions regarding the Ottomans’ 
intentions. Within a year after Georg Christoph von Kunitz’s appointment as ambassador, 
the hopes of the Viennese court to extend the armistice with the Porte was vanishing. The 
last instruction showed that the Hofburg was greatly concerned about the news. However, 
as the continuation of the communication between Vienna and Kunitz showed, the 
Habsburg court continued to hope that diplomatic initiatives would achieve a 
compromise with the grand vizier.  
As the level of anxiety in Vienna rapidly escalated, the Austrian and Ottoman 
interpreters gathered in Istanbul according to Kara Mustafa Paşa’s request. They 
discussed the proposed treaty’s translation but to no avail. At the end of March, Kunitz 
penned an encoded letter. He notified Vienna that at this meeting the reisülküttab had 
stated that the grand vizier, who was dissatisfied with the translation, wanted to discuss 
articles one by one.474 Kunitz again indicated that, most probably, this was just another 
delaying tactic; the grand vizier’s real desire was to march on to Belgrade, in defiance of 
the sultan’s orders to disperse the army.  
 By the spring of 1681, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s desire to carry out a campaign into 
Central Europe had become common knowledge. His objections to the Austrians did not 
aim at resolving matters; he simply wanted to gain time to deal with other issues. 
Therefore, it should not have surprised the ambassador when the grand vizier, at the next 







Paşa raised a new dispute that soon became the most important problem for the two 
empires. As noted above, in June of 1680, a courier reported to the Ottoman court that 
many villages around Nové Zámky had stopped paying tribute to the Ottoman garrison in 
that city. At the meeting on March 12, the reisülküttab presented a list of 133 villages to 
the Austrian ambassador and said that these locations were required to pay tribute to both 
sides.475 The grand vizier was overly concerned about the problem because Nové 
Zámky’s income had fallen by 30,000 Thaler. Kara Mustafa Paşa argued that the 
cessation of payments was a result of the Austrian troops’ presence in the area and their 
pressure on the villagers to stop paying tax to the Ottoman garrison. The grand vizier 
stipulated the repayment of the deficit to the Ottoman tax authorities if Austria wanted to 
pursue talks.  
 Kunitz, however, strongly disagreed with the grand vizier. The ambassador 
argued that Nové Zámky was a recently built fortress and did not have any tributary 
village. When Kara Mustafa Paşa responded that Buda, Pest, Eger, and Timișoara had 
tax-paying peasantry and asked how Nové Zámky could not have such a resource, Kunitz 
responded that those four cities had historical possession over their villages. However, he 
added, Nové Zámky’s district consisted of its walls and bastion; the villages around the 
town belonged to Levice and Nitra. Upon that response, Kara Mustafa Paşa asked the 
ambassador how the garrison at Nové Zámky could maintain itself. According to 
Kunitz’s report, the ambassador answered that the emperor could retake the garrison if 
the Ottoman court was not able to sustain it. An ambassador probably could not speak so 
comfortably in the presence of the grand vizier. Nevertheless, whatever answer given by 
                                                                                                                                                                             







Kunitz, it instigated the grand vizier to respond that if the ambassador did have authority 
to sign a treaty that mandated the aforesaid villages to pay tribute to both empires, they 
would continue the talks. 
Historically, Kunitz’s argument was not supported. The Ottomans had captured 
the city in 1663 and had prepared detailed tax-registers of its surroundings. Non-payment 
of taxes was not a novelty in the area. After the capture of the city, the Ottoman troops 
carried out punitive campaigns in 1669, 1673, and 1675 within the environs of Nové 
Zámky when villages ceased to pay taxes to the town.476 In reality, the situation appeared 
to be a typical (and tragic) early modern borderland dilemma: the people of the area were 
victims of the two empire’s struggle to control a strategic region. The courts in Vienna 
and Istanbul were more concerned about their prestige vis-à-vis the other party than the 
condition of the unfortunate frontier settlers. They forced the peasantry in the region to 
pay taxes to both states. Yet the people, overburdened by heavy taxes, often failed to pay 
their duties to either side. 
Regardless, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s plans left no room for bargaining about the 
matter. He said to Kunitz that if the ambassador did not have authority to accept the 
Ottomans’ conditions, the reisülküttab could hand him a specification to be forwarded to 
the emperor. The Viennese court would have to respond to that specification in 60 days. 
More interesting than the dispute itself was that Kunitz ended his account of the meeting 
with an optimistic remark, contradicting some of his earlier observations. Kunitz wrote 
that Kara Mustafa Paşa could still agree to an extension of the accord, despite his 
                                                                                                                                                                             







manifest tendency to obstruct peace talks for a yet-to-be revealed plan. He wrote that at 
the public audience in January the sultan had ordered the grand vizier to agree to a 
renewal of the accord. Furthermore, the army had been dispersed and no individual could 
reliably predict for at least a year a hostile move on the Ottomans' part. The Hofburg was 
not impressed by Kunitz’s optimism. Those in power in Vienna were sure that the grand 
vizier did not intend to renew the peace. The War Council that had met urgently upon 
Kunitz’s account of the audience emphasized that, if the Ottomans had intended to extend 
the peace, they would have agreed upon the former articles.477 
 Indeed, the developments in April 1681 escalated the years-long tension between 
Vienna and Istanbul over Hungary to a new level as both courts took significant steps. On 
April 18, the Ottoman court issued an ahidnâme, or charter, addressed to Apafi. In return 
for yearly tribute, Istanbul offered protection and free elections to Hungary as well as 
religious freedom.478 Vienna, on the other hand, gave significant concessions to the 
Kingdom at the Sopron Diet that convened on April 28. The move attempted to attract the 
malcontents along with the rest of Hungary, but it also showed that the Hofburg’s 
willingness to resolve matters diplomatically did not mean that they would surrender their 
dominions in Hungary. Through this well-known enterprise in Habsburg and Hungarian 
scholarship, the Viennese court abolished the gubernium in Hungary, restored Hungary’s 
autonomy, and largely reaffirmed religious freedoms.479 Both courts knew that these were 
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irrevocable moves that could be undone only through mutual concessions or through a 
major military showdown. As hostilities continued to mount, the course of events showed 
that the latter was a greater possibility. In fact, military confrontations had already 
occurred earlier in April between the Ottoman forces and Habsburg regiments consisting 
of Croatian, Hungarian, and German soldiers. 
 While such skirmishes slowly set the stage for Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unrevealed 
master plan, he also tried to secure support of the Ottoman tributaries in Europe. He held 
negotiations with Hungarian, Transylvanian, and Moldavian agents in Istanbul.480 
Although these steps were gradually dissolving possibility of a diplomatic resolution, the 
House of Austria’s insistence to resolve the matter through diplomatic channels 
continued. Kunitz received another audience on July 14.481 The main issue they discussed 
was again the condition of the peasantry around Nové Zámky and Székesfehérvár. Both 
sides presented lines of arguments parallel to their earlier stance. On August 1, another 
meeting took place at the reisülküttab’s private house office. In the absence of Kara 
Mustafa Paşa, Mavrocordato and a mektubcu (correspondence officer) accompanied the 
reisülküttab, while the interpreter Marco Antonio joined Kunitz. Against the demands of 
the Ottoman court, Kunitz asserted that the emperor would not give away any villages 
because the Ottoman Empire, at the time, had only de facto control on them: “Nové 
Zámky, neither by law nor by virtue of capitulation, could claim the aforesaid villages as 
tributaries.”482  
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Kara Mustafa Paşa’s alter ego: Imre Thököly 
These exchanges only led diplomatic talks to a stalemate as the military tension escalated. 
Recently, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s initiatives had resulted in the formation of an Ottoman 
contingent. It consisted of Ottoman troops from the European provinces, supported by 
Moldavian and Wallachian companies. Also, Transylvania was represented, not only by 
Apafi Mihály I’s 500 men but also 15,000 soldiers of a young Kuruc leader, Imre 
Thököly. The centrality of this aspiring Hungarian commander to the malcontents’ 
movement and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s policies during the remainder of the grand vizier’s 
career is well-known.  
Thököly’s rise to prominence in 1680 and 1681 was a result of his ambitious and 
uncompromising personality. Compared to the hesitant Apafi Mihály who prioritized 
balance and compromise in his policies, Thököly was an unruly commander with an 
expansionist and aggressive agenda.483 When his father, István Thököly, died in combat 
against the Habsburg army during the heyday of the Magnate Conspiracy, Imre Thököly 
had escaped to the Transylvanian sanctuary. By 1680, at the age of 23, his name was 
already known in Europe due to his successful operations in Upper Hungary. These 
operations played a significant role in the Hofburg’s decision to offer concessions to the 
Kingdom of Hungary at the Sopron Diet, where Thököly’s pro-Habsburg brother-in-law, 
Pál Esterházy, was elected the palatine of Hungary. In 1682, Thököly married Francis 
Rákóczi’s widow, Ilona Zrínyi, and secured through the Rákóczi estates the much needed 
financial basis for his enterprise.484 
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 Days before the aforementioned Ottoman contingent executed operations in 
Hungary, a Thököly agent met the grand vizier on July 21, 1681. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s 
response to the agent was clear: “Our door is open to requesters; your demands will be 
fulfilled as long as you keep your promises.” Commands to the Ottoman frontier generals 
to act according to Thököly’s wishes followed this welcoming remark.485 Apafi, 
foreseeing that he could fall out of favor due to the ambitious and bold Thököly, 
attempted to negotiate with him. Their agents held a meeting in May 1681 and sought 
common ground, but Thököly “refused to be subordinated to the prince.”486 For Apafi, 
his fall from grace would be unjustifiable. He had loyally submitted his yearly tribute to 
the Ottoman court since his election as prince in 1661 with Ottoman support. Although 
he paid the tribute regularly, he was fully aware that becoming a victim of the Ottoman 
state’s sublime interests was an omnipresent possibility. To lower risks, according to a 
note in Kunitz’s report from September 27, Apafi had regularly sent “gift” money to the 
court interpreter Mavrocordato. In return, the interpreter reportedly helped the prince 
survive the whims of the Ottoman court. Neither the tribute nor the gifts protected Apafi 
as Thököly’s reputation spread.  
By July of 1681, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s interest in Thököly was clear. Apafi was 
unhappy with the shift in the grand vizier’s interest toward this novice in Hungarian 
affairs. As a result of his resentment, Apafi abandoned the aforementioned Ottoman 
contingent following the successful operations in September 1681. Thököly, who was 
also present in the army, followed suit with his men, causing an unplanned dispersal of 
Ottoman forces. The incident had occurred without the grand vizier’s knowledge or 
                                                          







permission. Furthermore, the army’s dispersal enabled the Habsburg troops to recapture 
several strategic fortresses that they had lost to the Ottomans the previous month. Kara 
Mustafa Paşa, who was in the final phases of designing his master plan in Hungary, 
condoned these disobedient acts. He replaced the governor in Oradea who had 
commanded the operations.487  
In the meantime, Apafi could not easily leave the stage to Thököly. He continued 
to send the yearly tribute to the Ottoman capital. In November 1681, along with the 
tribute, the Transylvanian prince sent 12,000 ducats to the grand vizier, hoping to cajole 
him into electing his son, Michael II Apafi, as the new prince of Transylvania. To the 
same purpose, Mavrocordato received another 2,000 ducats.488 These moves did not save 
the unfortunate Apafi; the matter had long been decided by the Ottoman court. At the end 
of December of 1681, three agents of Imre Thököly (Ladislaus Szekely, Georgius 
Gazoky, and Stephanus Miko) arrived at the Ottoman capital. They met the grand vizier 
on January 9, 1682. Kunitz wrote to Vienna that Kara Mustafa Paşa promised to the 
agents to declare Imre Thököly the new king of Hungary. In return, the Porte expected 
the yearly tribute and the submission of the entire kingdom within two years.489 Thus, 
Kunitz added, the Ottoman court had completely discarded Apafi.  
Kara Mustafa Paşa had found his alter ego in the young Imre Thököly, whose 
ambitious, uncompromising, and bold personality greatly resembled the Ottoman grand 
vizier. Although Kara Mustafa Paşa’s intentions were not yet disclosed, Thököly’s traits 
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suited his aggressive style. Thököly could serve the grand vizier as a fireball that set the 
stage for the latter’s master plan in Hungary. Similarly, the young prince could rely on 
his formidable patron who sympathized with his strong anti-Habsburg sentiments. 
Whether Thököly could achieve his ultimate objective, a Hungarian Kingdom free from 
the oppressions and whims of the courts in Vienna, Istanbul, or elsewhere, was a concern 
for the future. 
 
Alberto Caprara’s journey to Istanbul as internuncio 
During the fall of 1681, the Ottoman court diverted its attention to a crisis with France, 
while the Austrian ambassador Kunitz expected new instructions from Vienna.490 Instead 
of the directives expected by Kunitz, a new internuncio with special instructions departed 
from Vienna at the beginning of 1682. Alberto (or Albrecht) Caprara was a Bolognese 
who had held a moral philosophy professorship at the University of Bologna. His former 
diplomatic experience included carrying non-diplomatic communications between courts 
and serving as an envoy in Flanders during the peace negotiations in that city as part of 
the Nijmegen treaties. His new mission was even more challenging. Caprara went to 
Istanbul to extend the peace that would expire in 1684. To that end, he was authorized to 
make last minute offers to dissuade the grand vizier from his intentions.491  Emperor 
Leopold gave a farewell audience to Caprara and the delegation on January 14, 1682. Yet 
Caprara delayed his departure until February 3 because “warmly blowing southeastern 
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winds,” portending the difficult mission awaiting him in the same direction, had caused 
snow in the neighboring mountains to melt and flood the Danube.492  
The news from Kunitz was even more discouraging than the flooded Danube. 
Caprara’s trip had already been heard in Istanbul, where the ministers were advising the 
grand vizier to renew peace with Austria.493 Kunitz’s optimism about Kara Mustafa Paşa 
was replaced by total pessimism and disregard for the grand vizier. In an encoded 
passage, Kunitz compared Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Kara Mustafa Paşa. He remarked that 
the former had treated everyone humanely; the latter governed tyrannically without 
reason. The grand vizier ignored his ministers and recently gave orders for shipment of 
more ammunition to Salonica. Moreover, as military preparations were underway, he sent 
orders to the paşa of Buda and wanted newly built Austrian fortresses be demolished. 
Furthermore, he commanded the paşa to force the villages that had stopped paying tax to 
the Ottoman garrison to renew paying their dues.494 In addition, Wallachia, Moldavia, 
and Transylvania received orders to prepare their forces to join an army of 50,000 men. 
Szatmár, Komárom, and Győr were potential targets. Kunitz added that the House of 
Austria’s ever-intensifying plea for peace increased the pride and arrogance of Kara 
Mustafa Paşa.  
For the Hofburg, the news was hardly surprising as they had been predicted.495 At 
the time, the question for the Viennese court was whether Caprara could finally change 
the course of action. The internuncio arrived in Istanbul on April 11. His first public 
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meeting with the grand vizier occurred on May 12. Then Caprara presented his 
credentials, but no negotiations occurred. Before the actual negotiations between the 
Austrian delegation and the Ottoman courtiers, Caprara met the sultan at the palace on 
June 9. He said to the sultan that he was sent to see whether the Ottoman court wanted to 
extend the armistice; it was the only way to give solace and relief to poor subjects and 
prevent their misery and arduousness. Reportedly Mehmed IV responded to the Italian 
“bene, bene”496 and directed the internuncio to his statesmen to begin peace talks.497 
Mehmed IV’s referral of Caprara directly to his courtiers was illustrative of the 
administrative dynamics inside the Ottoman court. Mehmed IV was in the thirty-fourth 
year of his reign, but despite his long rule he was fully detached from the decision-
making mechanism. The grand vizier had fully seized power at the expense of Mehmed 
IV’s nominal rule. In theory, a grand vizier was the mere deputy of his master, but Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s role as the grand vizier had exceeded all practical limits that existed for 
the sultan’s absolute deputy.    
On June 22, the delegation which included both Caprara and Kunitz met with 
Ottoman representatives formed of reisülküttab, Alexander Mavrocordato, the chief of 
janissaries, and another high-ranking officer. The meeting revealed that Caprara’s 
mission was more difficult than Vienna hoped. The Ottomans had new stipulations. They 
argued that Austria had broken the peace by building new fortresses. If Austrians wanted 
to renew the peace, they had to pay war reparations for all the damage inflicted along the 
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border since the Vasvár Treaty.498 Benaglia judged that the Ottomans were inconsistent 
and unreasonable with their demands. He wrote that the Ottomans were seeking excuses 
to start a war rather than seek peace. Their demand for compensation which “would 
remove Austria’s [purported] guilt” was unacceptable. Benaglia added that the Ottomans 
did not intend to renew the peace; they were only wasting the Austrians’ time. The 
ambassador’s report of the meeting echoed Benaglia. Kunitz wrote in an encoded letter 
that the grand vizier, in addition to his former claims regarding tax collection from 
villages near Nové Zámky and demolition of several Austrian fortresses in the area, was 
now stipulating that Vienna pay a large sum for all the damages inflicted on the Ottoman 
borders during the last 20 years.499 
The possibility of renewing peace was slowly vanishing. The Austrian delegation 
celebrated Archduke Joseph’s birthday on July 26, but that was only a transient 
enjoyment. On August 6, 1682, the sultan’s horsetail banners were set up in front of the 
Gate of Felicity (Bâbüssaâde) at Topkapi Palace, marking the announcement of war on 
Austria. Caprara discovered that in all the mosques of the Ottoman capital, people were 
praying for victory; their clamor was becoming louder every next day.500 The operations 
in Hungary had already begun in early July. Imre Thököly and his 40,000 men, 
accompanied by Ottoman regiments, captured strategic fortresses in Upper Hungary, 
including Košice and Fiľakovo. On September 6, 1682, İbrahim Paşa, the governor of 
Buda and the commander of the Ottoman forces, crowned Thököly King of Hungary with 
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attendant regalia.501 At the end of 1682, Kara Mustafa Paşa told Kunitz and Caprara that 
if the Monarchy wanted peace, it had to recognize Thököly as the King of Hungary. This 
was unacceptable for the Viennese court. Having realized that all hope for a renewal of 
peace evaporated, Caprara and Kunitz asked for permission to leave, but the grand vizier 
did not allow their departure. On April 1, 1683, the Ottoman army began its march into 
Central Europe. From that moment, the Austrian ambassadors were technically captives 
of the grand vizier although were not physically confined. They marched with the 
Ottoman army into Hungary. On July 14, 1683, the second Ottoman siege of Vienna 
began. Two-months later, on September 12, 1683, a European coalition army inflicted a 
humiliating defeat on the grand vizier’s forces. A new episode had begun not only in 
Habsburg and Ottoman history, but also for entire Europe and the Islamic world.  
                                                          










1683: an imperial break in Vienna and Istanbul 
The Ottoman debacle at Vienna in 1683 was homemade. The siege certainly was a 
product of conjunctural factors and strategic goals, as well as personal ambitions of Kara 
Mustafa Paşa which John Stoye, Thomas Barker, Walter Leitsch, and Zygmunt 
Abrahamovicz have examined.502 Their works, however, were based largely on European 
sources and their narratives were severely handicapped by orientalist caricaturization of 
the Ottoman grand vizier. Because of their monodimensional approach, they failed to 
contextualize the Hofburg’s Ottoman policy and Kara Mustafa Paşa administration within 
the broader comparative framework of governmental understandings in Vienna and 
Istanbul. Beyond stately concerns, Austria’s incessant push for a peace renewal and Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s obstinate negligence toward those requests were emblematic of two 
distinct decision-making mechanisms; the confrontation in Vienna in 1683 was a 
competition between two statecrafts and administrative mindsets. The governmental  
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divergence between the two early modern capitals was formed within peculiar historical 
frameworks and geopolitical conditions. 
At the same time, 1683 became the onset of bureaucratic and institutional changes 
in Vienna and Istanbul. Modern historiography is almost always tend to interpret the 
result of a major war in history between two parties as emblematic of improvement and 
success for the winning party or decline and collapse for the losing side. This falsification 
is essentially rooted in a basic premise of the modern age that a person or an entity 
prospers with wins and gains and fails with defeats and losses. In historical context, this 
is a deceptive dichotomy conducive to reductionist assessments especially about the 
defeated party at a war. 1683 was a decisive victory for the Habsburgs and a humiliating 
defeat for the Ottomans, yet it paved the way for parallel developments in Vienna and 
Istanbul with similar motives and purposes, albeit different in nature. 
 
Habsburg statecraft 
Although the House of Habsburg fought and won many decisive wars until the modern 
era (such as Marchfeld in 1278, White Mountain in 1620, and Vienna in 1683), the 
family relied on negotiation, compromise, and consensus throughout much of its history. 
This was not an intentional decision; rather it was a natural outcome of the Monarchy’s 
medieval and early modern geopolitical idiosyncrasy shaped by historical contingencies. 
The monarchical center at Vienna was neither strong enough to threaten the balance in its 
surroundings nor too weak to encourage potential violators. Thus, the European 
international community for centuries preserved the Habsburg counterpoise between 
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western and eastern Europe. With similar motives, the German princes elected the 
Habsburgs to the German crown; hence the Czech historian František Palacký’s 
statement that if the Monarchy did not exist, it would have to be created. 
The Habsburgs could effectively maintain such a precarious balance only through 
rigorous consultative processes and vigilant diplomatic hyperactivity. This was an 
especially pressing need against the Ottoman Empire. The diplomats in Istanbul were 
essentially tentacles of an advisory committee that subjected each report arriving at the 
capital to careful cross-examination. During the critical episode of peace talks in Istanbul 
with Kara Mustafa Paşa’s government, the Privy Council and its Deputized Council 
(Deputierte Räte) of key ministers directed the system.503  
Diplomatic processes were carefully supervised by these bodies, which often 
meant persistency in objectives. Yet the presence of such deliberative bodies did not 
necessarily guarantee efficiency of the Austrian statecraft. There were many decision-
makers but no lines of responsibility. The Privy Council and the Privy Conference were 
designed to complement each other, but they were not partners; they competed with each 
other for prestige inside the Hofburg.504 There were often difficulties in modifying 
previously made decisions. During the five and a half years preceding the declaration of 
war by the Ottoman court in August of 1682, the Hofburg continuously urged the 
ambassadors and special envoys commissioned in Istanbul to renew peace. War with 
France and the recalcitrance of anti-Habsburg Hungarians during much of the 1670s was 
                                                          
503 Between 1678 and 1683, Johann Adolf von Schwarzenberg, Johann Paul von Hocher, and Leopold 
Wilhelm von Königsegg were the three active members of the Deputized Council. Sienell, Die Geheime 
Konferenz unter Kaiser Leopold I., 42. 
504 Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700, 147. 
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an important hindrance to defying the Porte militarily. However, even after the treaty of 
Nijmegen (1678) and despite the increasingly pessimistic reports coming from Istanbul, 
the Viennese court did not modify its eastern policy and asked for peace along the eastern 
border. Such obstinacy to maintain the peace with the Ottomans was partially due to the 
vanity contest between the chanceries. In addition, there was a rivalry between the 
factions of “westerners” and “easterners” who disagreed about the Monarchy’s 
geopolitical priorities.505 Courtiers had different priorities for various reasons, making 
unanimity in foreign policy very difficult.  
The existence of different geopolitical perspectives in the Viennese court, to 
emphasize once again, was a natural result of the Habsburgs’ compulsory adherence to 
the international status quo and intra-monarchical dynamics. The Monarchy’s 
geopolitical peculiarity frequently necessitated toleration of the Ottoman court’s 
pretensions. Not everyone inside the court was happy about tolerating the Muslim 
neighbors, but the stakes were high for Vienna. Situated only 60 miles away from the 
Ottoman border, the imperial capital had very little lead time between the emergence of a 
potential threat in the east and its realization. Nor did Vienna have ample resources or 
decision-making flexibility possessed by the Ottoman capital. The Monarchy could 
mobilize only through a series of cumbersome negotiation processes and consultation 
with German princes. Factions inside the court often quarreled about how to overcome 
these challenges. As a result, decision-making bodies in general adopted an institutional 
                                                          
505 For a brief summary of “westerners” and “easterners,” see Thomas Mack Barker, Double Eagle and 
Crescent; Vienna’s Second Turkish Siege and Its Historical Setting, 133–136. 
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apprehensiveness, avoided new adventures, and strived to protect the status quo. In the 
meantime, the Ottoman grand vizier fanned the flame in Hungary. 
The uneasiness in the Hofburg’s decision-making patterns and statecraft had 
significantly influenced ambassadors. As the level of anxiety escalated in the Ottoman 
capital between 1676 and 1682, the ambassadors began to oscillate between optimism 
and pessimism. This was especially evident in Kunitz’s self-contradictory reports. To a 
certain extent, optimism was a requirement for the Austrian agents, because the Hofburg 
constantly instructed them to find a way to extend the armistice with the Porte. Their 
pessimism, on the other hand, was a reflection of their frustration due to the 
unpredictability of the grand vizier and the Ottoman court. Unable to strike a balance 
between the two ends, the ambassadorial reports wavered between idealistic optimism 
and realistic pessimism.    
The early modern Viennese court’s dependence on the existing political 
conjuncture—as long as it did not threaten the empire’s integrity—was also evident in 
Vienna’s exceedingly legalistic diplomatic posture. This was partially a consequence of 
the post-1648 European order where the preliminary indications of neutralization in 
confessional animosities were underway. Although religious conflict was far from over, a 
more legalistic and procedural understanding of international relations were gaining 
momentum.506 Among all the polities involved in the Thirty Years’ War, the Habsburgs  
                                                          
506 Volker Press, “Österreichische Großmachtbildung und Reichsverfassung: zur kaiserlichen Stellung nach 
1648,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 98 (1990): 131–54. It is worth 
emphasizing here that some scholars have questioned whether Westphalia was such a watershed in 
international relations. Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian 
Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87.  Also see chapter two above. 
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were most affected by these new perceptions. The diplomatic documents sent to and from 
Istanbul between 1676 and 1682 were illustrative of such a change. The reports of the 
agents in Istanbul and the instructions Vienna penned during these years frequently 
referred to the former peace treaties signed between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. 
These retrospective references extended as far back as Zsitvatorok (1606), although many 
treaties had been signed between the two states. The Hofburg clearly expected from Kara 
Mustafa Paşa’s court the same literal adherence to the previous accords. Upon the grand 
vizier’s compensation demands, Kunitz and Caprara carefully examined the claims 
within the framework of relevant articles in former treaties. They deemed that Austria 
had not infringed on any articles previously agreed upon between the two sides.507 What 
the Viennese court failed to appreciate was that the Ottoman central administration was 
guided by a diametrically different mindset that did not address Austria’s concerns.  
 
Ottoman statecraft 
The Ottoman central government possessed theoretical supremacy over all executive sub-
branches across the empire. The dîvan (imperial council) was technically a consultative 
chancery, but the sultan or a grand vizier could easily override other members. There 
were neither other consultative chanceries nor a pressing need for them in the absence of 
immediate security threats from outside of the empire. Sultans often enjoyed only de jure 
theoretical supremacy in the system. Except for a few of them, who were absolute 
arbiters in state affairs, executive authority was often in the hands of a grand vizier. 
                                                          
507 Georg Christoph von Kunitz and Alberto Caprara, “2te Conferenz,” July 7, 1682, HHStA: 
Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 152. 
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Recent research has convincingly shown that the system’s reliance on a grand vizier 
and/or a larger group of courtiers became especially evident after 1600. This gradual shift 
from sultanic rule to a bureaucracy-based government was a natural result of the 
expansion of the “political nation,” that is, “the body of people who could influence or 
play a legitimate role in the government.”508 In other words, post-1600 Ottoman sultans 
seldom possessed powers the Weberian trope of sultanic rule assumed existed in the pre-
modern Islamic states, just as early modern European rulers rarely enjoyed executive 
powers attributed to them by the “myth of absolutism.”509  
Once a grand vizier assumed office, he always relied on a larger political hâne 
(household) and appointed loyal members of his hânehalkı (household) to key positions 
inside and outside the court to safeguard themselves against rival political factions.510 
One may assume that unlike the sultans, whose primary concern was the royal household, 
grand viziers often prioritized the longevity of the empire. To that end, they strived to 
“improve imperial finances, strengthen the military, and end religious and military threats 
to the empire’s authority.”511  
Compared to the Hofburg, the power’s accumulation in the hands of a single 
individual meant that the early modern Ottoman court could make swift decisions and 
take immediate action. Nevertheless, a new problem emerged as the scope of grand 
vizieral authority multiplied at the expense of sultans’ control over executive processes: 
The administrative power was becoming more susceptible to individual ambitions. An 
                                                          
508 Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 11. According to Tezcan, the evolution had begun with the 
strangling of Osman II by the janissaries in 1622. 
509 Wilson, Absolutism in Central Europe, 2. 
510 Kara Mustafa Paşa’s household has not been researched to this day. For an analysis of  
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able and prudent grand vizier could efficiently use courtly power to rehabilitate the 
empire; whereas an opinionated or overly ambitious one could easily pull the state into a 
precarious position. This is where the difference between the first two Köprülü grand 
viziers and Kara Mustafa Paşa was evident. 
 Under Kara Mustafa Paşa’s predecessors (1656-1676), the possessor of the 
sultan’s seal had become a major catalyst inside the Ottoman court. In 1656, Köprülü 
Mehmed Paşa received the sultan’s seal following a tumultuous period of political 
instability in the capital and across the empire. The septuagenarian grand vizier reasserted 
control of the court in the empire, but he was challenged in his authority. Nonetheless, he 
successfully established an aggressive and uncompromising governing pattern. When 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa died, his elder son, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, assumed his father’s post 
in 1661 mainly by virtue of his father’s achievements. Building upon the legacy of his 
father and fully benefiting from critical decision-making moments during his career, Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa expanded the scope of authority and independence retained by the 
incumbent grand vizier in all aspects of state affairs. The executive authority that Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa diligently accumulated would furnish Kara Mustafa Paşa (Köprülü Mehmed 
Paşa’s adopted son) with an unforeseen supremacy over the decision-making processes 
from the first day he ascended to the grand vizierate.  
The result was Kara Mustafa Paşa’s becoming a sâhib’ül-seyf  (master of sword). 
Contemporary Ottoman chroniclers (especially those who had witnessed the tumultuous 
decades before the 1650s) used this appellation when describing the ideal statesman who 
                                                                                                                                                                             
511 Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 79. 
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is expected to provide effective leadership and restore authority in the empire. In their 
eyes, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was a sâhib’ül-seyf. In reality, the second Köprülü deserved 
the title more than his father. Kara Mustafa Paşa, the third representative of the Köprülü 
regime, also possessed similar traits. He was another sâhib’ül-seyf par excellence, mainly 
as a result of the Köprülü legacy he inherited. It is true that the power Kara Mustafa Paşa 
possessed was severely handicapped by his unrestrained ambitions; historians who have 
researched the motivations of Kara Mustafa Paşa in undertaking the siege of Vienna have 
justifiably stressed the grand vizier’s character. Yet no scholar to date has contextualized 
this significant strategic move within the broader framework of Köprülü regime and 
decision-making patterns Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited from his predecessors. The latter’s 
personal ambitions and decision-making patterns that resulted in the declaration of war in 
1682 and the siege of Vienna the next year were essentially corollaries of the 
unprecedented executive power the first two Köprülüs accumulated and turned over to 
Kara Mustafa Paşa. No other grand vizier in the history of the empire were as powerful as 
Kara Mustafa Paşa from the first day of his term. 
Kara Mustafa Paşa made the decision to campaign against Austria single-
handedly as the most powerful man and the absolute arbiter of state affairs. Some lesser 
known details that showed Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unchallenged position are worthy of 
mention. The siege decision was made in defiance of the Sultan’s decree, which 
commanded an attack on two strategic border fortresses; it went against the opposition of 
the majority of commanders who warned Kara Mustafa about a probable crusade-like 
reaction across Europe. Chronicler Silahdar, who personally joined the Vienna campaign 
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in the summer of 1683, was especially critical of the grand vizier’s ambitions. Silahdar 
criticized Kara Mustafa Paşa for being provocative, aggressive, prideful, avaricious, and 
arrogant.512 He wrote that Kara Mustafa Paşa subtly prepared the ground to declare a war 
on Austria. Complaint letters coming from the Austrian border were prearranged by him, 
through the help of his loyal men whom he had appointed to border fortresses and 
instructed to send to Istanbul false reports of incursions by the Austrians.513 The 
information was confirmed by the ambassador Kunitz’s report, dated January 4, 1681, 
which had notified Vienna that the grand vizier was asking the governor of Buda to take 
to justify a campaign against Austria. 
With the lack of astute counselors, it appears that Kara Mustafa Paşa was 
surrounded with obsequious aide-de-camps who inflamed his ambitions. Many of them 
were reportedly slaves of Central European origin who had converted to Islam. Most 
probably, the grand vizier recruited them to his household hoping to benefit from their 
knowledge about the laws and customs of new territories he planned to conquer.514 
Among them was a certain clerk named Mustafa, plausibly a French convert. Silahdar 
noted that this clerk fueled the passionate grand vizier during the march to Vienna before 
the siege decision. Allegedly, he told the grand vizier that it would be pointless to march 
on Győr, the original target of the campaign and a fortress already surrounded by 
Ottoman garrisons. Mustafa said to his master that if he directly advanced on the Austrian 
                                                          
512 Silahdar Tarihi, 1928, 2:18–19. 
513 Silahdar Tarihi, 1928, 1:757. 
514 Suraiya Faroqhi, “A prisoner of war reports: The camp and household of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa 
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capital and captured the city, his power would be equal to that of the Persian King 
Khosrow I (531-579), whose richness was possessed only by a handful of rulers 
throughout history. A noteworthy detail in the clerk’s speech is that he also assumed that 
once Vienna, the imperial capital, surrendered to the grand vizier’s army, the German 
princes would come under his rule. Thus, Kara Mustafa Paşa would expand his 
sovereignty to the western spheres of Holy Roman Empire and would provide another 
income source to Istanbul’s treasury equal to that of Egypt.515 The authenticity of the 
narrative is questionable. One could only be elected to the German crown. Besides, such 
narratives in Ottoman chronicles are usually a reflection of the chronicler’s personal 
political agenda. Silahdar may have fabricated the story to criticize the grand vizier 
posthumously. One may also suspect the extent of a clerk’s influence on the grand vizier. 
Notwithstanding such suspicions, the purported over-ambitious image of Kara Mustafa 
Paşa coincides with many similar narratives recorded in contemporary chronicles about 
his ambitions.516 
Although Kara Mustafa Paşa had inherited a practically unlimited decision-
making power, the incessant plea of the Austrian diplomats to extend the peace accord 
with the Porte must have been an important catalyst in Kara Mustafa Paşa’s ambitious 
decision. One lacks evidence to definitively determine when Kara Mustafa Paşa may 
have first conceived to besiege the Habsburg capital. Rumors were reported to Vienna as 
early as the late 1677, only a year after the grand vizier’s assumption of office. During 
                                                          
515 Silahdar Tarihi, 1928, 2:18–19. 
516 For instance, see Silahdar Tarihi, 1928, 1:735; 739. Despite the grand vizier’s absolute control over the 
bureaucracy, it ıs worth stressing that there were others who were not impressed by the grand vizier’s 
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the following years, however, Austria portrayed itself as vulnerable and desperate by 
condoning the grand vizier’s welcoming attitude to the Hungarian malcontents and his 
other open aggressions in Hungary. The Austrian ambassadors (as a feature of the 
Monarchy’s aforesaid reliance on the status quo) repeatedly referred to an assumed 
friendship between the two courts since Zsitvatorok. That attitude must have indirectly 
suggested to the grand vizier that Austria was ignoring the Ottoman court’s recent 
encroachments due to its desperate condition.  
Also, one may argue that the last phases of the negotiations must have reinforced 
any supposition in the grand vizier’s mind that the time was ripe to conquer the imperial 
capital. According to a note recorded by chronicler İsazade, Caprara’s last offer included 
payment of an annual sum to the Ottoman court as did Austria during the times of 
Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520-1566). The Austrian communication did not include any 
information about whether Caprara was authorized to make such an offer. İsazade, 
however, added that upon that offer Kara Mustafa Paşa ordered the chief of scribes, 
Telhisizade Mustafa Efendi, to hide the offer. Instead, as per the grand vizier’s orders, the 
chief of scribes reported to the sultan that Austria wanted to extend the peace in case the 
Porte wanted the same; if the Porte desired a war, then Austria was ready to take up 
arms.517 Scholars of Ottoman and Habsburg history know the end of the story: the cost of 
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s ambitions was his life. On December 25, 1683, he was strangled in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
obsessions. Among them were Uzun Ibrahim Paşa, the Crimean Khan, and Imre Thököly who disagreed 
with Kara Mustafa Paşa when he finally disclosed at a War Council his intention to march on Vienna. 




   
 
Belgrade on the orders Sultan Mehmed IV. The chief of scribes also faced the same fate 
when his role in the grand vizier’s plot was revealed. 
 
1683: onset of imperial reforms in Vienna and Istanbul 
How important a turning point was the year 1683 in the transformation of Habsburg and 
Ottoman administrative patterns and structures? As two early modern states, the 
Habsburgs and Ottomans did not greatly differ from each other in terms of institutional 
problems and governmental challenges they faced by the end of the seventeenth century. 
The year 1683, despite being a victory for the Habsburg Monarchy and a heavy defeat for 
the Ottomans, marked the onset of institutional reforms in Vienna and Istanbul. By the 
end of the eighteenth century,    
The glorious Habsburg victory in Vienna and the recovery of Hungary from the 
Ottomans by 1699 was not the product of ongoing reformatory processes; in fact, they set 
the stage for the reforms of the next century. By the end of the seventeenth century, the 
political and economic privileges of estates were still handicapping the Monarchy. At 
times of severe existential threats such as in 1683, the Habsburgs relied on support from 
estates and foreign allies as long as they, too, were threatened by the same conditions. 
Without full control of resources in the Monarchy and Erblande, the Habsburgs were not 
able to develop independent foreign policy. Bureaucratically, Leopold’s court was a 
clumsy decision-making body. Many of his courtiers owed their positions to old courtly 
customs such as personal favors or courtly intrigues. By the end of Leopold’s reign, his 
ministers were becoming less and less efficient. Leopold’s son, Joseph I (1705-1711), 
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strived to overcome the problems of his father’s court through administrative and 
financial reforms. He diminished the size of Privy Council and abolished the Privy 
Conference. Yet his initiatives were incomplete, nor did his younger brother, Charles VI 
(1711-1740), managed to complete these reforms.518 
  Five decades after Carlowitz, Empress Maria Theresia (1740-1780) finally 
implemented reforms that truly transformed the early modern Habsburg state.519 Under 
Maria Theresia and his son Joseph II (co-rule: 1765-1780; single-rule: 1780-1790) 
Austria became a new state, primarily as a response to the threat posed by Prussia. The 
most important goal of the Theresian reforms were to eliminate the incompatibilities 
between the Austrian chancelleries (Bohemian, Austrian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian), 
which were directed by nobles who primarily observed their own interests. Unlike her 
grand-father Leopold who followed traditional customs of loyalty when selecting his 
courtiers, Maria Theresia adopted a more meritocratic approach in choosing the 
statesmen who served her and staffed the newly created bureaucratic offices accordingly. 
The masterminds of the Theresian reforms were Haugwitz and Kaunitz, who significantly 
increased Vienna’s control in financial and administrative arenas at the expense of the 
privileges of provincial nobility. 
The Ottoman Empire also experienced a similar developments after Carlowitz, 
but one can appreciate what happened in the post-1683 Ottoman Empire only if one 
condones his eyes to what happened on the battlefield and focuses on the developments 
                                                          
518 See chapter one and conclusion in Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis. 
519 A recent analysis of state-making in the Habsburg Monarchy between 1740 and the First World War is 
John Deak, Forging a Multinational State: State Making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the 
First World War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015). 
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in the court, bureaucracy, and diplomacy. Analyzing institutional changes and reforms in 
the courtly and bureaucratic structure of the Ottoman state is not easy. Early modern 
Ottoman reforms were often like a silent film; they were improvisations depending on the 
circumstances without detailed plans or projections. They did not leave behind any traces 
or marks except historical facts. The only way of overcoming the problem is to employ as 
many sources as possible to outline the characteristics of an era and make inferences from 
a variety of perspectives.  
Kara Mustafa Paşa was the last Ottoman man of sword standing whose fall 
ignited another silent reform process in the empire. The grand vizier was a bold, 
ambitious, and passionate man who aspired to maintain the Ottoman Empire’s venerable 
custom of conquest; he was neither an historical anomaly nor a deranged fanatic. He was 
a man of sword representing the empire’s single-man oriented governance tradition 
rooted in the classical era. Also, he belonged to an age where monarchs and statesmen 
across Europe firmly believed that both their personal reputation and the longevity and 
prosperity of the states they ruled hinged on successful wars. These understandings 
gradually disappeared in the post-1683 period as a more inclusive and rational 
bureaucratic system replaced the single-man oriented structure. 
As emphasized earlier, the expansion of the political nation in the empire had 
begun with the strangulation of Osman II by the janissaries. The Köprülü regime restored 
authority, but the Köprülü viziers’ achievement in essence was to accumulate power 
again in the hands of self-assured individuals. In other words, the Köprülü regime was a 
reconstruction; it was not a transformation. However, there were indications of a real 
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shift in the Ottoman administrative edifice after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s death, from an 
individual-oriented system to a new one characterized by a more inclusive bureaucratic 
setting. This change occurred as an increasing number of individuals from kalemiyye 
(men of letters) began to take key positions in the decision-making bodies with the turn 
of the eighteenth century.520 Two decades after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s execution, Rami 
Mehmed Efendi, a former chief of scribes and the leading Ottoman negotiator at 
Carlowitz in 1699, became the grand vizier. By the mid-1700s, Koca Ragip Pasa, a 
rational statesmen who held the Ottoman Empire out of the Seven Years War, occupied 
the grand vizier post. Such developments were signs of transition from military state to 
bureaucratic state.521 
Another significance of the post-1683 era was the transformation of Ottoman 
diplomacy from a unilateral understanding to a bilateral one with increasing reliance on 
negotiation. Only several years after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s uncompromising diplomatic 
manner resulted in the debacle in Vienna, the Ottomans accepted English and Dutch 
mediation to sign a settlement with the Holy League.522 In the eighteenth century, the 
Ottomans more frequently followed a peace-oriented strategy and prioritized alliances 
                                                          
520 About the increasing influence of kalemiyye in Ottoman bureaucracy at the turn of the eighteenth 
century, see Ekin Emine Tusalp Atiyas, “Political Literacy and the Politics of Eloquence: Ottoman Scribal 
Community in the Seventeenth Century” (Ph.D., Harvard University, 2014). 
521 Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783 (Brill, 
1995), 15. 
522 Colin Heywood, “Heywood, Colin. ‘English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey, 1689-1698,’ in William 
Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), (,” in Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations, ed. William Hale and Ali 
İhsan Bağış (North Humberside: The Eothan Press, 1984), 26–39; Colin Heywood, “An Undiplomatic 
Anglo-Dutch Dispute at the Porte: The Quarrel Between Coenrad van Heemskerck and Lord Paget (1693),” 
in Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant Form the Seventeenth 
Century to the Early Nineteenth Century, ed. Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. De Groot, and Mauritz H. 
Van Den Boogert (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2000), 59–94. 
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and mediation rather than aggressions.523 Diplomatic initiatives gradually replaced wars 
in convincing enemies, resulting in the establishment of first Ottoman permanent 
embassies in Europe by the end of the eighteenth century.524   
This brings us to a final matter: Was the Vienna campaign religiously motivated? 
Religious ideologies were definitely still strong in early modern world, but I think that an 
inquiry into religion’s role in undertaking of the Vienna campaign cannot simply be a 
matter of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s personal religiosity. Whether the grand vizier was 
religiously motivated in 1683 is only a small portion of a much larger and complex 
problematic about the role of religion in shaping entire periods and eras in Ottoman 
history. Many Ottomanists have recently hypothesized an Islamic pietistic revivalism in 
the early modern Ottoman Empire and have argued that the early modern Ottoman 
processes of state and social formation partook in the Mediterranean age of 
confessionalization. As evidence, these scholars have indicated the increasing number of 
conversions to Islam or the proliferation of Islamic catechisms in the seventeenth century. 
Within such a framework, one scholar called the Vienna campaign “the failed final 
jihad.” Such arguments present two major problems. 
First, these arguments assume that religion in early modern world was essentially 
distinct from politics and economics and that it had an inclination to promote violence. 
One cannot deny that religious ideologies have propelled political, social, and economic 
processes under certain conditions. However, I agree with William Cavanaugh that the 
contention that pre-modern states were driven by supposedly transhistorical and 
                                                          
523 Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace, 117. 
268 
 
   
 
transcultural religious motives is primarily a product of present-day secular ideology. 
Cavanaugh argues that modern secularism positions itself such that secular, state-driven 
violence is considered a product of rational decision-making, and, hence, necessary. On 
the other hand, the assumed religious motivations of pre-modern states render their 
violence (or warfare) irrational and absolutist. Such a divide then serves—in the abstract 
level—the legitimation of modern state’s actions. The question of how one differentiates 
political or economic objectives from religious ones is ignored in the process. The 
Ottomanist “renewal of faith” literature did not present any awareness of these conceptual 
discussions.525          
The second problem relates to historiography and debates within Ottomanists 
scholarship. The comparative use of the confessionalization paradigm in the Ottoman 
historical context is welcome, but certain qualifications are in order. First, 
confessionalization is a well-documented theme in early modern Europe. Propaganda, 
censorship, coercion, and many other instruments were common across Europe during 
the age of confessionalization; together they reached to the effect of a widespread social 
phenomenon. In the Ottoman context, however, several narratives of conversion and 
catechisms, notwithstanding their significance, simply do not amount to a confessional 
age. Historians need many more and diverse evidence from across the empire to articulate 
an Ottoman confessionalization. Second, once such evidence is demonstrated, contextual 
links have to be detected between decision-making processes and purported confessional 
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1603-1839, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 81–117. 
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ideas. In confessional Europe, hundreds of scholars affiliated with different 
denominations were actively involved in confessional policies of monarchs. There is a 
solid interconnectedness between actual policy-making processes and religious-political 
literature. Nevertheless, the Ottoman “renewal of faith” paradigm is built upon weak 
connections between the contemporary literature and politics; it focuses mainly on the 
topics of legitimation and ethics.526 Third, in mainstream European historiography, the 
age of confessionalization along with absolutism and Enlightenment are believed to have 
set the stage for the emergence of the modern state. Accordingly, early modern states and 
churches have cooperated in strict observation of social and economic behaviors such as 
obedience to public rules or payment of taxes. According to the European master 
narrative, these obligations have gained a fully secular character over decades and 
sidelined divine duties, resulting in the emergence of centralized modern states. Thus, the 
confessionalization paradigm is one of the building-blocks of the progressive European 
narrative. In the Ottoman historical context, however, the concept has so far conveyed a 
pejorative tone. Negating its explicative origins, it is used to present the Ottoman Empire 
almost as a malevolent fanatical project. Finally, fourth, the use of religion-based 
paradigms to explain critical decision-making moments such as the Vienna campaign and 
the nature of Ottoman statecraft represents a regression from the criticisms of earlier 
studies which had indicated that Islam in the Ottoman Empire was subordinated to the 
state’s interests. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
525 The backdrop for this paragraph is William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular 
Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). See 
introduction and chapter 3, entitled “the creation myth of wars of religion.” 
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A full comprehension of early modern state’s nature can be achieved in two 
intertwined steps: The first step requires a thorough analysis of tangible processes such as 
strategic objectives of states or the personal goals of statesmen; and second, by 
contextualization of those processes within the broader historical and geopolitical 
framework that produced them. Any ideological motive that fed into these processes will 
be understood only after these first two steps are taken properly. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
526 The same problem was detected in an examination of political literature in Darling, “Political Change 
and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World,” 506. 
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